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This thesis investigates open market repurchase announcements by Toronto Stock Exchange 
(TSX) listed firms.     First, I develop a comprehensive database of normal course issuer bids (NCIB) and 
report descriptive data on repurchasing activity between 1994 and 2005.    I find that repurchase programs 
peak in 2000 and then decline.   I also find evidence that repurchase programs are concentrated in certain 
industries.   Next, using Compustat data, I investigate the characteristics of firms announcing repurchase 
programs.   I find evidence that firms who announce repurchase programs are large in size and have high 
operating cash flows, low leverage, low share turnover and low dividend yields.     I extend the 
repurchases literature by demonstrating that firms with low trading volume are more likely to initiate 
repurchase programs, consistent with an attempt to improve sell side liquidity.     Finally, I investigate the 
market reaction to NCIB announcements.    The results indicate that TSX firms experienced a significant 
market reaction to repurchase announcements between 1994 and 2005 as measured by both return and 
volume tests.   I extend the repurchases literature by showing that announcement returns are higher for 
firms who followed through on their previous repurchase announcements.     Little evidence exists of 
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Introduction and Outline of Dissertation 
1.1 Introduction 
Prior studies consistently document positive abnormal returns in the days surrounding stock repurchase 
announcements.      These abnormal returns are consistent with open market stock repurchase programs 
conveying favourable information to investors.    Most prior studies focus on US markets.     This thesis 
examines the market reaction to open market repurchase programs in the Canadian markets by examining 
TSX firms during the years 1994 to 2005.     I find that TSX firms experience a significant market 
reaction to repurchase announcements as measured by both volume and returns tests.   In addition to 
examining the overall market reaction, I investigate whether investors use two disclosures that are 
required in Canada but not the United States: the requirement to promptly report repurchases and the 
requirement to disclose the reason(s) for the repurchase program.       
 I find that while TSX repurchase announcements increased during the period 1994 to 2000, 
repurchase announcements have declined in recent years.     I find that TSX firms frequently only 
purchase a small percentage of the maximum shares that are indicated in repurchase announcements and 
many firms repurchase no shares at all.       This raises the possibility that some of the announcements 
may not be credible.     I investigate whether investors use past repurchases in assessing current 
repurchase announcements.   I find evidence that announcement returns are higher for firms who 
repurchased a higher percentage of shares under their previous repurchase program.      This evidence 
suggests that investors consider past actions in assessing current announcements, consistent with investors 
using past information to assess a current corporate announcement.    I find little evidence that investors 
react to the reasons cited for repurchase programs.     Taken together, these findings provide support for 
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the TSX requirement to disclose repurchases, but provide no support for the requirement to state the 
reason(s) for the repurchase program. 
         My analysis controls for the market’s prior expectation of a repurchase announcement.    
First, the likelihood of firms announcing a repurchase program is modelled using a probit model.    Then 
the market reaction is modelled in light of the market’s prior expectation that a repurchase announcement 
will occur.    This approach is necessary to avoid the potentially correlated omitted variable that 
corresponds to investors’ prior expectations of an announcement occurring.     As part of this analysis, I 
investigate several factors not previously investigated in the literature that may impact investors’ 
expectations of a firm announcing a repurchase program.   Specifically, I consider past repurchasing 
history and liquidity as potential variables that may be useful in predicting repurchase announcements.      
I find evidence consistent with low volume firms being more likely to announce a repurchase program.   I 
also find that repurchasing firms are concentrated in certain industries, are large in size and have low 
leverage.   
In addition to my investigation of additional factors that may impact the likelihood of repurchase 
announcements and the market reaction to them, I also utilize several methodological improvements.    
First, I utilize clustered standard errors as recommended by Petersen (2008).  Clustered standard errors 
ensure that the calculation of standard errors considers that there may be multiple observations for some 
sample firms.    Second, I consider competing information events and present results for the subsample of 
announcements that are not potentially confounded by competing information events such as earnings and 
dividend announcements.    To my knowledge, no prior study on repurchases has utilized clustered 
standard errors or excluded announcements with competing information events.     These methodological 
improvements serve to increase confidence in the results of this thesis. 
My work is concurrent with the work of Schmidt (2007).    Schmidt (2007) investigates whether 
the market reaction to TSX repurchase announcements is conditional on fulfilling past repurchase 
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announcements.   This topic is similar to my investigation of hypothesis three in section 8.4.   The results 
of this thesis as they relate to hypothesis three are similar to the results of Schmidt (2007).  Both studies 
find that announcement returns are positively related to the extent to which the most recent repurchase 
program was completed. 
1.2 Outline of Dissertation 
This dissertation proceeds as follows.   Chapter 2 discusses existing literature on payout policy and share 
repurchases.   Chapter 3 outlines and discusses TSX repurchase disclosure requirements.    Chapter 4 
describes TSX repurchase activity from 1994 to 2005 and presents descriptive statistics of repurchasing 
and non-repurchasing firms.     Chapter 5 reviews literature on the characteristics of firms that are likely to 
announce an open market repurchase program and presents predictions on announcement likelihood.    
Chapter 6 discusses the research design to be used to evaluate the likelihood of a firm announcing an open 
market repurchase program.    Chapter 7 presents the announcement likelihood results.    Chapter 8 
reviews the literature on the reaction to repurchase announcements and presents predictions on the market 
reaction to TSX open market repurchase announcements.      Chapter 9 discusses the research design to be 
used in the event study and the market reaction models developed in chapter 8.    Chapter 10 presents the 
results of the event study and the market reaction models.    Chapter 11 provides conclusions.     
References, tables, figures and appendices follow chapter 11.    In all cases, expected relationships are 
stated as predictions where the matter has previously been investigated in the literature and as hypotheses 
for new areas investigated as part of this thesis.   An overall model of the market reaction to open market 




Payout Policy: Theoretical Frameworks for Payout Policy Decisions 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews literature related to payout policy decisions.   The purpose of this chapter is to 
discuss theories that explain payout policy in general and, where applicable, the choice between dividends 
and repurchases.   Section 2.2 reviews the Miller and Modigliani (1961) Dividend Irrelevancy Theory.       
Section 2.3 reviews signalling and cheap talk models as they relate to payout policy announcements.    
Section 2.4 reviews Jensen’s (1986) Free Cash Flow Theory and its implications for payout 
announcements.    Section 2.5 discusses undervaluation, shareholder wealth expropriation and managerial 
opportunism.    Section 2.6 discusses Bagwell’s (1991) proposition that share repurchases may be used as 
a takeover deterrent.    Section 2.7 discusses leverage, taxes and financial flexibility.   Section 2.8 
discusses managerial incentives to repurchase shares caused by stock options. 
2.2 Miller and Modigliani Dividend Irrelevancy Theory 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) show that, assuming frictionless capital markets, a firm’s payout policies 
should have no effect on its value.     The intuition behind the Miller and Modigliani (1961) theory is that 
in a frictionless market, investors can obtain the same return as the firm on capital not needed for positive 
net present value investments.   Hence, investors are indifferent to the firm retaining or distributing this 
excess capital since they will earn the same amount.    If a firm does not pay dividends, a shareholder can 
simply sell a portion of the firm instead.     Since capital markets are assumed to be frictionless, the firm is 
assumed to be liquid and there are no transaction costs.     Miller and Modigliani (1961) do note the 
potential impact of frictions such as tax and transaction costs, but do not explicitly consider tax and 
transaction costs in their analysis since they vary from case to case.    While not specifically addressing 
repurchases, the Miller and Modigliani theory implies that repurchases using excess capital should also be 
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irrelevant to firm value, since repurchases can be viewed as simply another way of returning capital to 
shareholders. 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) re-examine payout irrelevance.   Their analysis points out a 
major flaw in the Miller and Modigliani (1961) Dividend Irrelevance Theory.   DeAngelo and DeAngelo 
(2006) show that Miller and Modigliani (1961)’s dividend irrelevancy proof requires that firms payout 
one hundred percent of their available cash flow.     They demonstrate that once this requirement is 
relaxed, and the firm is able to retain free cash flow, payout policy does matter. 
2.3 Signalling, Cheap Talk and Reputation 
Bhattacharya (1979) incorporates information asymmetry and signalling into the analysis of payout 
policy.    Bhattacharya (1979) extends Spence’s (1973) seminal work on signalling to payout policy.   
Spence (1973) demonstrates that for a signal to be credible, the cost of the signal must be decreasing in 
firm quality.    Therefore, only high quality firms will send the signal to the market since it will be less 
costly for them than low quality firms.      The signal then allows the market to differentiate between low 
and high quality firms.   Bhattacharya (1979) proposes that payout policy may be used as a method of 
signalling management’s private information about firm value.    A positive market reaction to a payout 
announcement will occur since the payout announcement indicates that the firm is of high quality and is 
able to make the announced payout.    Firms with poor future potential are unlikely to announce payout 
increases because they will find it more costly to follow through on their announcements.   Hence, payout 
policy is relevant because it serves to signal information to the market about firm value. 
Bernheim and Wantz (1995) list numerous studies that support the role of dividend 
announcements as a signalling mechanism.      These studies generally find that dividend announcements 
are effective in communicating information to investors.   However, it is difficult to determine empirically 
if firms are using dividend announcements with the intention of signalling information or whether 
information is simply obtained from the announcement with no intention of the firm to signal.   Numerous 
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studies also examine the role of signalling in repurchase announcements.   Comment and Jarrell (1991), 
Stephens and Weisbach (1998) and McNally (1999) find support for stock repurchase announcements as 
signalling devices in the U.S.    McNally (1999) takes the position that repurchase announcements are 
costly signals because insiders are exposed to more firm specific risks after the repurchase, since they will 
own a higher percentage of a more leveraged firm.     Hence, announcement returns should be increasing 
in insider holdings.    This assumes that the change in relative ownership percentage and firm leverage is 
substantial as a result of the repurchases.    McNally (1999) finds evidence consistent with his predictions.    
As subsequently discussed in chapter 3, this may not be the case for TSX securities since the number of 
shares that can be repurchased is limited compared to the United States.     Hence, insiders may not see a 
large increase in firm-specific risk as a result of the repurchase program. 
A major problem with the use of signalling theory to explain the market reaction to repurchase 
announcements is that repurchase announcements are not binding commitments.    For any signalling 
mechanism to reach equilibrium, the cost of the signal must be decreasing in firm quality.    TSX firms 
only pay a small fee to the TSX to initiate a repurchase program, so there is little cost to making an 
announcement and then buying no or few shares.    Repurchase announcements may constitute cheap talk 
that is unlikely to be believed by the market.    As subsequently discussed in section 4.1, TSX firms 
typically repurchase a small percentage (median 15.7% per Table 4) of the maximum shares announced.   
This may reduce the credibility of the repurchase announcement signal compared to dividend increase 
announcements since dividend increases tend to be more permanent than repurchases.    Firms may avoid 
making dividend increase announcements unless they are sustainable since they may be penalized if the 
dividends are later cut.    Guay and Harford (2000) find that dividend increases are more associated with 
future cash flow increases than repurchases, suggesting that a dividend increase announcement may be 
better news than a repurchase announcement.   Consistent with dividend increases being better news than 
repurchase announcements, Guay and Harford (2000) find that the stock price reaction is more positive 
for a dividend increase announcements than repurchase announcements. 
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 Sobel (1985) finds that cheap talk can be useful in a repeated game.     Sobel (1985) demonstrates that 
it pays for information providers to build a reputation for providing accurate and valuable information.  
Kim (1996) demonstrates the importance of reputation in repeated interactions involving cheap talk.  Kim 
(1996, p. 787) provides the following conclusion in a pre-trial negotiation setting: “Repeated interaction 
between a defendant and a plaintiff can enhance the credibility of cheap talk and improve efficiency in 
outcomes that would be infeasible without cheap talk.  The basic driving force is the reputation effect.  If 
the players are concerned about their reputation, cheap talk cannot be taken as meaningless even in a 
game where the interests of the players are sufficiently conflicting, because possible current gains from 
opportunistic behaviour can be wiped out by future losses in payoff from damaged reputation.”  Stocken 
(2000) provides further analysis and demonstrates that the use of review strategies, whereby players 
review past truthfulness, allows players to factor in past actions when evaluating a current disclosure.    
 Existing empirical studies in the finance literature support the existence of a reputation effect.  
Williams (1996) finds that the size of analyst forecast revisions in response to a current management 
forecast is positively related to past management forecast accuracy, after controlling for other aspects of 
believability.  Hirst, Koonce and Miller (1999) provide similar experimental findings.    Brucato and 
Smith (1997) find that the market reaction to dividend increase announcements is positively related to the 
directional consistency of past dividend and earnings changes, which they use as a proxy for the firm 
truthfully revealing private information.  Hutton and Stocken (2006) find that investors respond more to 
management forecasts when the firm has developed a forecasting reputation, which they measure based 
on past forecasting accuracy and frequency.   Outside of the finance literature, support exists for a 
reputation effect.  Boulding and Kirmani (1993) find that firms who fail to fulfill their warranty 
obligations sacrifice their reputations, thereby eliminating future repeat business and losing other potential 
customers due to word-of-mouth effects.   Davis and Weinberg (2005) find that online auction reputation 
information is accessed by consumers in making online purchasing decisions.    These studies provide 
support for a reputational effect where there is a repeated game with feedback. 
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2.4 Free Cash Flow Theory 
Jensen’s (1986) seminal paper on free cash flow provides insight into the effects of payout policy in the 
presence of agency costs.        Free cash flow is defined as cash flow remaining after funding all positive 
net present value investments.    Agency theory suggests that managers may choose to fund negative net 
present value investments or invest in perks when free cash flow exists.     Payouts reduce the ability of 
managers to invest in unprofitable investments or to invest in perks.   Further, payouts force managers to 
return to capital markets to fund future projects, thereby subjecting the firm to the monitoring of capital 
markets.   Therefore payouts will be viewed favourably by investors since they help to constrain agency 
costs.     Jensen (1986, p. 325) concludes “Free cash flow theory predicts that, except for firms with 
profitable unfunded investment projects, prices will rise with unexpected increases in payouts to 
shareholders or promises to do so”.   Jensen’s conclusion implies that share repurchase announcements 
should be viewed favourably by the market since they may serve to reduce agency costs and may indicate 
that corporate governance mechanisms designed to constrain over-investment are working.   Isagawa’s 
(2000) analytical paper shows that insiders with shareholdings are more likely to make payouts than waste 
funds on perks or low net present value investments since they bear some of the cost of the waste.   
 Recent studies find little evidence that corporate governance structures increase payouts or 
constrain management’s tendency to over-invest free cash flow.   Oswald and Young (2004), in a U.K. 
study, test a large number of governance variables and find that only management entrenchment 
(measured using degree of external board composition and insider holdings) reduces the tendency to 
payout excess cash.   Richardson (2006) finds that the presence of activist shareholders and the existence 
of anti-takeover defences results in less over-investment of cash flow, but other variables are found to be 
insignificant suggesting that most corporate governance structures are ineffective in constraining over-
investment of cash flow.     These studies suggest that it is difficult to find a one size fits all model of 
corporate governance that serves to reduce the agency costs associated with free cash flow.  
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2.5 Undervaluation, Shareholder Wealth Expropriation and Managerial Opportunism 
Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) propose that share repurchase programs give management the option to 
purchase shares when, in management’s opinion, the shares are undervalued.       They partially attribute 
the positive market reaction to repurchase announcements to the market’s recognition that firm value is 
increased as a result of acquiring a costless, yet valuable, option to repurchase stock.     However, as Oded 
(2005, p.273) points out, this analysis fails to recognize that if the firm is long in the option to repurchase 
shares when they are undervalued, the market is therefore short in the option to repurchase shares.    
Further, since the sellers are not aware who the buyer is in an open market repurchase transaction, sellers 
are not aware that they are selling to a more informed trader.    As a result, there is really only a benefit to 
long-term shareholders, who will not see their wealth expropriated by a competing trader with insider 
information.   Short-term shareholders can be exploited, since they may sell to management who has more 
information about the firm’s future prospects than the short-term shareholder.       
 Stephens and Weisbach (1998, p.316) propose that managers time share repurchases for when 
they believe that their firm’s stock is undervalued.    They refer to this as the “asymmetric information” or 
“undervalued equity” hypothesis.   In support of this hypothesis, Stephens and Weisbach (1998) cite 
studies showing that the initiation of repurchase programs is preceded by poor stock price performance 
and followed by good earnings and stock price performance.    Stephens and Weisbach (1998, p.316) 
conclude that “the asymmetric information hypothesis predicts that repurchases will increase following 
poor stock market performance and decrease following good stock price performance”.   
 Douglas (2007) proposes that managers may engage in share repurchases to enhance their 
personal wealth and to protect the personal benefits associated with control.     Douglas’s (2007) analysis 
concludes that managers are more likely to implement repurchase programs when they have a greater 
ability to impact pre-repurchase prices and the post-repurchase price.    The ability to impact pre-
repurchase price is increasing in information asymmetry and in the ability to time information releases.        
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Douglas’s (2007) analysis also suggests that payout policies may be influenced by corporate governance, 
since corporate governance mechanisms may constrain managerial opportunism. 
2.6 Takeover Deterrence 
Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) develop a model whereby repurchases serve to increase the cost of a takeover 
by revealing management’s private information about the firm.     As a result, repurchases serve to deter 
takeover bids.    McNally, Smith and Barnes (2006) provide results consistent with Bagnoli and Lipman’s 
(1989) predictions.    McNally, Smith and Barnes (2006), in a study of 60,000 TSX repurchase 
transactions, find that repurchases provide price support and the market learns that the shares are 
undervalued.    Similarly, Bagwell (1992) demonstrates that firms can deter hostile takeovers through 
share repurchases.    Bagwell (1992) demonstrates that repurchases increase the cost of a takeover by 
altering the distribution of shareholder reservation values since repurchases serve to prune investors who 
are willing to sell at lower prices.    The likelihood of repurchasing to deter takeovers is increasing in 
shareholder heterogeneity with respect to the price the shareholder is willing to sell at.   Bagwell (1992) 
shows that shareholder heterogeneity can result from differences in capital gains taxation as a result of 
investors having purchased at different prices.       
 2.7 Leverage, Taxes and Financial Flexibility  
Vermaelen (1981) proposes that firms may borrow funds and engage in repurchases to increase their 
leverage and obtain the tax benefits associated with greater interest deductions.    Also, if a firm is below 
its optimal level of leverage, repurchases will move the firm closer to its optimal level of leverage.    
However, Li  and McNally (2007) find no evidence that firms that are below the average level of debt in 
their industry are more likely to repurchase shares. 
Lie and Lie (1999) find evidence that firms adopt their payout policies to reflect the tax needs of 
their investors, which they refer to as “tax catering”.     Lie and Lie (1999) find that the likelihood of 
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repurchasing is negatively associated with recent stock price increases.    They attribute this finding to 
firms being reluctant to repurchase when their shareholders will suffer high capital gains taxes. 
Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000) and Guay and Harford (2000) propose that firms use 
repurchases to distribute transient cash flow shocks and dividends to distribute permanent cash flows.     
Both studies propose that firms will choose dividends for permanent cash flows since dividends are 
implicitly permanent commitments, whereas repurchases are not.     Both studies find that dividends are 
used to distribute permanent cash flow changes and repurchases are used to distribute temporary cash 
flow changes.  
2.8 Managerial Incentives 
Kahle (2001) investigates how stock options affect the decision to repurchase shares.   Kahle (2001) finds 
evidence consistent with the option funding hypothesis.   The option funding hypothesis predicts that 
firms will repurchase shares in order to prevent dilution due to stock options.     Further, since stock 
options are not normally dividend protected, managers have an incentive to repurchase shares instead of 
paying dividends since repurchase announcements normally result in an increase in stock price, whereas 
dividend payments result in a drop in stock price (the “ex-dividend” effect). 
2.9 Liquidity 
Existing literature on repurchases does not address whether firms might choose to use repurchases in 
order to improve liquidity.   Firms have an incentive to provide liquidity to their shareholders since if the 
stock is not liquid, many investors will avoid the stock.   As a result, the full value of the stock is not 
achieved due to suppressed demand.   Amihud and Mendelson (1986) show that expected stock returns 
are an increasing function of stock liquidity, as measured by the stock’s bid-ask spread.   This model 
shows that firms with low liquidity should have lower security values.     Longstaff’s (1995) model shows 
that the penalty for illiquidity can be large even when the illiquidity period is short.  Archival literature 
supports the existence of an illiquidity penalty.   Amihud and Mendelson (1991) on bonds, Silber (1991) 
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on restricted stocks and Brennen, Eldor and Hawser (2001) on options all confirm that securities with 
restricted marketability pay a price penalty.   Mittoo (2003), using Canadian data, finds that stocks which 
have higher liquidity gains from cross-listing also experience greater abnormal returns surrounding US 
listing.   
Due to the small size of many TSX firms, and the lower number of investors investing in TSX 
stocks than NYSE and Nasdaq stocks, investors of TSX firms who wish to sell often have a hard time 
finding a buyer.   Elfakhani and Lung (2003, p. 198) note that “there are proportionately more small firms 
listed on Canadian exchanges; consequently more firms are thinly traded”.   Elfakhani and Lung (2003) 
find that Canadian firms who undertake stock splits enjoy better liquidity after the split.   Mittoo (2003) 
finds that Canadian firms who cross-list on U.S. exchanges enjoy greater liquidity after cross-listing.   
However, the costs of stock splits and cross-listing may outweigh the benefits of increased liquidity for 
many small firms.    Repurchase programs provide a low cost alternative that may help to increase 
liquidity since repurchases will increase demand for the stock.   Further, by reducing the public float, 





TSX Open Market Share Repurchase Requirements 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Share repurchase regulations vary between Canada and the United States.     As outlined in this chapter, 
Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) share repurchase requirements result in TSX investors having more 
information about past repurchases and the reasons for the repurchase program at the time of a 
contemporaneous repurchase announcement than would investors of U.S. traded firms.      This thesis 
analyses whether there is any evidence that investors use this additional information.    I begin by 
analysing repurchase requirements in the United States.    I then analyse repurchase requirements for TSX 
traded firms.    I conclude by summarizing the regulatory differences between U.S. and TSX traded firms 
and discuss the implications of these differences. 
3.2 Share Repurchase Regulations in the U.S. 
There are no specific repurchase disclosure requirements for U.S. traded firms.     Firms engaging in 
repurchases on U.S. traded exchanges are subject to the provisions of SEC Regulation 10-b-18, a safe 
harbour provision for share repurchases.         There are no limits to the size of the program or the duration 
of the program.     Firms are not required to provide a press release announcing the program or any 
reasons for the program.    Most firms choose to voluntarily announce their programs.   There are no 
requirements to disclose actual repurchases except in the normal course of preparing financial statements. 
3.3 Share Repurchase Regulations on the TSX 
TSX share repurchase programs can take two forms, fixed tender offers and normal course issuer bids.     
Fixed tender offers are rare and consist of large offers made directly to shareholders.    During fixed 
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tender offers, section 94(8) of the Ontario Securities Act prevents the offering firm from issuing shares at 
the same time as the fixed tender offer.    The most common type of repurchase is a normal course issuer 
bid (NCIB).   NCIBs allow firms to repurchase shares on the open market.     Section 94(8) does not apply 
to normal course issuer bids since they are not considered formal bids according to section 89(1), since 
paragraph 93(3)(f) exempts NCIBs from being formal bids.   The definition of an ‘offeror’ in section 94 
requires that the offer to purchase shares be a formal offer, otherwise section 94 would not apply.   Since 
NCIBs are not formal offers, a firm making an NCIB is not an offeror under section 94 and section 94 
does not apply.   I also find evidence of many firms issuing shares while they have a NCIB in place1.    
Normal course issuer bids are restricted to repurchasing no more than the greater of 5% of 
outstanding shares or 10% of the public float in a year.    No more than 1% of shares outstanding can be 
repurchased in any calendar month.    Firms must apply for permission from the TSX to commence a 
NCIB.   Programs are limited to one year at which time the firm must re-apply to the TSX.     As a 
consequence, firms who wish to repurchase shares over a number of years must continuously re-apply to 
the TSX and make recurring announcements.   In this thesis, firms who make recurring repurchase 
announcements are referred to as “serial repurchasers”.    Serial repurchasers are common, resulting in the 
ability to examine the impact of past repurchase programs on the market reaction to current repurchases, 
which is a central theme of this thesis.   
Additionally, the TSX requires Canadian firms to disclose the reason(s) for their repurchase 
program.  This requirement exists in Australia, but not in the US or UK (Otchere and Ross, 2002, p. 516).  
Typical reasons include preventing dilution due to stock options, utilizing excess funds, indicating that the 
firm feels its shares are undervalued and increasing the proportionate interest of remaining shareholders.  
Table 3 shows the percentage of firms citing various reasons for their repurchase programs during the 
period 1994 to 2005.   
                                                     
1
For example, Bank of Nova Scotia had an NCIB in place from January 6, 2004 onward yet issued shares during the 
year ended December 31, 2004.   Compton Petroleum Corporation announced an NCIB in March 2004 and in 
March 2005, yet issued shares for cash in February 2005.  Other examples are available from the author on 
request.      
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3.4 Comparison of U.S. and TSX Share Repurchase Regulations 
An overall comparison of the requirements of Canadian and U.S. regulations for stock repurchases is 
provided in Appendix 2.  I focus on the effects of two unique TSX requirements, the requirement to 
disclose actual repurchases and the requirement to disclose the reason for the repurchase.  The specific 
announcement disclosure requirements for TSX firms are contained in Appendix 3.  A sample of one 
firm’s repurchase announcement is contained in Appendix 4.  
Most research focuses on U.S. firms.   However, U.S. firms are not required to report their 
repurchases on a timely basis.   The SEC is only now considering a quarterly reporting requirement.  At 
this time, U.S. firms are only required to provide detailed information on their repurchases in their annual 
financial statements.  Quarterly reports typically only disclose total shares outstanding.  Decreases in a 
firm’s total shares outstanding are an imperfect proxy for repurchases since the firm may also have issued 
shares during the period2.  Even if a firm voluntarily discloses repurchases in its quarterly report, it could 
take up to four months for investors to learn about the repurchases.  As a result, investors of NYSE or 
Nasdaq firms are often unable to see on a timely basis if the firm has followed through on its repurchase 
announcements.  These reporting differences result in investors of U.S. traded and TSX traded firms 
having different information sets at the time of a repurchase announcement.   I focus on TSX firms to 
investigate whether the market uses the historical information provided by TSX firms to assess the 
credibility of subsequent repurchase announcements.   
Additionally, the TSX requires Canadian firms to disclose the reason(s) for their repurchase 
program.  This requirement exists in Australia, but not in the US or UK (Otchere and Ross, 2002, p. 516).  
This further differentiates the information set available to investors of U.S. and Canadian firms.  This 
thesis investigates whether these reasons are associated with the market reaction to the repurchase 
announcement. 
                                                     
2 For a more detailed discussion of this problem, see Stephens and Weisbach (1998) and Lie (2005), p.423, 
especially footnote 11. 
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3.5 Use of TSX Data 
I utilize TSX data in this thesis for several reasons.    First, as discussed above, TSX regulations result in 
investors having more current information on the results of past repurchase programs and information on 
the reasons for the repurchase program.   This thesis tests whether this additional information is associated 
with the market reaction to the repurchase announcement.    Second, as Ikenberry, Lakonishok and 
Vermaelen (2000, p. 2374) point out, Canada is the only other country that has a reasonable sample of 
repurchases.  I am able to identify 2,870 equity repurchase programs during the period 1994 to 2005.   
Use of Canadian data allows me to confirm findings that have been previously established only using U.S. 
data.    As noted in chapter 4, my sample is recent and includes a sub-period where repurchasing activity 
begins to decline.  Hence, I will be able to confirm past empirical results in a substantially different 
regulatory setting.    In addition, the ready availability of Canadian repurchase data has practical research 
advantages.   Research on the repurchases of U.S. firms has been hampered by the lack of actual 
repurchase data since researchers need to use a variety of estimation techniques to approximate actual 
repurchases.  For example, Lie (2005) is forced to throw out 37% of share repurchase programs since 
actual repurchases cannot be determined.  Use of TSX data alleviates such problems since it is possible to 
determine the exact number of shares repurchased each month by consulting the TSX Daily Record3.   
Finally, my education has been largely subsidized in the past by Canadian taxpayers and I believe that it is 
important for Canadian researchers to investigate Canadian capital markets. 
 
 
                                                     
3 Oswald and Young (2004) note that disclosure of actual repurchases are made by U.K. firms, indicating the 
possibility of conducting this study using U.K. data.  However, Oswald and Young (2004, p.32) are only able to 
identify 429 announcements over a six year period indicating that use of U.K. data would substantially restrict 




Share Repurchase Activity on the T.S.X. from 1994 to 2005, Data Sources and Thesis Sample 
4.1 Share Repurchase Programs and Announcements 
I obtained a complete list of all open market repurchase programs between 1994 and 2005 from the TSX 
Daily Record.  These repurchase programs, known as normal course issuer bids (NCIB), are summarized 
in Table 1.    Table 1 indicates that overall repurchase activity peaked in 2000 and has generally declined 
since 2000.     Table 1 documents that 16.3% of TSX listed securities during the period 1994 to 2005 
chose to commence a repurchase program. 
   I exclude preferred share, debenture, warrant, instalment receipts and trust repurchases since the 
incentives to repurchase these securities may be different from the incentives to repurchase common 
equities.   After excluding these other types of securities, there are 2,870 equity repurchase programs 
during the years 1994 to 2005.  In order to be consistent with and comparable to other repurchase studies, 
such as Stephens and Weisbach (1998), Guay and Harford (2000), Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen 
(2000), Kahle (2001) and Li and McNally (2007), I do not exclude financial firms from my analysis.   As 
documented in Table 2, I am able to locate the press releases for 2,617 equity repurchase programs (91% 
of all equity repurchase programs) from the Lexis-Nexis database and the SEDAR database.    I obtained 
few press releases for 1994 to 1996 since SEDAR does not cover those years, so the search was limited to 
the Lexis-Nexis database.   The reasons given by firms for their repurchase announcements are 
summarized in Table 3. 
Table 4 provides completion rates for NCIBs from 1994 to 2004.     The completion rate for an 
individual firm is equal to the percentage of the announced maximum targeted shares that were actually 
repurchased.    For the entire period, the mean completion rate was 31.9% and the median completion rate 
was 15.7%.      These rates are consistent with most firms repurchasing considerably less than the 
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announced maximum target.     Completion rates peak in 1999 and steadily decline after 1999.      Median 
completion rates from 2001 to 2004 are less than 10%.       
Name changes by firms are a potential concern to this study for two reasons.   First, one important 
contribution of this thesis is the examination of whether firms’ past repurchase history impacts the market 
reaction to their current announcements.    If firms change names, it is possible that their history could be 
misclassified.    Second, potential serial correlation in the residuals (see section 9.4) cannot be properly 
controlled for if firm name changes are not properly identified.    To reduce the likelihood of name 
changes impacting the results, the following procedure was employed.     First, I identified all NCIB 
announcing firms during the sample period whose names remain unchanged on the Compustat database as 
of January 2008.    For the remaining firms, who are no longer on the Compustat database under their 
original name, I identified these firms as potential name changers.    For the potential name changers, I 
then examined all new releases on the Lexis-Nexis and SEDAR databases in the three years following 
their last NCIB announcement.    If the firm changed name during the three year period after its last 
repurchase announcement, I recorded the name change in my repurchases database. 
4.2 Market Data 
Market data were obtained from the Centre for Financial Markets Research Centre database.    As 
summarized in Table 5, market data necessary to conduct an event study was available for 1,756 securities 
for returns analysis and 2,178 securities for volume analysis.   The difference in the number of securities 
is attributable to the tendency of the CFMRC to leave return fields as no data available when there are no 
transactions on a given trading day.   In contrast, the equivalent volume field contains a value of zero.   
Table 7 compares the accounting characteristics of the firms with volume data but no return data available 
against firms with available return data.    Table 7 shows that the firms with missing returns data are 
smaller, have lower capital expenditures, lower market to book ratios, lower share turnover, higher 
leverage and higher dividend payout ratios than firms with available returns data.       
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Under my supervision, a Brock University Faculty of Business research assistant and myself 
compiled a volume index from the TSX Daily Record for each trading day from 1994 to 2005.   This 
volume index is not available from commercial data sources and was compiled from the TSX Daily 
Record for use in this thesis in order to conduct volume testing.    Daily volume, daily total transactions 
and daily total dollar transactions were manually entered into an excel spreadsheet and then converted to a 
SAS dataset for use in volume tests.       
4.3 Accounting Data 
Accounting data were obtained from the Compustat North American and Canadian files4.    The primary 
purpose of this thesis is to examine the market reaction to TSX repurchase announcements.   Care has to 
be taken to ensure that only ex-ante information is considered.     Table 6 describes the availability of 
accounting data on the Compustat database.    Table 6 shows that total asset data was available for 1,873 
firms, constituting 65.3% of the 2,817 announcements.    Compustat coverage is low in the early sample 
years and peaks at 81.1% in 2001.   Firms are classified as repurchasers if they announced a repurchase 
program after the audit report date of the fiscal years presented in Table 6.    The reported sample includes 
all TSX firms in the Compustat North American and Canadian files with fiscal years ending during the 
years 1993 to 2004 for which total asset and SIC code data were available (9,861 firm years).    Data were 
obtained from the Wharton Research Data Services system during 2008.    Using the list of repurchasing 
firms and their announcement dates (discussed in section 4.1), I then determined the audit report date of 
the immediately preceding fiscal year from the financial statements contained on the SEDAR database.    I 
then assigned the appropriate Compustat accounting period to each repurchase announcement.    In order 
to ensure that the information considered in the announcement prediction and market reaction models is 
ex-ante information available to investors at the time of the repurchase announcement, I allow a lag from 
year end to the audit report date for the preparation and auditing of the annual financial statements.   
                                                     
4 I found it necessary to merge these two databases, as there were examples of TSX firms who were contained in one 
file but not the other.    Careful analysis of the data allowed me to eliminate duplicate listings.   When using the 
North American dataset, I restricted the download to firms who were listed in the North American dataset as being 
traded on the TSX. 
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Typically the lag was approximately two months.   For example, if a firm had a December fiscal year end 
and made a repurchase announcement on March 2, 2004, I would use the fiscal results for December 31, 
2003 if the audit report date for 2003 was dated before March 2, 2004.   Otherwise, I would use the fiscal 
results for December 31, 2002 since the results for 2003 are not publicly available and hence investors 
would only be able to develop expectations based on 2002 results.     I am able to locate accounting data 
for 1,873 common equity repurchase announcements covering 2,030 securities (157 of the announcements 
were for two share classes).    I report the data from the most recently reported fiscal year immediately 
preceding the repurchase program announcement date since the primary purpose of this analysis is to 
consider the publicly known characteristics of firms who subsequently announce repurchase programs.   
Therefore Table 6 presents the data of repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms that would be known to 
the market at the time of the announcement (or non-announcement).   The actual announcements occurred 
in the year following the fiscal years shown in Table 6 
Table 7 Panel A presents mean accounting values of repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms 
during the years 1994 to 2005.    I document characteristics that prior research has indicated differ 
between repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms.    Dittmar (2000) reports that repurchasing firms are 
larger than non-repurchasing firms and have lower leverage and market-to-book ratios.   Consistent with 
her findings, I report differences in size, leverage and market-to-book ratios.   Barth and Kasnick (1999) 
find that repurchasing firms have greater intangible assets than non-repurchasing firms.   I investigate 
whether firms’ cash and capital expenditures differ, since free cash flow theory (section 2.4) indicates that 
firms with excess cash and low capital expenditure needs should be more likely to repurchase shares.   I 
also investigate whether firms are using repurchases in lieu of dividends by comparing the dividend 
payout ratios of announcing and non-announcing firms.   The results documented in Table 7 Panel A 
indicate that announcing firms are characterized by greater size (t=5.829, p<0.01) and a greater proportion 
of intangible assets (t=6.471, p<0.01) than non-announcing firms.     Announcing firms have a lower 
proportion of cash (t=9.208, p<0.01), capital expenditures (t=4.602, p<0.01), leverage (t=1.893, p<0.10) 
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and share turnover (t=5.270, p<0.01) than non-announcing firms.   Market-to-book ratios and dividend 
payout ratios are not significantly different. 
4.4 Industry Composition 
Table 8 presents analysis of repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms by four digit SIC codes.  Table 8 
reports all four digit SIC codes with at least 90 Compustat observations during the period 1993 to 2004.   
Table 8 shows that there is substantial variation in repurchase program rates by industry.     Industries 
where share repurchase programs are common include the investment industry (SIC Codes 6020, 6211, 
6282 and 6799) and commercial real estate (SIC Code 6512).    Industries where repurchase programs are 
rare include natural resource industries (SIC Codes 1000, 1040, 1311 and 1400), pharmaceutical and 
biological products (SIC Codes 2834 and 2826), broadcasting (SIC code 3663) and computer 
programming and system design (SIC Codes 7370 and 7373).       These results are surprising since the 
industries with low repurchase rates are industries where information asymmetry is usually considered to 
be high.     If firms are using repurchases to communicate their prospects, we would normally expect firms 
with high information asymmetry to be more likely to announce a repurchase program.    However, the 
industries with low repurchase program rates are industries where cash is likely to be scarce.   For 
example, mining firms require capital to continue explorations and pharmaceutical and biological firms 
require capital for research and development.    Given the difficulty of justifying these products to capital 
providers, these firms may opt to retain cash for future projects rather than distributing cash through 
repurchases.    
4.5 Corporate Governance, Ownership and Compensation Data 
Corporate governance, ownership and compensation data were collected for announcing firms.     These 
data were obtained from the firm’s proxy circulars, which are available on SEDAR.     Table 9 Panel A 





Repurchase Announcement Likelihood: Review of Literature and Hypothesis Development 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Where the market is able to anticipate a repurchase announcement, there is likely to be little market 
reaction to the repurchase announcement since in efficient markets investors will have already 
incorporated the probability of a repurchase announcement into price.   Hence, consistent with Kim and 
Verrecchia (1991), the market reaction can be expected to be greater where the announcement is not 
anticipated by the market.    Consistent with Li and Prabhala (2005) and Li and McNally (2007), I employ 
a conditional event study where first the likelihood of a repurchase announcement is modeled and then the 
market reaction to a repurchase announcement is considered in light of the market’s prior assessment of 
the likelihood of a repurchase announcement being made.    Use of a conditional event study first requires 
an analysis of announcement likelihood. 
Past research, such as Dittmar (2000) and Li and McNally (2007), provides evidence on which 
firms are likely to engage in repurchase programs.   In this section I discuss the likely antecedents of 
repurchase announcements5.   Where this discussion overlaps with chapter 2, I refer the reader to the 
appropriate section in chapter 2.    I include factors shown in previous research to be relevant to the 
announcement decision but also model some unique Canadian factors that are likely to impact repurchases 
in Canada.   To clearly separate my intended contribution to the literature, I label factors examined in 
prior research as predictions and label new factors that I am exploring as part of this thesis as hypotheses. 
                                                     
5 My data also allows for the study of the antecedents of actual repurchases as opposed to repurchase 
announcements.   I leave this topic for future study. 
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5.2 Repurchase History 
Canadian firms’ repurchase programs are limited to one year, after which a new application to the TSX 
must be made, along with a new announcement.  In order to have multi-year repurchase programs, many 
Canadian firms routinely obtain TSX approval year after year.  Investors may be able to anticipate these 
announcements given their recurring nature.   Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) find that for U.S. firms, 
announcement returns are decreasing in the number of prior repurchase announcements, indicating that 
the market may anticipate repeat announcements.    Consistent with Jaganathan and Stephens (2003) 
findings, I predict (P1) that the likelihood of announcing a repurchase program is positively associated 
with past repurchase program announcements. 
5.3  Dividend Level  
Fama and French (2001) document that public firms now pay less dividends, even when firm 
characteristics are considered.    They interpret this as being consistent with stock exchanges including 
more growth-oriented firms.    Grullon and Michaely (2002) find that while the overall payout rate has 
remained constant over time, dividends have decreased and repurchases have increased.   They interpret 
this finding as evidence that firms are substituting repurchases for dividends.   If firms are substituting 
repurchases for dividends, firms with a low dividend payout ratio should have a higher likelihood of 
engaging in repurchases resulting in a negative relationship between dividend payout ratio and the 
likelihood of announcing a repurchase program.  However, Dittmar (2000) finds no relationship between 
shares repurchased and dividend payout ratio (dividends/income) and Li and McNally (2007) find no 
relationship between the likelihood of a repurchase announcement and dividend yield (dividends per 
share/market price per share), suggesting that firms are not substituting repurchases for dividends.   
However, given the findings of Grullon and Michaely (2002) and the difference in sample period between 




As discussed in section 2.9, another possible motivation for repurchase programs is that repurchase 
programs may allow small, thinly traded firms to increase their stock’s trading liquidity.  TSX firms 
frequently (5.8% per Table 3) cite providing liquidity as a reason for their NCIB programs.   The 
discussion in section 2.9 suggests that firms with trading liquidity problems have an incentive to provide 
trading liquidity through repurchases, resulting in the following hypothesis: 
H1 The likelihood of a firm announcing a repurchase program is decreasing in firm trading 
liquidity. 
5.5 Cash Flow and Corporate Governance 
Many studies on repurchases use agency theory to explain the market reaction to repurchase 
announcements.     Section 2.4 discusses the free cash flow theory first proposed by Jensen (1986) and 
suggests that firms with excess cash should distribute that cash to avoid the agency costs associated with 
the tendency of management to invest in self-serving investments or to utilize funds for perks, empire 
building, and excessive salaries.    Consistent with agency theory, prior studies, such as Dittmar (2000) 
and Li and McNally (2007) find that high cash flow firms are more likely to repurchase shares since these 
firms bear greater agency costs if they do not make payouts.   Further, Guay and Harford (2000) and 
Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000) find that firms use temporary cash flow surpluses to fund 
repurchases.  I therefore predict (P2) that the likelihood of a firm announcing a repurchase program is 
increasing in cash balances (P2A), operating cash flow (P2B) and change in cash flow (P2C). 
5.6 Information Asymmetry 
As discussed in section 2.5, where information asymmetry is high, management may wish to utilize its 
information advantage to purchase stock when management feels that the firm’s stock price is 
undervalued.  Under Ikenberry and Vermaelen’s (1996) costless option theory, if management feels that 
25 
 
shares are or are likely to be undervalued, they will put a repurchase program in place so that the firm can 
repurchase its shares at depressed prices and potentially re-issue them when the market realizes its 
mistake and raises the stock price.   Also, by announcing repurchase programs, firms may be able to 
signal to the market that they are undervalued, provided the announcements are credible. 
Ho, Liu and Ramanan (1997) find that the market reaction to a repurchase announcement is 
negatively related to firm size and the number of analysts following the firm.   These results are consistent 
with repurchase announcements conveying more news where greater information asymmetry exists at the 
time of the repurchase announcement.   Ho, Liu and Ramanan (1997) also find that the re-evaluation of 
prior accounting information is more significant for firms with greater information asymmetry.   Barth 
and Kasznik (1999) find that firms with more intangible assets, a proxy for information asymmetry, are 
more likely to repurchase shares.     As discussed in section 2.5, Douglas’s (2007) model suggests that 
management’s ability to benefit from repurchase programs is positively related to information asymmetry.   
Consistent with their findings, I predict (P3) that the likelihood of announcing a repurchase program is 
positively related to pre-announcement information asymmetry.    
5.7 Undervaluation 
Many TSX firms cite undervaluation as a reason for repurchasing shares.     Prior studies such as Dittmar 
(2000) and Li and McNally (2007) find that firms are more likely to repurchase shares where abnormal 
returns have been negative leading up to the repurchase announcement.  Section 2.5 discusses Stephens 
and Weisbach’s (1998) asymmetric information hypothesis.   Consistent with the asymmetric information 
hypothesis, I predict (P4) that firms are more likely to announce a repurchase program where abnormal 





Repurchase Likelihood: Research Design 
 
6.1 Announcement Likelihood Model 
The decision to implement a repurchase program is binary since firms choose to either commence 
a repurchase program or not.     Therefore, the repurchase announcement decision is modeled using a 
probit model.    Assume that firms’ repurchase decision takes the following form: 
y* = β’x + e 
where β is a vector of parameters, x is a vector of explanatory variables corresponding to the variables 
defined in section 6.2 and e ~ N(0,1) is a random shock.   We observe y=1, representing the firm 
announcing a repurchase program if y*>0, and y=0, representing the firm not announcing a repurchase 
program, otherwise.  The variables defined in section 6.2 are proxies for the factors discussed in chapter 5 
that are expected to be used by the market to predict the likelihood of a repurchase announcement. 
 It can therefore be demonstrated that: 
(1) Pr(y=1) = Ф(β’x)  
where Ф is the normal cumulative distribution function.     
Assuming that the observations are identically and independently distributed, we can construct the sample 
log likelihood function which can be maximized using standard nonlinear maximization algorithms.  
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Equation (1) is estimated using a probit model.   Probit model 1 is estimated using accounting 
data and all available Compustat firms.   I test the predictions and hypotheses in chapter 5 by comparing 
the results from model (1) to the predicted signs in Appendix 5. 
As subsequently discussed in section 9.4, the predicted value Фβ’x is used in the subsequent 
market reaction models discussed in chapters 9 and 10 as a proxy for the markets’ surprise level for the 
announcement.    To control for the market’s level of surprise that the announcement is occurring, I use 
model (1) to estimate the market’s prior expectation that a repurchase announcement will occur.     I then 
include the predicted value in my analysis of announcement returns and volumes to control for the 
market’s level of surprise that the announcement occurred.   The predicted value is bounded by 0 (low 
probability of repurchase announcement) and 1 (high probability of repurchase announcement). 
6.2 Proxy Selection 
Appendix 5 contains definitions of variables used to analyse the probability of a firm announcing a 
repurchase program and to develop a repurchase announcement expectations model.   This section 
discusses the proxies selected, their measurement and the rationale for their selection. 
6.2a Repurchase History 
Repurchase history is measured using two variables, NCIB1 and NCIB3.   NCIB1 is a binary variable, 
taking on a value of one if the firm announced a repurchase program in the fiscal year prior to the fiscal 
year in which the current repurchase announcement occurred.     NCIB1 therefore measures whether a 
firm has had a recent repurchase program.      NCIB3 measures the number of repurchase programs 
announced in the three fiscal years prior to the fiscal year in which the current repurchase announcement 
occurred.    NCIB3 measures the intensity of repurchase program over a three year period and can take a 
value of 0 to 3.     P1 predicts that the likelihood of announcing a repurchase program is positively 
associated with past repurchase programs.    Therefore, a significantly positive coefficient on NCIB1 or 




Dividend level is measured using two variables, DYIELD and DVPT.    DYIELD is measured as 
dividends per share during the most recently completed fiscal year prior to the announcement divided by 
share price at the end of the most recent fiscal year prior to the repurchase announcement.     DVPT is 
measured as dividends per share divided by income per share during the most recently completed fiscal 
year prior to the repurchase announcement.   If firms determine their total payout level and then decide 
between dividends and repurchases, there should be a negative relationship between DYIELD and DVPT 
and repurchase announcements. 
6.2c Liquidity 
Liquidity is measured using the variable VOL, which represents total share volume traded during the most 
recently completed fiscal year divided by total outstanding shares at the end of the most recently 
completed fiscal year preceding the repurchase announcement.    Alternative measures include bid-ask 
spread and market depth.      It is not possible to calculate market depth for TSX firms since the CFMRC 
database does not contain the number of bids and asks on the order book and the TSX is an electronic 
exchange.      Bid-ask spread was rejected as a measure of liquidity since it is more a measure of price 
uncertainty rather than liquidity.      The use of share turnover has some disadvantages.   For instance, it is 
possible that a stock could be liquid while not trading frequently.   If there are few reasons to trade 
because the stock’s value is stable over time, trading may not occur frequently.    However, it may still be 
possible to find a buyer or seller when necessary.    Nevertheless, high trading volume does indicate that it 
is possible to find a buyer or seller on a regular basis.     Therefore, it is used as the best available 
alternative to measure liquidity. 
6.2d Cash Balances, Cash Flow and Investment Opportunities 
As discussed in section 5.5 firms with high cash flow or large cash balances may repurchase shares in 
order to reduce the agency costs associated with using cash for perks or negative net present value 
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investments.        Also, prior studies such as Guay and Harford (2000) find that firms use temporary cash 
flow surpluses to fund repurchases     P2 predicts that the likelihood of a firm announcing a repurchase 
program is increasing in cash balances (P2A), operating cash flow (P2B) and change in cash flow (P2C).    
I measure cash balances (variable CASH) as cash over total assets at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year prior to the announcement.   Operating cash flow (variable OCF) is measured using cash flow 
from operations during the most recently reported fiscal year over total assets at the end of the most 
recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.     Finally, change in cash (variable CASHCHG) 
is measured as the percentage change in year-end cash during the most recently reported fiscal year prior 
to the announcement.     Capital expenditures (variable CAPX) are measured as capital expenditures 
during the most recently reported fiscal year end over total assets at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year prior to the announcement.    Capital expenditures (variable CAPX) reduce available cash.    
Therefore, there should be a negative relationship between CAPX and repurchase announcements. 
6.2e Information Asymmetry 
P3 predicts that the likelihood of announcing a repurchase program is positively related to pre-
announcement information asymmetry.   Appendix 5 contains definitions of the variables I use to measure 
information asymmetry.   I use three measures of information asymmetry.   First, consistent with Barth 
and Kasnick (1999)’s repurchase study, I measure information asymmetry based on intangible assets over 
total assets (variable INTAN) at the end of the most recently completed fiscal year prior to the 
announcement.   My second measure is research and development expenditures over total sales (variable 
XRD) during the most recently completed fiscal year prior to the announcement.  Huddart and Ke (2007) 
find that research and development expense is a good measure of information asymmetry based on models 
of informed trading.   Finally, my third measure is size (variable SIZE) which I measure as the natural log 
of total assets at the end of the most recently completed fiscal year prior to the announcement.   Smaller 
firms are expected to have greater information asymmetry since they typically have smaller annual reports 
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and less analyst coverage.   Ho, Liu and Ramanan (1997) use size as a proxy for information asymmetry 
and find it to be negatively related to repurchase announcement returns. 
6.2e Undervaluation 
Firms’ true values are unobservable.    Therefore it is difficult to develop a proxy for which firms are 
undervalued.    Section 2.5 discusses Stephens and Weisbach (1998)’s asymmetric information 
hypothesis.   Consistent with the asymmetric information hypothesis and the results of prior studies, such 
as Stephens and Weisbach (1998) and Dittmar (2000), I measure the propensity for undervaluation with 
reference to price movements in the period leading up to the repurchase announcements.    P4 predicts that 
firms are more likely to announce a repurchase program where abnormal returns have been negative in the 
period prior to the announcement.     If managers believe that their firms’ shares are undervalued, they 
may wish to exploit this perceived undervaluation by repurchasing shares, thereby reducing the firm’s 
cost of capital.     Managers are more likely to feel the firm is undervalued if there has been a sudden drop 
in price.     I proxy for likelihood that the firm’s management feels the firm is undervalued by measuring 
cumulative abnormal returns in the twenty eight trading days leading up to the repurchase announcement 
(variable CARJB).  Kahle (2002), in a widely cited study, uses a period of forty days prior to the 
announcement, which represents approximately twenty eight trading days.  I use a twenty eight trading 
day period to be consistent with Kahle (2002). 
6.2f Industry Composition 
As discussed in section 4.5, Table 8 shows that there is substantial variation in repurchase program rates 
by industry.     Industries where share repurchase programs are common include the investment industry 
(SIC Codes 6020 and 6211) and commercial real estate (SIC Code 6512).    Variable HIGHIND takes on 
a value of one for these SIC codes and 0 otherwise.    Industries where repurchase programs are rare 
include natural resource industries (SIC Codes 1000, 1040, 1311 and 1400), pharmaceutical and 
biological products (SIC Codes 2834 and 2826), broadcasting (SIC code 3663) and computer 
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programming and system design (SIC Codes 7370 and 7373).       Variable LOWIND takes on a value of 
one for these SIC codes and 0 otherwise.     Given these varying repurchase program rates by industry, 
and assuming reasonable market efficiency, investors should expect more (less) repurchase 
announcements in industries where repurchase programs are prevalent (rare).    Inclusion of the variable 
LOWIND and HIGHIND in Probit Model 1 controls for investor expectations by industry and assumes 
that industry repurchasing rates are relatively constant over time, otherwise treatment as an ex-ante 
variable is not reasonable.    These variables are not included in Probit Model 1A to determine if inclusion 
of this potentially ex-post variable impacts the results. Probit Model 1A indicates that inferences are 




Repurchase Likelihood: Empirical Results 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the empirical results of three probit models used to model the antecedents of 
repurchase announcements.    The results are reported in Table 11.   Probit Model 1 uses all TSX firms 
included in the Compustat database from 1993 to 2004 to model the likelihood of a firm announcing a 
repurchase program during the period 1994 to 2005.    The results of Probit Model 1 indicate that past 
repurchase history, leverage, trading volume, research and development expenses, dividend yield, size and 
industry are associated with the probability of TSX firms announcing a repurchase program.     Pearson 
correlations for the independent variables used in Probit Model 1 are reported in Table 10. 
7.2 Probit Model 1/1A Results 
Table 11 presents the results of Probit Models 1 and 1A.     Probit Model 1A is a parsimonious 
version of Probit Model 1 that drops several potentially redundant or ex-post variables.   The results of 
Probit Model 1A are qualitatively indifferent from the results of Probit Model 1, so the discussion of 
results below focuses on Probit Model 1.    In this section, I discuss the results of Probit Model 1 as they 
relate to the predictions in chapter 5. 
7.2a Firm History 
Both NCIB1 and NCIB3 are positively associated with the probability of announcing a repurchase 
program in Model 1 providing support for P1.       NCIB3 is also positively associated with the probability 
of announcing a repurchase program in Model 1A.    In all cases, the variables are significant at the 0.01 
level of confidence.   This result is consistent with many TSX firms having repurchase programs year 
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after year, which I refer to as “serial repurchasers”.      Serial repurchasers are common on the TSX, 
allowing investors to evaluate past repurchase activity when evaluating a current repurchase 
announcement and to form expectations about the probability of a firm announcing a repurchase program. 
7.2b Dividends 
Dividend yield (variable DYIELD) is negatively associated with the probability of a repurchase 
announcement.     Firms who pay a large portion of their earnings to shareholders as dividends are less 
likely to announce a repurchase program.     This result is consistent with firms choosing an amount of 
income to pay to shareholders.    As dividends increase, repurchases decrease since the amount of the total 
payout is limited. 
7.2c Liquidity 
Trading volume (variable VOL) is negatively associated with the probability of a repurchase 
announcement, providing support for H1.     This result is consistent with thinly traded firms finding it 
advantageous to provide trading liquidity through repurchase programs.        
7.2d Cash Flow and Cash Balances 
Cash flow from operations (variable OCF) is positively associated with the probability of a repurchase 
announcement, consistent with P3B.    Cash balance as a percentage of assets (variable CASH) and 
change in cash from the previous year (variable CASHCHG) are not significantly associated with the 
probability of a repurchase announcement.    Therefore, there is no support for P3A and P3C.    These 
results are consistent with firms with strong operating cash flows announcing repurchase programs 
knowing that their strong operating cash flows will allow them to fund the repurchase program in the 
future.      Actual cash on hand (CASH) is less important than the ability to generate cash (OCF) when 
firms are deciding whether to commence a repurchase program.   Probit Model 1A uses the variable FCF 
in place of CASH, CASHCHG, OCF and CAPX.   FCF represents free cash flow and is calculated as cash 
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from operations less capital expenditures during the most recently reported fiscal year over total assets at 
the end of the most recently completed fiscal year.    FCF is positively associated (p=0.001) with the 
probability of repurchase in Probit Model 1A suggesting that firms seek to mitigate agency costs by 
distributing free cash flow, consistent with Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow theory. 
7.2e Information Asymmetry 
P6 predicts that the likelihood of announcing a repurchase program is positively related to pre-
announcement information asymmetry.    Three variables are used to proxy for information asymmetry: 
INTAN, XRD and SIZE.    Contrary to expectations, XRD is negatively associated with the likelihood of 
announcing a repurchase program.     The variable XRD was selected since firms with high research and 
development expenses are expected to have greater information asymmetry, since investors may lack 
information on the success of the research and development efforts.   However, XRD may also be a valid 
proxy for a firm’s investment opportunities.    Firms with high research and development expenses may 
simply be firms with larger investment opportunities.    Firms with large investment opportunities may not 
wish to expend their available cash on repurchases.      The result is, therefore, likely more due to the 
choice of an inappropriate proxy than evidence against P6.      SIZE is positively associated with the 
likelihood of announcing a repurchase program, consistent with P6.   However, SIZE can represent a 
number of factors beyond information asymmetry and care should be taken in interpreting SIZE as a 
variable.    INTAN is not significantly associated with the probability of announcing a repurchase 
program.      One problem with the use of this variable is that many TSX firms are young in comparison to 
more established firms on exchanges such as the NYSE, which have frequently been the subject of 
previous repurchases research.      Intangible assets are generally only recorded from acquisitions, since 
both Canadian and U.S. accounting regulations prohibit the recording of self-created goodwill.    As a 
result, many young TSX firms have not yet accumulated significant intangible assets that are recognized 
under generally accepted accounting principles.     Therefore, the variable INTAN in a TSX research 
setting may be a weak measurement of information asymmetry.     Taken together, the results provide 
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such weak support for P6 that it is premature to conclude that TSX firms’ repurchase decisions are 
influenced by information asymmetry. 
7.2f Industry Composition 
As expected, firms in industries with high concentrations of repurchases (HIGHIND) are positively 
associated with the probability of announcing a repurchase program.     Firms in industries with low 
concentrations of repurchases (LOWIND) are negatively associated with the probability of announcing a 
repurchase program.      This result is not unexpected given the approach to measuring these variables.      
Probit Model 1A excludes industry composition.   The results of Probit Model 1A are qualitatively 
unchanged from Probit Model 1 indicating that the inclusion of this variable has no impact on the overall 
conclusions of the results reported in Table 11. 
7.2g Leverage 
Leverage (variable LEV) is negatively associated with the probability of a repurchase announcement, 
consistent with firms with little financial slack being unlikely to engage in repurchase programs.     Highly 
leveraged firms may have debt covenants that restrict their ability to reduce their capital levels.    Also, 
highly leveraged firms may be cautious about using up cash for repurchases given their future debt 
obligations. 
7.3 Conclusions on Announcement Likelihood 
The results of Probit Model 1 indicate that the probability of announcing a repurchase program is 
positively associated with the number of past repurchase programs, operating cash flow and size.   The 
probability of announcing a repurchase program is negatively associated with research and development 
expenses, trading liquidity, dividend yield and leverage.    Membership in certain industries that have low 




The Market Reaction to TSX Repurchase Announcements 
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
8.1 Announcement Reaction 
Prior studies consistently demonstrate positive cumulative abnormal returns around the time of repurchase 
announcements, providing empirical evidence that the market considers repurchase program 
announcements to be favourable news.    U.S. examples include Vermaelen (1981), Comment and Jarell 
(1991), Jaganathan and Stephens (2003) and Grullon and Michaely (2004).   Canadian examples include 
Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (2000) and Li and McNally (2007).      Li and McNally (2007) 
document abnormal announcement returns of 0.73% during 1987 to 2000.    As discussed in chapter 2, 
several non-mutually exclusive theories have been advanced to explain these abnormal returns.  The most 
often cited theories explaining the positive market reaction to repurchase announcements are signalling 
theory and free cash flow theory.    Under signalling theory, if a firm is able to credibly communicate an 
intention to repurchase shares, a positive market reaction to the announcement is predicted.   Most past 
applications of signalling theory to repurchase studies presume that repurchase announcements convey 
credible positive information, since a rational firm would not normally repurchase shares unless 
management had non-public information that they were undervalued.      The cost of false signalling is 
repurchasing overvalued shares, which raises the cost of equity capital.   While there may be instances 
where management “burns money” by repurchasing overvalued shares, ceterus paribus, this behaviour is 
not expected to be widespread, so in general, repurchase announcements are considered to be good news.   
Free cash flow theory based on Jensen (1986) also predicts a positive market reaction to repurchase 
announcements.   Under free cash flow theory, a repurchase announcement is considered good news since 
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it represents a commitment to reduce agency costs.   Distributions of cash reduce agency costs because 
they limit the potential for management to spend cash on perks or to invest in low yielding investments.    
 On the other hand, there are reasons why repurchase announcements by TSX firms may not result 
in a significant market reaction.    First, as shown in Table 1, TSX repurchase announcements are not 
uncommon corporate events.    Many firms have repurchase programs every year.    Investors may be able 
to anticipate these announcements.    If investors are able to anticipate TSX repurchase announcements, 
there may be little market reaction since in an efficient market, investors should include the probability of 
repurchase into price.    Further, as noted in chapter 3, TSX repurchase regulations limit the number of 
shares to be repurchased under the program to no more than 5% of outstanding shares or 10% of the 
public float.    Jaganathan and Stephens (2003) report that the mean fraction of shares targeted for 
repurchase by U.S. firms is 7.68%, 7.13% and 6.67% for infrequent, occasional and frequent repurchases 
respectively.    Jaganathan and Stephens (2003) report that the percentage of the targeted shares actually 
repurchased is 64.6%, 80.7% and 103.1% respectively for infrequent, occasional and frequent 
repurchasers.   In contrast, Table 4 indicates that TSX firms on average only acquired 31.9% of the 
targeted shares (median is 15.7%).   Given that TSX repurchase regulations limit the actual number of 
shares to be repurchased to a smaller amount than typically occur in the U.S., and TSX firms typically 
repurchase a lower percentage of the announced shares, investors may see the announcements as a non-
material event, and may not react at all.    Finally, investors may be concerned that the repurchase 
program will allow management to exploit its information advantage over shareholders in order to 
repurchase shares when management has inside information that they are undervalued.     This may cause 
investors to avoid the stock and could result in a negative market reaction. 
Therefore, it is an open empirical question as to whether TSX firms enjoy a significant positive 
market reaction to their repurchase announcements during the sample period in this study, which ranges 
from 1994 to 2005.      Given the results of prior studies and the predictions of signalling and free cash 
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flow theory, I predict (P5) that announcing firms will have a significantly positive market reaction as 
measured by both returns and volume tests. 
 
8.2 Size of Repurchase Announcement 
Comment and Jarrell (1991) and Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) find that, for U.S. firms, announcement 
returns are increasing in the announced number of shares to be repurchased implying that the size of the 
repurchase program is important information.   However, as noted by Li and McNally (2007), most 
Canadian firms choose to announce the maximum number of shares that may be repurchased in their open 
market repurchase programs.   U.S. firms do not face similar restrictions, since Rule 10b only restricts the 
number of shares that can be repurchased on a daily basis.      As a result, given that very few Canadian 
firms (approximately 15% of my sample) announce less than the maximum, the number of shares to be 
repurchased in Canada is unlikely to be a significant variable affecting the market reaction to a repurchase 
announcement. 
8.3 Reasons for Repurchase Program 
Unlike U.S. firms, TSX firms are required to cite the reason(s) for their repurchase programs.  Some firms 
(<5%) ignore the TSX requirement to state the reason for their repurchase programs.  Many firms provide 
multiple reasons.  Table 3 presents the distribution of reasons given for the sample of firms for which 
press releases were available (see Table 2).   Prior studies only focus on the undervaluation explanation 
and do not differentiate between firms who claim that their repurchase programs are being put in place 
due to current undervaluation or potential future undervaluation.  I extend the repurchases literature by 
developing predictions for other explanations and including them in my empirical models. 
Many firms (40.9%) cite current undervaluation as a reason for their repurchase program.   If the 
claim of current undervaluation is credible, there should be a positive market reaction.   Otchere and Ross 
(2002) and Li and McNally (2007) studying Australian and TSX firms respectively find that firms citing 
39 
 
undervaluation enjoy greater announcement returns.    Consistent with Otchere and Ross (2002) and Li 
and McNally (2007), I predict (P6A) that announcement returns (and volume changes) are positively 
associated with firms citing current undervaluation as a reason for their repurchase programs. 
Announcements that cite potential future undervaluation as a reason for the repurchase program 
(32.4%) should be viewed positively.   This explanation indicates that management will create demand for 
the firm’s shares when, in management’s opinion, the shares are undervalued.    This may reduce 
information asymmetry since the market will be able to infer from management’s actions information 
about the value of the firm’s shares. I predict (P6B) that announcement returns and volume changes are 
positively associated with firms who cite putting the program in place in case of future undervaluation as 
a reason for their repurchase programs.  
Announcements that cite improving the liquidity of the firm’s stock as a reason for the repurchase 
program (5.8%) should also be viewed positively.   As indicated in section 2.8, analytical and empirical 
studies support the notion that firms with low market liquidity pay a ‘liquidity penalty’.   If management 
is able to credibly communicate an intention to improve market liquidity, the market should respond 
positively to the announcement since improving market liquidity should increase the value of the firm. I 
predict (P6C) that that announcement returns (and volume changes) are positively associated with firms 
who cite improving market liquidity as a reason for their repurchase program. 
In the three cases above, I predict a positive reaction, but only if the announcement is credible.    I 
will inter-act these variables with my credibility variable (past follow-through).   I predict a positive 
reaction only when the disclosed reason is credible.    For the explanations that follow, I do not have clear 
predictions since there are competing arguments as to what the market reaction should be and the 
explanations may not be informative.   Nevertheless, it is an interesting empirical question as to whether 
these explanations impact the market reaction. 
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Some firms (7.3%) cite avoiding dilution due to stock options as a reason for their repurchase 
programs.    This rationale might evoke a positive reaction if investors are concerned about dilution of 
their interests due to stock options.    On the other hand, the market might see the announcement of the 
intention to purchase shares as proof that the stock option programs are expensive and may react 
negatively to the announcement.   Kahle (2002) finds that announcement returns are smaller for firms with 
high levels of non-managerial options.   Kahle (2002) attributes the finding of decreased returns to the 
market interpreting a repurchase to fund options as not being indicative of undervaluation.   Consequently 
where a firm cites option funding as the reason for its repurchase program, I expect no abnormal returns 
during the announcement window.  
Announcements that cite excess cash (5.1%) or good use of cash (57.7%) as an explanation could 
also evoke either a negative or positive response.     If the market perceives that the firm has few 
investment opportunities, a negative reaction could occur.   On the other hand, if the market had already 
viewed the firm as having few good investment opportunities before the repurchase announcement, the 
lack of investment opportunities should already be incorporated in price.    Consistent with Jensen’s 
(1986) free cash flow theory, announcing the return of excess cash should be viewed as a positive 
development since management is indicating that they do not intend to waste cash.  Hence, a positive 
reaction to the announcement could also occur.   One problem is that citing good use of cash is a common 
reason (57.7%) and not particularly informative.    One would expect firms to put their cash to good use.   
It is possible that many firms provide “good use of cash” as a reason simply to meet the TSX requirement 
that the reason for the NCIB be stated.  It is possible that a negative reaction may occur if the market 
views “good use of cash” as ambiguous and indicative of a lack of transparency. 
Announcements that cite helping or increasing the proportionate interest of remaining 
shareholders as a reason for the repurchase program (37.3% of firms) could also be viewed positively or 
negatively.    Shareholders who do not have an intention to sell may view this statement positively since 
management will be using its information advantage when purchasing stock from selling shareholders.   
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Selling shareholders will be facing an informed buyer.   Depending on the unobservable ratio of long-term 
to short-term shareholders, the market reaction could be positive or negative.   Again the reason is not 
particularly informative and may just be provided to meet the TSX requirement to provide a reason for the 
program. 
8.4 Credibility 
I employ a framework similar to Mercer (2004) to examine whether the market assesses the credibility of 
TSX stock repurchase announcements.   Mercer (2004) synthesizes the existing literature on disclosure 
credibility to identify four factors that investors consider when assessing the credibility of a management 
disclosure: (1) situational incentives at the time of the disclosure, (2) management’s credibility, (3) the 
levels of external and internal assurance and (4) characteristics of the disclosure itself, which includes 
precision, venue, time horizon, amount of supporting information and inherent plausibility.  
8.4.1 Situational Incentives 
Summarizing the literature, Mercer (2004, p. 187) concludes that “investors should be less likely to 
believe management disclosures when management has high incentives to be misleading or untruthful”.   
Similarly, Lippert, Nixon and Pilotte (2000) apply an agency theory approach and predict an inverse 
relationship between the stock price response to dividend increase announcements and the pay-stock 
performance sensitivity of management compensation for two reasons: (1) Increased pay-performance 
sensitivity exacerbates managers optimistic bias regarding future performance, reducing the credibility of 
the dividend signal and (2) Increased pay-performance reduces the need for dividends as a means of 
reducing agency costs since the interests of management and shareholders are aligned.   Their empirical 
results confirm their prediction.  Rogers and Stocken (2005) find that bias in management forecasts is 
associated with the incentives to incorporate bias and that the market varies its response to management 
forecasts with the amount of predictable bias.   Applying Lippert, Nixon and Pilotte’s (2000) approach to 
repurchase announcements, investors should be less likely to believe that the repurchase announcement is 
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credible and actually conveys good news the more management stands to gain from an increase in stock 
price.   Where management has stock price dependant incentives, the interests of management and the 
shareholders are likely to be more aligned, so there should be less of a tendency to invest in perks or low 
net present value investments.  As a result, the announcement that the firm intends to distribute cash will 
be less positively viewed by investors since there is less need to distribute cash to reduce agency costs.    
Consistent with these studies, I predict that announcement returns will be negatively related to managerial 
wealth incentives leading to the following hypothesis: 
H2 Announcement returns (and volume changes) are negatively related to stock-price-
dependant managerial wealth incentives. 
Kahle (2002) does not consider managerial incentives beyond the number of stock options held. I 
extend Kahle (2002) by considering managerial wealth incentives beyond the number of stock options 
held since Mercer’s (2004) disclosure credibility framework includes all managerial wealth incentives.     
In addition to the number of options held, I measure and include in my empirical tests the extent that stock 
options have intrinsic value and insider holdings, since insider holdings also create a managerial wealth 
incentive.     Jensen and Murphy (1990) show that the value of options to managers is increasing in the options’ 
intrinsic value.   Core and Guay (2001) note that the sensitivity of managers’ wealth to market value, known as delta, 
depends on intrinsic value, among other factors.    If the stock options are deep out of the money or if 
management holds no shares, a gain in stock price will not provide an immediate benefit to management.   
However, existing shareholdings and stock options that are already in the money will further increase in 
value with a rise in share price.    Therefore the benefit to management is increasing in the extent that 
stock options have intrinsic value and in the extent of management shareholdings.      
8.4.2 Management Credibility 
Section 2.3 discusses studies that support the existence of a reputation effect for corporate disclosures.    
Bandyopadhyay and Kao (1996) provide the first empirical analysis of the role of history in stock 
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repurchase programs.  They find that while announcing firms enjoy abnormal returns during the 
announcement period, firms that have made repurchases under past repurchase programs enjoy greater 
returns over the repurchase period than firms that did not make repurchases.   I extend their work by using 
a continuous variable for repurchase history and incorporating past behaviour into Mercer’s (2004) 
credibility framework.   Use of Mercer’s (2004) framework results in a more complete modelling of 
investor reaction that includes other aspects of credibility, such as equity-based managerial incentives 
(section 8.3.1).  My work is similar in nature to Schmitt (2007) who finds that the repurchase 
announcement returns are positively related to completion rates on recently completed repurchase 
programs.    Further, I control for the market’s prior expectation of the likelihood of a repurchase 
announcement and the disclosed reasons for the repurchase.  By controlling for other factors that may 
influence the market reaction to a repurchase announcement, I am able to reduce the likelihood of 
correlated omitted variables and to rule out competing explanations. 
 Lie (2005) finds that improvements in performance are limited to firms who actually repurchase 
shares during the same fiscal quarter.  Lie’s (2005) results suggest that actual repurchases, not 
announcements, are more important in forecasting future performance.  In his conclusion, Lie (2005) 
points out the benefits of a study that addresses the actual follow through rate of firms.  My study partially 
addresses Lie’s call for research into follow through rates by considering the extent to which the market 
considers past follow through rates in interpreting a current announcement. 
 As discussed in chapter 3, TSX reporting standards allow investors to see the extent to which the 
announcing firm followed through on its prior repurchase announcement.  Given the framework of the 
TSX repurchase system, I contend that firms and their management may develop reputations for either 
following through or not following through on their share repurchase announcements.  Consistent with the 
empirical and analytical studies discussed above, if a firm has had a recent repurchase program and had 
followed through on the repurchase announcement for that program, subsequent repurchase 
announcements will be more likely to believed by the market and considered good news.  Therefore, more 
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positive return and a greater volume reaction is expected if the firm had a recent repurchase program and 
repurchased stock during the year in which its previous plan was in place leading to the following 
hypothesis. 
H3 Announcement returns (and volume changes) are positively related to the follow-through 
rate on the immediately preceding repurchase program. 
Management’s response to stock price changes during its past repurchase programs may impact 
the importance of past repurchases on the credibility of the current announcement.  Prior repurchases are 
expected to be evaluated in light of market conditions at the time the prior repurchase program was in 
place.   Prior repurchases may be endogenous since they reflect prior market conditions.   There may be 
no loss of credibility or reputation if management did not repurchase shares but the stock price rose 
nonetheless.  In this case, there was no need for management to purchase stock since the market increased 
the price of the share.   Also, the rise in share price can be seen as confirmation of the good news implicit 
in the previous announcement.  Stephens and Weisbach (1998, p.327, note 11) note the following: “If, for 
example, there is a strongly positive reaction to the announcement, underpricing will be reduced, lowering 
the firm’s demand for reacquiring securities”. However, where management announced a repurchase 
program, the price of the stock dropped and management did not buy any shares back, management’s 
credibility with respect to the current announcement is expected to be low since the firm did not stand 
behind its previous statement that the firm intended to repurchase shares and subsequent information did 
not confirm that the previous announcement was good news.   If the price of the stock rose during the year 
the previous repurchase program was in place and the firm bought back stock, credibility would be very 
high since the firm carried through with its repurchase announcement and the market accepted the good 
news conveyed in the previous announcement.  If the price of the stock dropped during the year of the 
previous repurchase program and the firm bought back stock, credibility would be high since the firm 
supported its stock through actual repurchases when it was dropping in price.  In summary, the effects of 
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past stock price behaviour and past repurchases during the most recent repurchase program on the 
credibility of a current repurchase announcement are predicted to be as follows: 
 High Repurchases (exceed average) Low Repurchases 
Stock Price 
Increased 
Very high credibility.    No loss of credibility. 
Stock Price 
Decreased 
High credibility. Low credibility. 
 
The above discussion indicates that credibility should be higher where the firm’s stock price rose 
during its preceding repurchase program.   Since credibility is higher, cumulative abnormal returns over 
the announcement period should be higher.  In contrast, prior studies such as Ho, Liu and Ramanan 
(1997) and Stevens and Weisbach (1998) find that a drop in stock price just prior to a repurchase 
announcement is associated with greater returns during the announcement period.    This finding is 
attributed to the market being more likely to believe that the stock is currently undervalued if it 
experienced a decline in price just prior to the announcement.  Where there has been a drop in price, the 
repurchase announcement is seen as conveying previously private management information to the market 
that the market’s recent negative assessment of the firm’s future prospects was incorrect.   Therefore, I 
will control for price changes over the one year period corresponding to the prior repurchase program 
(variable PPRET), a long-term measure, and cumulative abnormal returns in the twenty eight trading days  
immediately preceding the current program announcement (variable CARJB), a short-term measure.  
Kahle (2002), in a widely cited study, uses a period of forty days prior to the announcement, which 
represents approximately twenty eight trading days.  I use a twenty eight trading day period to be 
consistent with Kahle (2002).      I predict (P7 and P8 respectively) that the long-term measure will be 
46 
 
positively related to announcement returns and volume changes, while the short-term measure, as in prior 
studies, will be negatively related to announcement returns and volume changes. 
8.4.3 Levels of External and Internal Assurance 
Mercer (2004) summarizes the results of experimental and archival research on the effects of 
external auditing on disclosure credibility and finds that, ceteris paribus, audited disclosures are more 
credible than un-audited disclosures.   However, given that repurchase announcements involve a statement 
of future intent that cannot be verified by an external auditor, it is not possible to have repurchase 
announcements with external audit assurance.   All firms and regulatory jurisdictions are equal in this 
respect. 
Assurance from within the firm may improve disclosure credibility.   Wild (1996) finds that 
investors rely more on earnings after formation of an audit committee.   Other studies cited in Mercer 
(2004) find a link between corporate governance and credibility, implying that better corporate 
governance structures may make disclosures more credible.  Since the firm is well governed, its 
disclosures are more likely to be truthful and informative resulting in a greater market reaction.   This 
approach can be applied to stock repurchase announcements and results in the prediction that better 
corporate governance indicators should be associated with greater announcement returns and volume.     
The presence of external directors may indicate to investors that the firm is well governed since 
management is subject to scrutiny through the presence of external directors.   The announcement of a 
repurchase plan may also indicate to the market that the external directors have been successful in 
constraining management’s use of free cash flow.   Consequently, I predict (P9) a positive relationship 
between announcement returns (and volume changes) and the presence of external directors.        
8.4.4 Disclosure Characteristics 
Mercer (2004) lists additional factors that affect disclosure credibility.  These factors relate to the 
characteristics of the disclosure itself. 
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a. Precision.   Given that few (approximately 15% of sample firms) TSX firms announce less than the 
maximum, the precision of the announced number of shares to be repurchased in Canada is unlikely to be 
a significant variable affecting the market reaction to a repurchase announcement.     
b. Venue.  Mercer (2004) summarizes evidence that suggests that the venue management chooses to make 
a disclosure in may impact the credibility of the disclosure.  However TSX firms are required to announce 
their repurchase programs through a press release carried on the major corporate news services.   As a 
result, there is little or no variation in venue and hence it is not expected to be a significant factor affecting 
the market reaction to a repurchase announcement by a TSX firm. 
c. Time Horizon.   Mercer (2004) notes managers are likely to have better information about short time 
horizons.  As a result, short horizon disclosures may be more credible than long horizon disclosures.    
Again, however, all Canadian repurchase programs are limited to one year and no firms in my sample 
announced that their program would be restricted to less than one year, so there is no variation among 
firms with respect to time horizon.     In contrast, U.S. firms may have multi-year programs. 
d. Amount of Supporting Information.   Where additional information is provided to support the 
disclosure, disclosure credibility may be higher for two reasons.   First, the firm may be disclosing 
proprietary information.  Investors, realizing that disclosure of proprietary information is costly, may 
perceive the disclosure to be more credible.  Second, additional disclosures increase the ex post 
verifiability of the disclosure.   Since management’s reputation may suffer, the ex post verifiability of the 
disclosure places limits on management’s ability to make opportunistic disclosures.     Canadian firms are 
required to provide reasons for their repurchase programs.  However, some firms (<10%) in my sample 
either provided no reason at all in violation of the requirement or provided very vague reasons for their 
repurchase programs.  Other firms provided more detailed reasons for their repurchase programs.  In 
many cases, multiple reasons were cited for the repurchase program.    
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e. Inherent Plausibility.   Mercer’s (2004) final factor influencing the credibility of a management 
disclosure is the inherent plausibility of the disclosure.   The more plausible the disclosure, the more 
credible it is.  Disclosures that are inconsistent with prior beliefs will be received with skepticism.  
Numerous management forecasting studies are cited by Mercer (2004) as support but, for the sake of 
brevity, will not be repeated here.   Ho, Liu and Ramanan (1997) find that repurchase announcements are 
associated with greater abnormal returns where firms have enjoyed an increase in quarterly profits and 
sales, consistent with the market viewing the repurchase announcement as plausible good news since the 
repurchase news is consistent with past earnings news.   This effect is larger for firms with higher 
information asymmetry.   I include in my regressions as control variables (Appendix 8) the same factors 
considered by Ho, Liu and Ramanan (1997).       I also include cash on hand.    In order for a repurchase 
announcement to be plausible good news, investors should feel that the firm has the capability to 
repurchase shares.    Consequently, I predict (P10) that announcement returns are increasing in firm cash. 
  Section 2.5 discusses the asymmetric information hypothesis.   Prior studies such as Ho, Liu and 
Ramanan (1997), Stevens and Weisbach (1998) and Li and McNally (2007) find that a drop in stock price 
just prior to a repurchase announcement is associated with greater returns during the announcement 
period.    This finding is attributed to the market being more likely to believe that the stock is currently 
undervalued if it experienced a decline in price just prior to the announcement.  The announcement that 
the firm is repurchasing its shares is seen as conveying information to the market that the market’s recent 
negative assessment of the firm’s future prospects was incorrect.    The greater the more recent drop in 
stock price, the more information a repurchase announcement conveys since it reverses other recent 
information.   Consistent with these prior studies, I predict (P8 repeated) a negative relationship between 
announcement returns and volume changes surrounding the repurchase announcement and cumulative 
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9.1 Market Reaction Tests 
P7 predicts a significant market reaction to TSX repurchase announcements.   I begin by calculating 
abnormal returns and abnormal volume using multiple models of abnormal returns and abnormal 
volumes.   Abnormal return and abnormal volume models measure returns and volume in excess of what 
would be expected to occur if the announcement did not occur.   I use multiple models of abnormal 
returns and volume in order to ensure that the results are not contingent on the choice of model.    Event 
window abnormal returns are calculated using cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) from the market model 
and buy and hold returns (BHR) from the buy and hold model.     Kothari and Warner (2004, p.12) discuss 
the differences between these two models.    The market model calculates daily abnormal returns and then 
calculates cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) by compounding the daily returns over the event window.    
The buy and hold return model calculates cumulative returns over the entire event window and essentially 
ignores daily returns.  Essentially, the difference between the two models is that the market model allows 
for daily adjustment of the amount invested (ie. daily portfolio re-balancing), whereas the buy and hold 
model does not.   These models are defined in Appendix 6.   Examples in the repurchases literature of the 
use of market return models include Barth and Kasznik (1999), Ikenberry, Lakinishok and Vermaelen 
(2000) and Grullon and Michaely (2004).    Examples in the repurchases literature of the use of buy and 
hold returns include Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) and Li and McNally (2007).    
Alternative approaches include raw returns and control sample returns, such as Jaganathan and Stephens 
(2003).   Following Cready and Hurtt (2002), I also test the market reaction to repurchase announcements 
using volume metrics since Cready and Hurtt (2002) show that volume metrics are capable of detecting 
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investor reaction to an information event when returns tests are not.   Cready and Hurtt (2002) find that 
volume tests are particularly useful where the expected investor reaction is small and where sample sizes 
are small.    Investor response to a Canadian normal course issuer bid is expected to be small since firms 
are limited to a maximum of 10% of the public float of the firms’ stock.  In contrast, US repurchase 
announcements are not limited in size by regulation.   Also, repurchase announcement sample sizes are 
limited in comparison to earnings announcement studies since not all firms repurchase shares.   
Cumulative abnormal volume (CAV) is calculated for each security in the sample using log-transformed 
relative volumes as described by Campbell and Wasley (1996) and non-transformed relative volumes. 
In order to ensure that the event study results are not contingent on the choice of event window or 
estimation period, a number of event windows and estimation periods are used.   I use the statistical 
package Eventus by Cowan Research Inc. which allows for easy calculation of abnormal returns and 
volume using various models, event windows and estimation periods.     A complete list of market 
reaction variables including their calculation approach (market model or buy and hold model), event 
windows and parameter estimation periods is contained in Table 11.   Table 11 also contains the results, 
which are discussed in chapter 10.    My primary measures of CAR and CAV, for which I report complete 
empirical results, utilizes the market model calculated over the three day event window commencing one 
day before the announcement.    I estimate the market model using a minimum of sixty days data and a 
maximum of 200 days data.     My primary measures of CAR and CAV use an estimation model that 
includes equal days before and after the announcement date.    I utilize this approach for two reasons.   
First, if firm risk shifts over time, use of equal days before and after the announcement may better reflect 
firm risk at the time of the announcement.   Changing firm risk may be a risk in this study since 
repurchases reduce equity, resulting in increased financial leverage.    Mandelker (1974) utilizes a post-
event period to account for the possible change in risk due to mergers.    Masulis (1980) splits the 
estimation period equally into a pre-event and post-event period in his study of the price impacts of 
exchange offers and recapitalization announcements.   Masulis (1980) splits the event period since, 
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similar to share repurchases, exchange offers and recapitalizations can impact capital structure and hence 
risk.      Second, use of an estimation period before and after the event allows inclusion in the sample of 
firms who do not have a long history of returns before the repurchase announcement.   Table 15 indicates 
that the correlation between the primary measure of returns (CAR) and an alternative that uses an 
estimation period before the announcement (CARNP) is 0.9798, indicating that the choice of estimation 
period (pre-event or mixed) is unlikely to have any impact on the results of this study.    I do not use log 
transformed returns in my primary measure of cumulative abnormal returns since the primary event 
window (-1 to +1) is short, so continuous compounding should not impact the results.   Table 15 indicates 
that the correlation between the primary measure of returns (CAR) and an alternative that uses log 
transformed returns (CARCC) is 0.9945, suggesting that the use of non-log transformed abnormal returns 
is unlikely to impact the results of this study. 
After calculating abnormal returns and volume using various models, event windows and 
estimation periods, the Patell (1976) test and the generalized sign test are conducted to evaluate the 
market reaction.    These tests are defined in Appendix 6.   The Patell (1976) test considers whether the 
returns (or volume) around the repurchase announcement are normal given the pattern of returns during 
the return estimation period.    A significant Patell (1976) test indicates that the returns (or volume) 
around the event period were significantly higher or lower than what normally occurred during the 
estimation period and is used as a test of whether the sample repurchase announcements had information 
content (P7).        The generalized sign test tests the null hypothesis that the fraction of positive returns 
(or abnormal volume) in the event window is the same as in the estimation period.  It is also used to 
evaluate the information content of the sample repurchase announcements (P7).  In a very recent paper, 
Campbell, Cowan and Salotti (2009) use seeded simulated abnormal returns of varying levels (-5% to 
+5%) to evaluate the appropriateness of commonly used event study tests and conclude that the 
generalized sign test is the best test.    Campbell, Cowan and Salotti (2009) also find support for market 
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model based tests, such as the Patell (1976) test, provided the market model based tests use a local stock 
exchange index, as is done in this thesis. 
 
9.2 Market Reaction Explanatory Model 
The market’s reaction to the repurchase announcement for firm j at announcement date t is modeled using 
the following two regression equations: 
(2) CARjt = γ + δYjt + € 
(3) CAVjt = ν + ψYjt + ¥ 
Where CARjt and CAVjt refer to cumulative abnormal returns and volume respectively calculated 
according to the definitions in Tables 12 and 13 for firm j at announcement date t, γ and ν represent 
intercept terms, δ and ψ are vectors of k parameters, Y is an n x k vector of k variables corresponding to 
the ex-ante variables for firm j at time t in Appendices 7 (primary variables) and 8 (control variables) and 
€ and ¥ represent residual error terms.  
Equations (2) and (3) are estimated using only firms who announced a NCIB.  Four sets of results 
are presented in Tables 18 to 30.    Model 1 utilizes all announcing firms with available market and 
announcement content data.   Model 2 utilizes all announcing firms with available market, announcement 
and accounting data.    Model 3 controls for proxy circular data items.    Model 4 contains the same 
announcing firms as model 3, but excludes announcements with competing information events.    I test the 
predictions and hypotheses in chapters 5 and 8 by comparing the results from the OLS models to the 
predicted signs in Appendix 7. 
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9.3 Proxy Selection 
In this section, I discuss the proxies used to represent the factors likely to impact the market reaction to a 
repurchase announcement.   Justification for these factors is provided in chapter 8.   Primary variables are 
defined in Appendix 7.   Control variables are defined in Appendix 8. 
9.3a Shares Targeted 
I measure shares targeted (variable TARGET) as shares to be repurchased per the announcement over 
total outstanding shares at the end of the fiscal year immediately preceding the announcement. 
9.3b Reasons for the Announcement 
I personally read the 2,617 found press releases (see Table 2) and coded all variables according to the 
explanations summarized in Table 3.      I developed this list of explanations by first reading 
approximately 500 press releases and determining the most common explanations.     Table 3 summarizes 
the proportion of firms citing each reason.   I ignore explanations used by less than five percent of firms 
since it is statistically impractical to determine the importance of infrequently provided reasons due to 
small sample sizes.   As described in Appendix 7, the variables CUV, FUV, GOOD, EXCASH, STOCKP, 
LIQ and REMSH are binary variables taking on a value of 1 if the firm cites the corresponding reason in 
their repurchase announcement. 
9.3c Managerial Incentives 
H2 predicts that the market reaction to repurchase announcements is negatively related to managerial 
wealth incentives.    I measure managerial wealth incentives using three variables.   OPTPER is measured 
as total options outstanding divided by total shares outstanding as reported in the most recently completed 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.    Data on total options outstanding were hand collected from 
firms’ financial statement notes in the year immediately prior to their repurchase announcements.   
INMONEY is the intrinsic value of options as of the most recently reported proxy circular preceding the 
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repurchase announcement date, scaled by total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year 
preceding the repurchase announcement date.        INMONEY measures the extent to which stock options 
are in the money.     If stock options have intrinsic value, management will experience an immediate gain from any 
increase in stock price as a result of the repurchase announcement.   If options do not have intrinsic value, there is 
unlikely to be an immediate gain unless the shares are barely out of the money and the increase in stock price from 
the announcement puts the options `in the money`.    Jensen and Murphy (1990) show that the value of options to 
managers is increasing in the options’ intrinsic value.   Core and Guay (2001) note that the sensitivity of managers’ 
wealth to market value, known as delta, depends on intrinsic value, among other factors.   As a result, intrinsic value 
may serve as a proxy for delta.    I include both OPTPER and INMONEY since OPTER measures the future 
incentive to raise share prices and INMONEY measures the current incentive to raise share prices.   Finally, 
INSIDER is total insider shares as of the most recently reported proxy circular preceding the repurchase 
announcement date divided by total shares outstanding as reported in the most recently completed fiscal 
year preceding the repurchase announcement date.       
9.3d Management credibility 
H3 predicts that the market reaction to repurchase announcement is positively related to the follow-
through rate on the firm’s most recent repurchase program.    I measure the repurchase rate (variable REP) 
as the number of shares actually repurchased during the last repurchase program, but no more than three 
years preceding the current announcement, divided by the maximum number of shares the preceding 
announcement stated could be repurchased under the plan.   P10 predicts that the market reaction to a 
repurchase announcement is increasing in cash on hand, since cash on hand indicates an ability to actually 
repurchase shares.    Variable CASH is measured as cash over total assets as of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement and is predicted to be positively associated with announcement 
returns.  
9.3e Information Asymmetry 
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I use the same three information asymmetry proxies (INTAN, XRD, SIZE) for market reaction analysis 
that I use for repurchase announcement likelihood.   These variables are discussed in section 6.4f.     
9.3f Corporate Governance 
P9 predicts a positive relationship between the market reaction to a repurchase announcement and board 
independence.    Variable EXBRD is measured as the number of non-executive directors over total 
directors as of the most recently reported proxy circular preceding the announcement.      
9.4 Announcement Surprise and Sample Selection 
I control for the market’s prior expectation of a repurchase announcement using several methods.   
Controlling for the market’s prior expectation of a repurchase announcement is appropriate since the 
market will already have expectations as to whether firms will announce repurchase programs.  Also, it is 
only possible to observe announcement returns and the disclosed reasons for repurchase programs for 
firms who actually announce repurchase programs.   As a result, the sample of TSX firms who announce 
repurchase programs is a truncated sample of the entire population of TSX firms.    Selection is not the 
focus of this thesis.     However, any attempt to model the market’s reaction to an announcement without 
first considering the market’s assessment of the likelihood of that announcement occurring in the first 
place could result in a correlated omitted variable problem since the surprise level of the announcement 
could be an important variable.  As Li and Prabhala (2005, p. 10) point out “the process of correction for 
self-selection can be viewed as including an omitted variable”.    
I use three approaches to control for the market’s prior expectation of a repurchase 
announcement.    In the first series of regressions (Tables 18,19,25,26), I include the variable NCIB3, 
which represents the number of repurchase programs announced in the three fiscal years prior to the most 
recently completed fiscal year prior to the announcement.    NCIB3 is used to proxy for the market’s 
expectation that the firm will announce a repurchase program.   I utilize this simple approach to control 
for the market’s prior expectation of the probability of a repurchase announcement since Francis and 
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Lennox (2008) show that more formal selection models can be sensitive to the choice of variables in each 
stage of the two step procedure employed.    Using UK data on auditor selection, Francis and Lennox 
(2008) show that by changing the variables included in the first and second stage of the Heckman 
selection model they employ, their results are extremely sensitive to minor specification changes.   Using 
their UK auditor selection data, they find that simple one stage OLS models are much less sensitive to 
specification changes.       
My second approach to controlling for the market’s level of surprise that a repurchase 
announcement has occurred is similar to Li and McNally (2007).   Li and McNally (2007) are the only 
previous example in the repurchases literature of controlling for selection bias.     Li and McNally (2007) 
first estimate the probability of an announcement using a probit model.    They estimate this probability 
using a sample of announcing firms and a comparative sample (size, industry) of firms who did not 
announce repurchase programs.     They estimate one probit model for all firms in the cross-sectional 
sample over the period 1988 to 2000.    They document that the probit model residuals of the announcing 
firms are correlated with the announcement returns and interpret this finding as evidence that firms 
convey private information in their repurchase announcements.    
Li and McNally (2007)’s approach assumes that information is available to investors immediately 
after the end of the fiscal year.    Their approach allows no lag for the preparation or auditing of the 
financial statements or for preparation and issuance of the proxy circular.     
In my second set of market reaction regressions, I employ the Li and McNally (2007) approach 
with several modifications.   First, I assume that the annual financial statements become available to 
investors on the same day that the auditor signs the audit report, since it is common practice for 
companies to issue a press release announcing their earnings and other important results immediately after 
the auditor has completed their field work and issued an audit report.      This generally involves a lag of 
approximately two months after the end of the fiscal period.   I also check the date of the proxy circular 
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and only use proxy circulars that were publicly issued at the time of the repurchase announcement.     This 
modification is made to ensure that only ex-ante information is considered.    My second modification is 
that I also include repurchase history, options and liquidity as potentially significant announcement 
predictors, since as discussed in chapter 5 there is support for these variables impacting the announcement 
decision.    Finally, I include the predicted value from probit model 1 in the OLS market reaction model, 
rather than testing for a correlation between the residuals of the two models.   Inclusion of the predicted 
value from the probit model in the OLS models controls for the market’s level of surprise that a 
repurchase announcement has occurred. 
I use the entire Compustat database from 1993 to 2004 to develop an announcement expectations 
model (Probit Model 1 in Table 11).    This approach has the advantage of allowing size and industry to 
be variables considered by investors in determining their expectation of a repurchase announcement.     I 
explicitly include size and industry in the model.    This approach also allows for a considerable increase 
in sample size when developing an expectations model.    It also results in a sample of firms that is more 
representative of the population of repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms.   The disadvantage of this 
approach is that it is too costly to gather corporate governance, ownership and compensation data for all 
firms on the Compustat database.   There are no commercial databases that contain this information.     As 
a result, it is not possible to control for the influence of corporate governance, ownership and 
compensation structure on the repurchase decision.     
In my second series of market reaction regressions (Tables 20,21,27,28), I use the predicted value 
from Probit Model 1 (results in Table 11), P1, to proxy for the market’s level of surprise that the firm 
announced a repurchase program.     The predicted value is transformed using the normal cumulative 
distribution function to a value that is bounded by 0 (low probability of announcement) and 1 (high 
probability of announcement).   P1 has a mean of 0.2076 and a standard deviation of 0.247.     
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Finally, I use a full information maximum likelihood Heckman model to formally control for 
selection (Tables 22,23,29,30).     The Heckman model has the advantage of being frequently employed as 
a method of controlling for sample selection.    Francis and Lennox (2008) provide a complete description 
and extensive discussion of the Heckman model and cite over thirty recent accounting studies that utilize 
this approach.      In summary, the Heckman model allows for the possibility that factors that impact the 
repurchase announcement decision may also impact the market reaction to the repurchase announcement.    
As a result, potentially endogenous explanatory variables exist that could bias the coefficients of ordinary 
least squares regressions if the truncated errors are correlated with the explanatory variables.    The 
Heckman procedure accounts for potentially truncated errors that could bias the coefficient estimates.    I 
use the full-information maximum-likelihood Heckman model rather than the original two stage Heckman 
model.    Francis and Lennox (2008) emphasize the importance of imposing and justifying exclusion 
restrictions when using selection models.    I impose exclusion restrictions by including the following 
variables in the first stage, but excluding them from the second stage.   First, I control for industry 
(variables LOWIND and HIGHIND) in the first stage because some industries have either high (variable 
HIGHIND) or low (variable LOWIND) repurchase rates.   However, there is no theory that suggests that 
the market reaction to repurchase announcements should vary by industry.    Second, I control for 
dividends (variables DVPT and DYIELD) in the first stage since empirical evidence, such as Grullon and 
Michaely (2002) show that firms may be substituting repurchases for dividends.   Modigliani and Miller 
(1961) in a seminal paper provide an analysis that suggests that dividend policy has no affect on market 
value.    Finally, leverage (variable LEVERAGE) is included in the first stage since heavily levered firms 
may not have the financial capacity to repurchase shares and may be prohibited from reducing equity as a 
result of debt covenants.    However, leverage is unlikely to impact the market reaction to TSX repurchase 
announcements since TSX regulations severely limit the number of shares that can be repurchased.   
Hence, the repurchases are unlikely to have a large impact on leverage that might necessitate a market 
reaction due to a change in risk profile for the stock.   As noted in section 11.4, limitations of analysis, 
these exclusion restrictions can be challenged on the grounds that if management seeks to maximize firm 
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value through repurchases, it is possible that any factor that impacts management’s propensity to 
repurchase shares could also impact firm value.    It would be convenient if there were exogenously 
imposed events during the sample period that led firms to repurchase shares without those same events 
impacting market value.   Unfortunately, there are no such exogenously imposed events.   Firms 
voluntarily choose to repurchase shares.     
9.5 Use of Panel Data, Serial Correlation and Outliers 
As my sample contains multiple observations from many firms, there is the potential for serial correlation 
in the residuals.     Petersen (2008) simulates the results of several models typically used to estimate 
standard errors in panel data.    Petersen (2008) provides evidence that only clustered standards errors are 
unbiased, since they the account for the residual dependence created by the firm effect.      Consistent with 
the findings of Petersen (2008), I use clustered standard errors, which provide more conservative 
estimates of standard errors than regular ordinary least squares regression, since the standard error 
estimates account for the potential serial correlation in the residuals of observations from the same firms.     
Clustered standard errors allow for the possibility that disturbances within each cluster are correlated with 
each other, but require that the disturbances from different clusters be uncorrelated6.   I use the statistical 
package STATA to conduct my regression analyses.    STATA contains a feature that allows the 
determination of clustered standard errors.    I define a cluster as an individual firm.     
9.6 Competing Information Events 
In order to provide results that are less likely7 to be confounded by competing information events, I also 
present results for the sub-sample of firms who do not make other announcements, such as earnings or 
dividends at the same time as their repurchase program announcement or announce multiple security 
                                                     
6 Baum, Christopher, 2006,   An Introduction to Modern Econometrics Using Stata, p.138.     
7 TSX firms are required to post earnings and dividend announcements on SEDAR.   TSX firms are not required to 
include press releases on SEDAR, although they are encouraged to do so.   As a result of the lack of requirement to 
include all press releases on SEDAR, it is not possible to guarantee that firms in my sample did not have other press 
releases on the same day as their repurchase announcement. 
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repurchase programs.    All announcements were scrutinized for competing information events by 
reviewing all documents on the SEDAR database within 10 days of the announcement date.     Any firm 
with an announcement during the standard event window (-1,1) were noted.     This procedure identified 
526 security announcements that had confounding information events, representing 18.36% of sample 
announcements.      The high rate of competing information events indicates that competing information 
events may be a significant problem when studying TSX repurchase announcements.    Results excluding 




Market Reaction Empirical Results 
 
10.1 Introduction 
Stock repurchase announcement studies consistently document positive abnormal returns around the 
announcement.  These findings are consistent with repurchase announcements conveying favourable 
information to the market.   In this chapter, I begin by examining the market reaction to TSX repurchase 
announcements.    I find evidence that repurchase announcements convey information to the market, as 
evidenced by statistically significant price and volume reaction tests.    Next, I examine factors that may 
be associated with the market reaction to TSX repurchase announcements.   I find evidence that firms who 
cite current undervaluation as the reason for their repurchase program enjoy higher announcement returns, 
but this reason fails to remain statistically significant when other potential explanatory variables are 
controlled for.    Other reasons are not found to be significant.     I also find evidence that firms who have 
fulfilled more of their previous repurchase announcements enjoy higher returns on subsequent 
announcements.    This evidence provides limited support for TSX disclosure requirements. 
10.2 Market Reaction to ACIB Announcements 
Tables 12 and 13 present mean cumulative abnormal returns and volumes respectively according to a 
number of definitions of returns, event windows, index type and event parameter estimation periods.     
Abnormal returns range from 1.04% to 1.78% depending on the definition used.      Abnormal volumes 
range from 1.28% to 3.75%.    Volume results are strongly influenced by whether log transformations of 
volume are conducted.    While mean abnormal volume is positive, it is interesting to note that there are 
more reductions in volume around the announcement date than increases in volume.   This result is 
consistent with some investors not wanting to trade against an informed trader (management) and 
avoiding trading.    Douglas (2007) notes that repurchases can result in wealth expropriation by 
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management if management utilizes non-public information to purchase shares when they are 
undervalued.    The reduction in trading in many stocks may reflect investors’ desire to protect against 
wealth expropriation by management who has an information advantage over investors.       In all cases, 
both cumulative abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal volume are statistically significant at the 
0.001 level using both a standard Patell test and a generalized sign test.   Table 14 presents correlation 
coefficients of market and volume variables.     These correlation coefficients indicate that the choice of 
return and volume estimation methods yield similar results, providing some comfort that the primary 
measures of CAR and CAV are robust to the choice of abnormal return calculation method, estimation 
period method and event window.   The correlation is lowest between the primary measure, CAR, and 
CARLW, which measures returns over a five day window instead of a three day window.      
Tables 15 and 16 present abnormal returns and volume by day relative to the announcement date 
(day 0).   Figure 1 presents mean daily abnormal returns for announcing firms in graphical form.   Figure 
2 presents mean daily abnormal volume for announcing firms in graphical form.   Table 15 indicates that 
most stocks have negative returns leading up to the repurchase announcement date.   On the 
announcement date and for several days after the announcement, returns are positive.     After the 
announcement period, abnormal returns do not occur and returns appear to follow a random walk pattern.    
It is interesting to note that abnormal returns persist for up to five days after the repurchase 
announcements.   The generalized sign test reported in Table 16 indicates that abnormal volumes persist 
for up to nine days after the repurchase announcement.    The Patel-Z test indicates that abnormal volume 
exists in the pre-event period, the event period and the post-event period.      The results of the Patel-Z test 
are unexpected and difficult to explain.    Campbell, Cown and Salotti (2009) examine the effectiveness of 
standard event study tests as they apply to returns reactions, but they provide no evidence on these tests as 
they apply to volume reactions.     In their study of return measures, Campbell, Cowan and Salotti (2009) 
conclude that overall, the generalized sign test is the best test since it more accurately captures the seeded 
abnormal returns included in their sample.   One possible explanation for the long period of statistically 
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abnormal Patel-Z volumes reported is that the Patel-Z test may not be appropriate for volume results.     
Other possible explanations include insider trading and model misspecification.    The generalized sign 
test indicates that investors may take some time to digest the news contained in TSX repurchase 
announcements.    However, it is premature to conclude that the TSX is lacking in market efficiency from 
this result as transaction costs and other factors may prohibit a faster price and volume reaction.     
In summary, the results are consistent with TSX share repurchase announcements conveying 
information to the market since there is clear evidence of a market reaction around the time of the 
announcement.      Therefore, I conclude that TSX repurchase announcements are a significant 
information event. 
10.3 Market Returns Reaction Explanatory Model Results  
Table 17 reports Pearson correlations for explanatory model variables.   Tables 18 and 19 present the 
results of four OLS regressions without controls for sample selection, other than the inclusion of the 
NCIB3 variable, as discussed in section 6.3.   Table 18 provides results for all announcers and Table 19 
presents results for repeat announcers.    In all cases, the dependent variable is cumulative abnormal 
returns calculated using the primary measure of CAR (see Table 12).      Model 1 provides the results 
using only market data.    Model 2 presents the results using both market and accounting data.    Model 3 
provides results using the sample with available market data, accounting data and proxy statement data.     
Model 4 repeats Model 3, but excludes all firms with competing information events (see section 9.5).     In 
all cases, as discussed in section 9.4, all standard errors are calculated using robust clustered standard 
errors. 
Tables 20 and 21 present the same results as Tables 18 and 19, except that the regressions include 
the predicted value probit model 1 in order to control for the market’s level of surprise that the repurchase 
announcement has occurred.      Tables 22 and 23 present the results of explanatory models using the 
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Heckman full information maximum likelihood procedure.   Table 24 presents an overall summary of the 
results of the market return explanatory models reported in Tables 18 to 23. 
10.3a Shares Targeted 
Variable TARGET is insignificant in any of the results documented in Tables 18 to 23.    This result is 
expected since the majority of firms typically announce the maximum allowable limit of five percent of 
outstanding shares.    Therefore, there is little information gained from the number of shares targeted. 
10.3b Reasons for the Announcement 
Little support is found for a relationship between the reasons cited for the repurchase program and 
abnormal returns.    Variable CUV, representing a claim by the firm that it is commencing a repurchase 
program due to current undervaluation, is statistically significant in model 1 in Tables 18 and 19 for all 
and repeat announcers respectively.     However, when controls for accounting and proxy circular data are 
included, CUV does not remain statistically significant.      Tables 19 to 23 indicate that including controls 
for selection results in a non-significance result for most repurchase explanations.    An exception is FUV, 
representing a claim by the firm that it is commencing a repurchase program in case of future 
undervaluation.     As reported in Tables 18 and 20 this variable is negatively related to announcement 
returns when controls for proxy circular data are included.      However, the result is not very robust across 
models.       Overall I conclude that there is little market reaction to the reasons provided by TSX firms for 
their repurchase programs.     This finding contradicts the earlier findings of Otchere and Ross (2002) and 
Li and McNally (2007).      There may be several reasons for the results of this study contradicting the 
findings of earlier studies.    First, I consider a wider range of explanations than previous studies.   For 
example, I consider the reasons CUV, FUV and GOOD as separate reasons.  Li and McNally (2007) 
consider all these explanations to be the same reason.      Otchere and Ross (2002) only consider 
undervaluation as a reason for the repurchase program.    Second, while reading these announcements and 
recording their reasons, it was observed that these announcements tend to follow a boiler-plate pattern, 
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with many announcements from different firms using the exact same language.   Firms may be copying 
each other’s releases, resulting in a loss of distinct information content.     Also many firms cite multiple 
reasons, resulting in some confusion as to the true motivation of the firm for repurchasing shares.      
Finally, the use of clustered standard errors is more conservative than regular OLS regression and reduces 
the reported significance of all variables, including variables relating to the reasons for the announcement. 
10.3c Managerial Incentives 
H2 predicts a negative relationship between managerial wealth incentives and announcement returns.     
Variable OPT, representing the extent of stock options, is not statistically significant in any of the models.     
This finding fails to confirm the findings of Kahle (2000) who found a negative relationship between 
options outstanding and announcement returns.    INMONEY is negative and weakly significant (0.10 
level) in Tables 18 and 22 which report the results for all announcers.    The variable is not significant 
when the sample is restricted to repeat announcers, suggesting that investors may react more to the 
intrinsic value of stock options when the firm does not make frequent announcements.      This finding 
provides weak support for H2.    INSIDER is positive and significantly associated with announcement 
returns in table 19.    The result for INSIDER indicates that announcement returns are higher the greater 
the percentage of the firm that is held by insiders.    This result does not support H2 which predicts that 
where management owns a large portion of the firm, repurchase announcement returns will be negative 
since management will gain from any price appreciation.     An explanation for the finding of a positive 
relationship between insider holdings and announcement returns is that the market infers from the 
announcement that insiders are not prepared to waste funds on perks or low net present value investments.    
Hence a positive market reaction is observed as shareholders reduce their concerns of potential agency 
costs.    However, the result is not economically significant since the coefficient is very near zero, 
suggesting little economic impact. 
10.3d Managerial Credibility 
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Variable REP is positive and significant in most models in Tables 19, 21 and 23 which apply to repeat 
announcers.    REP is not significant in model 4 in Tables 19, 21 or 23.   Model 4 has significantly 
reduced sample sizes as a result of the exclusion criteria imposed and this may explain the non-
significance of REP in this subsample.     Coefficient estimates range from 0.0105 to 0.0165, suggesting 
that firms who repurchased one hundred percent of their previous repurchase announcement maximum 
target enjoy a repurchase announcement return of 1.05% to 1.65% higher than firms who repurchased no 
shares under their previous repurchase plan.    Given that mean abnormal announcement returns are 
1.19% (see Table 12), the results indicate that following through on previous repurchase announcements 
has an economically significant impact on subsequent announcement returns.   I find little evidence of an 
interactive effect between REP and other variables (CUV, FUV, LIQ and PPRET), suggesting that the 
positive association between announcement returns and the follow-through rate on the previous program 
is not limited to certain explanations.   Variable PPRET, representing abnormal returns over the prior 
program, is not significantly related to announcement returns, suggesting that investors do not condition 
their response to a current announcement on returns over the previous program.    Overall the results 
support H3.     Announcement returns are higher where the firm followed through on its previous 
announcement. 
P8 predicts a negative relationship between announcement returns and pre-announcement returns.    
Contrary to this prediction, variable CARJB, representing pre-announcement returns is positive and 
statistically significant in many of the models reported in Tables 18 to 23.    This finding contradicts the 
previous findings of Kahle (2002) and Li and McNally (2007) and suggests that firms that have enjoyed 
strong recent stock performance will obtain greater repurchase announcement returns than firms who have 
had poor recent stock performance8.   P10 predicts a positive relationship between cash and announcement 
                                                     
8 In un-tabulated results, I re-perform models 3 and 4 in Tables 19 and 20 and include inter-active variables of recent 
stock performance and claims of under-valuation.    I find no evidence of an inter-active effect between recent stock 
performance (variable CARJB) and claims of under-valuation (variables CUV and FUV) for all announcers (Table 
19).   For repeat announcers (Table 20), the coefficient on the inter-action of CARJB and FUV is positive and 
significant (p<0.05) in both models 3 and 4.   The coefficient estimate is 0.1203 for model 3 and 0.0826 for model 4.    
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returns.    CASH is positive and weakly associated (0.10 level of significance) with announcement returns 
in some versions of model 2.   However, cash is not significant when additional proxy statement controls 
are included.    This result may be due to decreased sample size or due to consideration of proxy statement 
items.    Overall, the results for a positive relationship between cash and announcement returns do not 
support P10.  
10.3e Information Asymmetry 
Ho, Liu and Ramanan (1997) find a negative association between size and announcement returns, which 
they attribute to the market learning less from announcements of firms with low information asymmetry.    
Tables 18 to 23 indicate that there is no consistent relationship between announcement returns and SIZE, 
INTAN and XRD, the three measures of information asymmetry used in this study.       The lack of result 
may be due to these factors being weak proxies for information asymmetry (see section 7.2e). 
10.3f Corporate Governance 
P9 predicts a positive relationship between the market reaction to a repurchase announcement and board 
independence.    Variable EXBRD is measured as the number of non-executive directors over total 
directors.     Variable EXBRD is insignificant in any of the models in Tables 18 to 23.    Therefore, there 
is no evidence in support of P9.    A failure to find a significant impact of a corporate governance factor is 
not unusual.     As discussed in section 2.4, recent studies such as Oswald and Young (2004) and 
Richardson (2006) find little evidence that corporate governance structures increase payouts or constrain 
management’s tendency to over-invest free cash flow.   Investors may perceive that governance structures 
are unlikely to ensure that management follows through on its announcement. 
10.3g Announcement Surprise and Sample Selection 
                                                                                                                                                                           
These results suggest that firms who cite potential future undervaluation as a reason for their repurchase program 
enjoy higher announcement returns the greater their pre-announcement returns.  
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Tables 18 and 19 do not utilize the predicted value from a probit analysis to proxy for the market’s level 
of surprise that an announcement has occurred.    Instead, the regressions documented in Tables 18 and 19 
use the variable NCIB3 to control for the market’s prior expectation that a repurchase announcement is 
occurring.       NCIB3 is negative and statistically significant in Table 18, indicating that less market 
reaction can be expected when firms have previous repurchase programs.   This result is consistent with 
the findings of Jaganathan and Stephens (2003) who found that announcement returns are decreasing in 
prior repurchase programs, which they attribute to the market being less surprised and informed by repeat 
repurchase announcements.     NCIB3 is not statistically significant in the regressions reported in Table 
19.   However, all firms included in the regressions in Table 19 were repeat announcers.    Tables 20 and 
21 utilize the predicted value (P1) from Probit Model 1 to proxy for the market’s level of surprise that the 
announcement occurred.    P1 is only significant for the firms reported in Model 2 of Table 20, 
representing all announcers, but without controls for proxy circular data.   When proxy circular data is 
considered in Models 3 and 4, P1 is not significant.   Finally, I employ a Heckman full information 
maximum likelihood model to formally control for sample selection.    The results are presented in Tables 
22 and 23 and document similar results as Tables 18 to 21.    To test for the impact of selection, I use 
STATA to calculate ATHRHO, the hyperbolic arctangent of the probability from the probit model.    A 
significant ATHRHO indicates that OLS results will not generate consistent estimates9.    The only 
significant ATHRHO coefficient occurs for model 2 applied to all announcers (Table 22) and is highly 
significant for Model 2, suggesting that controlling for the accounting characteristics of announcing firms 
using the heckman procedure provides better estimates of coefficients than the simple OLS estimates of 
Model 2 contained in Tables 18.    With the exception of Model 2 for all announcers, the insignificant 
coefficients for ANTRHO for the models reported in Tables 22 and 23 indicate that selection has little 
impact on the results reported in this thesis.       
10.3h Market Returns Reaction Explanatory Models: Overall Evaluation of Results 
                                                     
9 For a detailed discussion of the full information maximum likelihood Heckman model and the ATHRHO test, see 
Baum, C., An Introduction to Modern Econometrics Using Stata, p.p. 266-271. 
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Tables 18 to 23 present the results of market returns reaction explanatory models using various 
explanatory variables.   Samples correspond to the availability of data for the explanatory variables used 
in each model.    The results are summarized in Table 24.   Tables 18 and 19 present results that control 
for the surprise level of the repurchase announcements by controlling for the past history of 
announcements.    Tables 20 to 21 present results that control for the surprise level of the repurchase 
announcements by including the predicted value from probit models 1.     Tables 22 and 23 utilize the 
more formal Heckman full information maximum likelihood model to control for sample selection.      
Given the wide acceptance of the Heckman model, and the advantages of the Heckman model that are 
discussed in Francis and Lennox (2008), the results in Tables 22 and 23 are considered to be the most 
reliable results presented in this thesis since they contain formal controls for sample selection.   However, 
given the findings of Francis and Lennox (2007) on the potential pitfalls of selection models, discussed in 
section 9.4, all results should be considered. 
 The major result of this thesis is that announcement returns are positively related to the follow 
through rate on the most recent repurchase program (REP).         Table 24 Panel B indicates that this result 
is confirmed in all analyses of repeat announcers except in model 4 and in Table 19 Model 2.    These 
results are based on a small sample with full proxy circular controls and no competing announcements.  
These requirements significantly reduce the sample size and may account for the lack of significance of 
REP in these models.   Most importantly, Table 23 Model 2, which includes formal controls for sample 
selection through use of the Heckman procedure and has a large sample size, confirms that announcement 
returns are positively related to the follow through rate on the most recent program. 
Other variables are often not significant as reported in Table 24.    The lack of significance of 
many variables that were found to be significant in prior studies may be due to several factors.   First, the 
sample sizes used in some models in this study are small, making it difficult to obtain statistical 
significance.   Second, this study utilizes clustered standard errors to account for the lack of independence 
of multiple observations from the same firm.   Previous studies do not mention the use of clustered 
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standard errors.   Clustered standard errors are more conservative since they consider the lack of 
independence.    As a result, it is possible that if clustered standard errors were used in previous studies, 
some variables may not have been found to be significant.     Finally, this study introduces several new 
variables that were omitted from prior studies.    Examples include the prior program’s follow through 
rate (REP), intrinsic value of stock options (INTRINSIC) and share turnover (VOL).   Inclusion of these 
variables may have impacted the significance of variables found to be significant in prior studies.           
10.4 Market Volume Reaction Explanatory Models Results  
Tables 25 to 30 present volume reaction model results similar to the return reaction models contained in 
Tables 18 to 23.     All models are the same except that the dependent variable is cumulative abnormal 
volume (CAV).   Few variables are significant in Tables 25 to 30.    Interpreting volume reactions is 
difficult.   Kim and Verrecchia (1991) find that trading volume is proportional to both the absolute price 
change and a measure of differential precision of private information across traders.   Unfortunately, in an 
empirical setting, the level of differential precision of private information across traders is unobservable 
leaving the researcher unable to control for a potentially important omitted variable.   The results of 
Tables 28 to 35 should be considered in light of this limitation. 
Similar to the results of the returns reaction models, NCIB3 is negative and statistically 
significant for all announcers (Table 25), but not for the subsample of repeat announcers (Table 26).    
This result is consistent with the market reacting less to repeat announcers since the announcement is 
predictable and hence has less information content.      Also similar to the results of the returns reaction 
model, P1 is negative and generally statistically significant for all announcers (Table 27), but not for the 
subsample of repeat announcers (Table 28).       This result is also consistent with the market reacting less 
to announcements where the probability of the announcement was high. 
 Models 1 and 2 in Tables 25 and 26 indicate that trading volume reduces when firms claim 
undervaluation as a reason for their repurchase programs.    One possible explanation is that investors 
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reduce trading while they attempt to determine if the claim of undervaluation is warranted.     Some 
investors may be unwilling to sell if they feel that management’s claim may be true.    However, the result 
is not robust to use in smaller samples that include proxy circular data variables.   Hence, caution should 
be taken in interpreting this result. 
 
 Accounting variables are only inconsistently significant in the results reported in Tables 25 to 30.    
Proxy circular data variables (EXBRD, OPT, INSIDER, INMONEY) are either insignificant or not 
consistently significant, with the exception of INSIDER, the percentage of shares held by insiders.   
INSIDER is positive and statistically significant (Tables 28 and 31) for the subsample of firms without 
competing information events.     However, this is a small sample result and should be interpreted with 
caution. 
 
 In summary, the volume reaction models provide less insight into the market reaction to 
repurchase announcements than returns models.    The results indicate that trading volume reaction is 






Conclusions, Limitations and Further Study 
 
11.1 Introduction 
This thesis examines the market reaction to open market repurchase announcements by TSX firms during 
the period 1994 to 2005.     I begin by discussing the differences between TSX and US repurchase 
regulations.   Two major differences are noted and subject to empirical testing.   First, TSX firms must 
disclose the reason(s) for their repurchase programs.    Second, firms must promptly report to the TSX the 
number of shares repurchased each month.    The TSX publishes this information each month.     As a 
result, investors of TSX firms enjoy more information about a firms repurchase program and history than 
do investors of US exchange traded firms.     This thesis investigates whether this information is 
associated with the market reaction to repurchase announcements.       
 
11.2 Results     
Open market share repurchases have increased steadily in the United States over the years.   In contrast, I 
find that while TSX repurchase announcements increased during the period 1994 to 2000, repurchase 
announcements have declined in recent years.     I find that TSX firms frequently only purchase a small 
percentage of the maximum shares that are indicated in repurchase announcements and many firms 
repurchase no shares at all.       This raises the possibility that some of the announcements may not be 
credible.     I investigate whether investors use past repurchases in assessing current repurchase 
announcements.    
I find evidence of a significant market reaction to TSX repurchase announcements as measured 
by both return and volume tests.     This significant market reaction continues for up to five days 
according to returns tests and up to nine days according to volume tests.      This reaction period is longer 
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than what is typically observed in other repurchases studies.       Announcement returns are positively 
associated with the extent to which firms fulfilled their previous repurchase announcements.    This 
evidence suggests that investors consider past actions in assessing current announcements, consistent with 
investors using past information to assess a current corporate announcement.    I also find limited 
evidence that investors react to repurchase announcements that cite current undervaluation as the reason 
for the repurchase program.     Taken together, these findings provide limited support for TSX disclosure 
requirements.        I also find limited evidence that announcement returns are negatively associated with 
the extent to which the firm’s stock options have intrinsic value. 
11.3 Contribution 
        My thesis contributes to academic research as follows.  First, it extends the literature on disclosure 
credibility by applying Mercer’s (2004) credibility framework to stock repurchases announcements.  This 
enables a comparison of repurchase announcements to other disclosures, and helps to ensure a thorough 
modeling of investor reaction, since Mercer’s framework synthesizes existing research on disclosure 
credibility.  Second, my thesis extends the literature on the characteristics of firms that engage in 
repurchases by showing that the probability of a TSX firm announcing a repurchase program is increasing 
in firm size, past repurchase program frequency and operating cash flow and decreasing in leverage, share 
turnover, research and development expenses and dividend yield.     Finally, my thesis contributes to the 
literature on reputation by showing that a firm’s follow-through rate on previous repurchase 
announcements positively affects the market price reaction to current announcements.  
 11.4 Limitations of Analysis 
The results of this thesis are subject to several limitations.   This section discusses some of the important 
limitations of this thesis.  
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First, section 4.1 discusses the disclosed reason(s) for repurchase programs.    This evidence 
needs to be evaluated in light of the possibility that firms may not be truthful about the real reasons for 
their repurchase announcements. 
Second, as discussed in section 9.6, I identify all repurchase announcements where the firm has a 
concurrent earnings or dividend announcement.    This is possible since firms are required to post earnings 
and dividend announcements on SEDAR.   However, firms are not required to post all press releases on 
SEDAR, so it is not possible to ensure that there are no competing non-dividend or non-earnings 
announcements.     
Third, as discussed in section 9.4, exclusion restrictions for sample selection models are difficult 
to justify with certainty since firms may seek to maximize their market values which may impact their 
repurchase decisions.     There are no natural experiments that result in variables that impact the 
repurchase decision, but do not impact market value.    I have made a reasonable attempt to provide a 
theoretical basis for the variables included in each stage of the sample selection models employed in this 
thesis. 
Fourth, many of the variables used in this study may be endogenous.     I have attempted to deal 
with the endogeneity of past repurchase follow through by controlling for market conditions during the 
prior program (variable PPRET).    However, other sources of endogeneity may exist which could impact 
the results presented in this thesis. 
Finally, as noted in section 10.4, it is difficult to analyze volume reactions since it is not possible 
to observe the precision of privately held information, which Kim and Verrecchia (1991) demonstrate is 
important to volume analysis. 
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11.5 Further Study 
 Future research will include the following.    I would like to expand my sample to include the 
years 2006 and 2008.   Expansion of my sample may allow items that were marginally insignificant to 
become significant in a larger sample size.     Next, I would like to expand my research to consider tax 
motivations for repurchasing in Canada.  My database includes data that allows me to identify where the 
major shareholder is a connected corporation under Canadian tax law.   Connected corporations receive 
dividends on a tax free basis, so it is possible that firms modify their payout methods to cater to their 
major shareholders’ tax needs.     I will also further explore corporate governance factors.  My database 
contains data on whether management receives performance based compensation and on whether 
management had any loans outstanding to the firm.     My database also includes monthly share 
repurchases by firm.   I would like to examine whether current repurchases foreshadow future 
performance increases.    Finally, I would like to attempt to implement a Cox Proportional Hazard model 
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Table 1 
Toronto Stock Exchange Aormal Course Issuer Bid Programs 
Aumber of Programs by Year and Type of Security 
 
This table presents the number of normal course issuer bids (NCIB) by type of security announced 
during the period 1994 to 2005 and reported in the TSX Daily Record.    The percentage of TSX listed 
securities announcing a NCIB is determined by dividing the total number of programs by the total 
number of listed securities per the TSX Monthly Review. 
 




















1994 0 3 0 1 133 137 1538 8.9% 
1995 1 1 2 0 193 197 1572 12.5% 
1996 1 1 2 1 195 190 1626 11.7% 
1997 1 2 4 3 218 228 1720 13.3% 
1998 6 1 13 4 310 335 1721 19.5% 
1999 8 2 19 2 326 357 1761 20.3% 
2000 10 6 20 1 346 383 1708 22.4% 
2001 13 2 22 2 285 324 1645 19.7% 
2002 8 6 36 2 233 285 1654 17.2% 
2003 5 3 42 1 226 277 1710 16.2% 
2004 6 5 69 1 193 274 1804 15.2% 
2005 4 12 99 1 222 338 1962 17.2% 
Total 63 44 328 20 2870 3325 20421 16.3% 
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Found Press Releases 
 
This table documents the number of press releases that were obtained.   Press releases were obtained 
from the Lexis-Nexis database, the SEDAR database or from corporate websites. 
 
        Percentage 
    Missing Found  of Press 
    Press  Press  Releases 
Year Total  Releases Releases Found 
 
1994 133  65  68  51.1 
 
1995 193  65  128  66.3 
 
1996 185  52  133  71.9 
1997 218  23  195  89.5 
1998 310  10  300  96.8 
1999 326  6  320  98.2 
2000 346  12  334  96.5 
2001 285  9  276  96.8 
2002 233  6  227  97.4 
2003 226  3  223  98.7 
2004 193  1  192  99.5 
2005 222  1  221  99.5 





Equity Securities, Reasons Cited for Repurchase Programs 1994 to 2005 
 
This table documents the percentage of TSX announcements citing various reasons for repurchase 
programs during the period 1994-2005.   Firms can cite more than one reason for their repurchase 
program.   The results reflect the 2,617 repurchase announcements that were obtained (see Table 2). 
 
1. Current Undervaluation.        40.9%  
2. Firm is putting in place repurchase program in case of future undervaluation.  32.4%  
3. Repurchase program is a good use of funds/investment.    57.7%  
4. Firm has excess cash.          5.1%  
5. Repurchasing stock for stock plans or to prevent dilution due to stock options.   7.3%  
6. To improve liquidity.          5.8% 
7. To benefit/increase interest of remaining shareholders.    37.3% 




Program Completion Rates 
 
This table documents mean and median completion rates for all equity normal course issuer bids 
during the years 1994 to 2004.    The completion rate is equal to the actual number of shares 
repurchased divided by the maximum number of shares that the repurchase announcement stated 
could be repurchased under the program. 
 
    Mean  Median  
    Percentage Percentage 
    Completion Completion 
Year Total  Rate  Rate 
1994 133  36.3  25.3 
1995 193  30.9  12.9 
1996 185  31.6  17.9 
1997 218  37.7  17.3 
1998 310  38.3  25.4 
1999 326  42.5  29.3 
2000 346  35.8  20.7 
2001 285  23.7   8.0 
2002 233  23.5   6.7 
2003 226  18.3   4.7 
2004 193  26.1   7.8 




Event Study Sample 
 
This table documents the number of firms that were included in the event study, the results of which 
are reported in Tables 10 and 11. 
 
        Returns  Volume 
        Testing  Testing 
 Total announcements, 1994 to 2005   2,870  2,870 
 Missing press releases      (253)   (253) 
 Missing market data      (861)   (439) 
 Announcements with press releases and 
  market data      1,756  2,178  
 





Accounting Data Availability of 
Announcing and Aon-Announcing Firms 
 
Panel A: Available Total Asset and Industry 
This table presents information on the number of firms for which total asset and industry information was 
































1993 42 133 31.6 477 519 1218 42.6 
1994 99 193 51.3 566 665 1244 53.5 
1995 102 195 52.3 634 736 1258 58.5 
1996 126 218 57.8 627 753 1323 56.9 
1997 147 310 47.4 596 743 1420 52.3 
1998 227 326 69.6 622 849 1433 59.3 
1999 245 346 70.8 685 930 1456 63.9 
2000 205 285 71.9 731 936 1398 67.0 
2001 189 233 81.1 718 907 1316 68.9 
2002 172 226 76.1 719 891 1304 68.3 
2003 153 193 79.3 779 932 1340 69.6 
2004 166 222 74.8 834 1000 1421 70.4 
Total 1873 2870 65.3 7988 9861 16131 61.1 
 
Panel B: Sample Size for Probit Models 
          
        All  
      NCIB  Non-NCIB 
Observations with total asset and 
industry data available per Panel A  1873   7988 
Missing accounting data for Probit Model 1 (637)  (3287) 
Available data for Probit Model 1  1236   4701 
 
                                                     




Mean Accounting Values of Announcing and Aon-Announcing Firms 
 
This table presents mean accounting values obtained from the Compustat database.    The number of observations 
used to generate the means is shown in brackets.    T-tests compare the means of the respective samples.   SIZE= 
Total assets in thousands of dollars at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   
CASH= Total cash as a percentage of total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the 
announcement.   CAPX= capital expenditures during the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the 
announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the 
announcement.  INTAN= Total intangible assets as a percentage of total assets at the end of the most recently 
reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   MBOOK= Market value of equity divided by book value of equity 
at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement. VOL= Total share volume during the 
most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement divided by total shares outstanding at the end of the 
most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.   LEV= Total debt divided by total assets at the end 
of the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.  DVPT=Dividends as a percentage of total 
income during the most recently reported fiscal year end preceding the announcement. 
Panel A: Announcing and Aon-Announcing Firms  
Item Mean All Announcing Firms with 
available Compustat data 
Mean All Non-Announcing Firms 
with available Compustat data 
t-test all Announcing versus all 
Non-Announcing Firms 
SIZE 6862.52 (1873) 2840.06 (7988)  5.829*** 
CASH 0.1143 (1873) 0.1664 (7977) -9.208*** 
CAPX 0.0869 (1776) 0.1100 (7667) -4.602*** 
INTAN 0.0851 (1814) 0.0624 (7719)  6.471*** 
MBOOK 1.89 (1855) 2.13 (7069) -0.330 
VOL 0.3565 (1855) 0.7774 (7094) -5.270*** 
LEV 0.4100 (1562) 0.5700 (7392)  -1.893* 
DVPT   0.4100 (1848) 0.3000 (7848)  0.740 
 
Panel B: Firms with Aecessary Market and Volume Data for Event Study 
 Mean All Announcing 
Firms with Necessary 
Market Data for Event 
Study  
Mean All Announcing 
Firms with Necessary 
Volume Data for Event 
Study but missing market 
data 
T-test Announcing Firms 
with Returns Data versus 
Announcing Firms with 
Volume Data but missing 
market data 
SIZE 8549.66 (1366) 180.74 (256) 3.3867*** 
CASH 0.1143 (1366) 0.1141 (256) 0.0186 
CAPX 0.0938 (1299) 0.0587 (247) 3.8661*** 
INTAN 0.0873 (1326) 0.0772 (247) 0.9914 
MBOOK 2.03 (1352) 1.19 (256) 3.0788*** 
VOL 0.4115 (1352) 0.1092 (255) 14.3069*** 
LEV 0.40 (1156) 0.43 (201) -2.5722** 
DVPT   0.29 (1347) 1.24 (255) -2.0359** 
 





Repurchase Program Rates by Industry 
 
This table presents repurchase program rates for Compustat covered firms with fiscal years ending from 
1993 to 2004.    Mean repurchase program rate is the number of observations in the SIC Code where the 
firm subsequently announced a repurchase program divided by the number of observations for the SIC 
Code.    The overall announcement rate for all firms in the Compustat database was 18.99%.    T-tests are 
reported testing whether the mean repurchase program rate for the SIC Code differs from the population 
rate of 18.99%. 
 
SIC Code Industry Number of 
Compustat 
Observations for 
SIC Code from 









1000 Metal mining 429   3.96% -15.94*** 
1040 Gold and silver ores 781   4.74% -18.74*** 
1311 Crude petroleum and natural gas 1107 16.53% -2.20** 
1400 Mining, quarry, non-metal materials 128   2.34% -12.40*** 
2834 Pharmaceutical preparations 203   5.91% -7.88*** 
2836 Biological products and diagnostic testing 192   2.08% -16.36*** 
3312 Steel works and blast furnaces 108  25.00% 1.44 
3663 Radio, television, broadcasting 110    6.36% -5.40*** 
3714 Motor vehicle parts and accessories 124   12.90% -2.01** 
4813 Phone communication and radio telephone 102   16.67% -0.63 
6020 Commercial banks 110   30.00% 2.51** 
6211 Security brokers and dealers 93   44.08% 4.85*** 
6282 Investment advice 109   40.36% 4.53*** 
6512 Operators of non-residential buildings 104   37.5% 3.88*** 
6799 Investment firms 203   18.23% -0.28 
7370 Computer programming and data processes 113   11.50% -2.48** 
7372 Pre-packaged software 315   21.27% 0.98 
7373 Computer integrated system design 126     6.34% -5.80*** 
All other All other SIC codes with less than 90 
observations 
5404   
Total All firms in all SIC codes 9861 18.99%  
 





Mean Corporate Governance, Ownership and Option Values: 
Repurchasing Firms 
 
This table presents mean values of corporate governance, ownership and option variables for repurchasing 
firms with available data.    The number of observations is presented in parentheses.   EXBRD= 
Percentage of board members who are not officers of the firm per the most recent proxy circular 
preceding the announcement date.   INSIDER= Total shares held by senior officers and directors per the 
most recent proxy circular preceding the announcement date divided by total outstanding shares at the end 
of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.   OPT= Total stock options 
outstanding as a percentage of total shares outstanding at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year 
prior to the announcement.   INMONEY= Intrinsic value of total insider stock options outstanding per the 
most recent proxy circular preceding the announcement date divided by total assets at the end of the most 
recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.   
 
Item Mean (# of observations) 
EXBRD 0.7488 (1035) 
INSIDER 0.1991 (984) 
OPT 0.0486 (1028) 





Correlation Matrices of Announcement Prediction Model Independent Variables 
 
This table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients of variables used in Probit Model 1, the results of which are 
presented in Table 11.   NCIB3= Number of repurchase programs in the three fiscal years preceding the fiscal year 
of the current announcement.  NCIB1=1 if the firm commenced a repurchase program in the fiscal year preceding 
the fiscal year of the current announcement, 0 otherwise.  DVPT=Dividends as a percentage of total income during 
the most recently reported fiscal year end preceding the announcement.    DYIELD= Dividends per share during the 
most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement divided by year end market value per share as of the 
most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.   VOL= Total share volume during the most recently 
reported fiscal year prior to the announcement divided by total shares outstanding at the end of the most recently 
reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.   CASH= Total cash as a percentage of total assets at the end of the 
most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.   OCF= Operating cash flow during the most 
recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently 
reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.   CASHCHG= Percentage change in opening and closing cash 
during the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.   CAPX= capital expenditures during the 
most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently 
reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  FCF= Operating cash flow less capital expenditures during the 
most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently 
reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  INTAN= Total intangible assets as a percentage of total assets at 
the end of the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   XRD= Research and development 
expenses as a percentage of total sales during the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   
SIZE= Natural log of total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   
CARJB= Abnormal returns using the market model in the twenty eight days prior to the announcement window.   
MBOOK= Market value of equity divided by book value of equity at the end of the most recently reported fiscal 
year prior to the announcement. LEV= Total debt divided by total assets at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year prior to the announcement.   LOWIND=1 if the firm is in industries with the following SIC codes: 
1000,1040,1400,2834,2836,3663 and 7373.   HIGHIND=1 if the firm is in industries with the following SIC codes: 
6020,6211,6282 and 6512.  INTAN= Total intangible assets as a percentage of total assets at the end of the most 
recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   XRD= Research and development expenses as a percentage 
of total sales during the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   SIZE= Natural log of total 
assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement. MBOOK= Market value of 
equity divided by book value of equity at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   
CAPX=capital expenditures during the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement divided by 




Table 10 (continued) 
Correlation Matrices of Announcement Prediction Model Independent Variables 
 
 NCIB1 NCIB3 CASH CAPX INTAN CASHCHG XRD DYIELD SIZE 
NCIB1 1.00         
NCIB3 0.82 1.00        
CASH -0.10 -0.12 1.00       
CAPX -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 1.00      
INTAN 0.05 0.05 -0.11 -0.16 1.00     
CASHCHG 0.00 0.00 0.08 -0.08 -0.00 1.00    
XRD -0.07 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.44 1.00   
DYIELD 0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 1.00  
SIZE 0.24 0.27 -0.32 -0.12 0.17 0.08 -0.18 0.12 1.00 
MBOOK -0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.07 -0.01 0.02 
LEV 0.01 0.01 -0.13 0.15 0.03 -0.19 0.12 0.01 -0.07 
DVPT 0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.09 0.07 
LOWIND -0.22 -0.22 0.27 0.02 -0.14 -0.01 0.08 -0.04 -0.29 
HIGHIND 0.06 0.06 0.00 -0.05 0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.0 0.00 
VOL -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
OCF 0.01 0.03 -0.06 0.46 0.02 0.20 -0.17 0.01 0.10 
 
 MBOOK LEV DVPT LOWIND HIGHIND VOL OCF 
MBOOK 1.00       
LEV -0.04 1.00      
DVPT 0.00 0.00 1.00     
LOWIND -0.03 -0.15 -0.04 1.00    
HIGHIND 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.06 1.00   
VOL -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.02 -0.00 1.00  






Probit Analysis of Antecedents of Repurchase Announcements 
 
This table presents probit coefficient estimates.     Models 1 and 1A utilize data from the entire Compustat database 
from 1994 to 2004 (Number of Observations=5937, Number of Firms=1198).      
 
The dependant variable is 1 if the firm announced a repurchase program, 0 otherwise.   Independent variables are 
defined as follows.   NCIB3= Number of repurchase programs in the three fiscal years preceding the fiscal year of 
the current announcement.  NCIB1=1 if the firm commenced a repurchase program in the fiscal year preceding the 
fiscal year of the current announcement, 0 otherwise.  DVPT=Dividends as a percentage of total income during the 
most recently reported fiscal year end preceding the announcement.    DYIELD= Dividends per share during the 
most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement divided by year end market value per share as of the 
most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.   VOL= Total share volume during the most recently 
reported fiscal year prior to the announcement divided by total shares outstanding at the end of the most recently 
reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.   CASH= Total cash as a percentage of total assets at the end of the 
most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.   OCF= Operating cash flow during the most 
recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently 
reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.   CASHCHG= Percentage change in opening and closing cash 
during the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.   FCF= Operating cash flow less capital 
expenditures during the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement divided by total assets at the 
end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  INTAN= Total intangible assets as a 
percentage of total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   XRD= 
Research and development expenses as a percentage of total sales during the most recently reported fiscal year prior 
to the announcement.   SIZE= Natural log of total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year prior to 
the announcement.   CARJB= Abnormal returns using the market model in the twenty eight trading days prior to the 
announcement window (-1,+1).   XRD= Research and development expenses as a percentage of total sales during 
the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   MBOOK= Market value of equity divided by 
book value of equity at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   CAPX=capital 
expenditures during the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement divided by total assets at the 
end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  MBOOK= Market to Book Ratio at the 
end of the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   LEV= Total debt divided by total assets at 
the end of the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   LOWIND=1 if the firm is in industries 
with the following SIC codes: 1000,1040,1400,2834,2836,3663 and 7373.   HIGHIND=1 if the firm is in industries 




Table 11 (continued) 
















N – NCIB firms  1236  1236  
N – Non-NCIB 
firms 
 4701  4701  
N-Total  5937  5937  
Pseudo R2  0.3210   0.2820  
      
NCIB1      +  1.018 0.000   
NCIB3      + 0.2927 0.000 0.0783 0.000 
LOWIND       - -0.6324 0.000   
HIGHIND       + 0.3873 0.062   
MBOOK  -0.0070 0.605 -0.0001 -0.17 
CASH       +        0.1909 0.231   
CASHCHG       + 0.0249 0.210   
OCF       + 0.0608 0.007   
VOL       - -0.1765 0.011 -0.2139 0.001 
CAPX       - -0.0880 0.619   
INTAN       + 0.9260 0.577 0.1265 0.408 
XRD       + -1.4980 0.001 -1.341 0.000 
DYIELD       - -0.0305 0.029   
DVPT       - -0.0144 0.131 -0.0141 0.085 
LEV       - -0.5547 0.000 -0.3224 0.001 
SIZE       + 0.1078 0.000 0.1001 0.000 




Event Study Returns Results: ACIB Sample 
 
This table presents event study cumulative abnormal returns results for TSX firms announcing repurchase 
programs during the years 1994 to 2005.      Cumulative abnormal returns using the market model and the 
buy and hold model are calculated according to the definitions contained in Appendix 6.   Raw returns 
reflect cumulative returns over the event window.    Index refers to the CFMRC equally weighted or value 
weighted index.   Event window refers to the period in days starting before (-) and ending after (+) the 
NCIB announcement date.    N refers to the number of observations.   Patell Z test results and generalized 
sign test results are calculated according to the definitions contained in Appendix 6.   All results were 
generated using the statistical package Eventus.   All calculations are calculated without log 
transformation of returns, except CARCC which converts each security and index return from rjt to log 






Model12 Index Event 
window   











 Sign Z 
CAR Market  Equally (-1,+1) 1756 998:758 1.19% 9.66*** 8.63*** 
CARCC Market Equally (-1,+1) 1756 1012:744 1.15% 9.12*** 8.16*** 
RAW Raw n/a (-1,+1) 1756 1076:622 1.57% 12.31*** 17.29*** 
CARV Market Value (-1,+1) 1756 985:771 1.13% 9.23*** 7.84*** 
CARNP Market Equally (-1,+1) 1728 979:749 1.12% 8.58*** 8.28*** 
CARNPV Market Value  (-1,+1) 1728 971:757 1.11% 8.45*** 7.81*** 
CARLW Market 
model 
Equally (0,+4) 1789 1028:761 1.78% 11.62*** 9.24*** 
BHR Buy and 
hold 
Equally (-1,+1) 1756 966:790 1.06% n/a 7.10*** 
BHRV Buy and 
hold 
Value (-1,+1) 1756 970:786 1.05% n/a 7.12*** 
CARJB Market  Equally (-30,-2) 1809 728:1081 -3.68% 10.26*** -5.39*** 
 
*** denotes significance at the 0.001 level 
                                                     
12 Estimated using a minimum of 60 and a maximum of 200 days of returns split equally between the period ending 
31 days before and commencing  31 days after the event day, except CARNP which is estimated using a minimum 






Event Study Volume Results: ACIB Sample 
 
This table presents event study cumulative returns results for TSX firms announcing repurchase programs 
during the years 1994 to 2005.      Cumulative abnormal volume using market models are calculated 
according to the definitions contained in Appendix 6.   Event window refers to the period starting before 
(-) and ending after (+) the NCIB announcement date.    N refers to the number of observations.   Patell Z 
test results and generalized sign test results are calculated according to the definitions contained in 
Appendix 6.   All results were generated using the statistical package Eventus.   CAV is calculated with 






























































(-1,+1) 2178 822:1356 3.75% 20.56*** 13.50*** 
 
*** denotes significance at the 0.001 level 
                                                     
13 Estimated using a minimum of 60 and a maximum of 200 days of returns split equally between the period ending 





Correlation Matrices of Return and Volume Market Reaction Variables 
 
This table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients of alternative definitions of abnormal returns and 
abnormal volume.   All variables are defined in Tables 12 and 13.    
 
Panel A: Return Measures 
 CAR CARNP BHR CARLW 
CAR 1.0 0.9798 0.9710 0.6593 
CARCC 0.9945 0.9743 0.9730 0.6842 
CARNP 0.9798 1.0 0.9427 0.6560 
BHR 0.9710 0.9427 1.0 0.6405 
CARLW 0.6593 0.6560 0.6405 1.0 
RAW 0.9605 0.9546 0.9281 0.6227 
 
Panel B: Volume Measures 
 CAV CAVNLT 
CAV 1.0 0.6093 





Mean Daily Abnormal Returns Around TSX Repurchase Announcements 
 
 
This table presents mean daily, non-cumulative, abnormal returns during the period prior to, during and 
after TSX NCIB repurchase announcements (day 0).   Mean daily abnormal returns are calculated using 
the market model defined in Appendix 6, estimated over a minimum of 60 days and a maximum of 200 
days split equally between the period ending 31 days before and commencing 31 days after the event day 
and using an equally weighted market index.   Patell Z test results and generalized sign test results are 
calculated according to the definitions contained in Appendix 6.   All results were generated using the 
statistical package Eventus. 
                       Mean                                                        
                       Abnormal    Positive:        Patell        Generalized       
         Day     Return      Negative           Z             Sign Z           
          -20            -0.22%     716:870         -2.341**        -1.259 
          -19            -0.34%     669:934         -4.523***       -4.003*** 
          -18            -0.11%     738:860         -1.901*         -0.432 
          -17            -0.20%     734:854         -2.165*         -0.400 
          -16            -0.27%     715:877         -3.121***       -1.448$ 
          -15            -0.17%     711:874         -2.356**        -1.488$ 
          -14            -0.11%     715:864         -1.135          -1.147 
          -13            -0.26%     693:899         -3.592***       -2.553** 
          -12             0.02%     751:851         -0.309           0.126 
          -11            -0.30%     685:926         -4.337***       -3.381*** 
          -10            -0.22%     737:866         -2.309*         -0.599 
           -9            -0.22%     733:877         -3.199***       -0.961 
           -8            -0.13%     713:895         -2.430**        -1.914* 
           -7            -0.10%     753:858         -1.276           0.015 
           -6            -0.26%     691:919         -4.031***       -3.059** 
           -5            -0.03%     723:883         -0.168          -1.369$ 
           -4            -0.05%     737:858         -0.021          -0.413 
           -3             0.04%     740:848          0.366          -0.098 
           -2            -0.14%     744:850         -1.325$         -0.038 
           -1             0.00%     743:860          0.270          -0.298 
           0              0.61%     904:719          7.579***        7.249*** 
           +1             0.58%     883:749          6.943***        5.978*** 
           +2             0.31%     834:803          3.759***        3.426*** 
           +3             0.12%     797:831          2.305*          1.806* 
           +4             0.16%     823:802          3.126***        3.170*** 
           +5            -0.08%     800:824         -1.201           2.051* 
           +6             0.01%     770:862          0.346           0.372 
           +7            -0.17%     734:886         -1.985*         -1.141 
           +8             0.29%     749:869          4.441***       -0.347 
           +9            -0.04%     748:866          0.924          -0.304 
          +10            -0.03%     732:878          0.220          -1.011 
          +11             0.02%     763:844          0.147           0.609 
          +12             0.13%     742:851          2.591**        -0.115 
          +13            -0.10%     745:846         -0.753           0.083 
          +14            -0.17%     746:864         -1.786*         -0.311 
          +15            -0.13%     717:872         -2.472**        -1.278 
          +16             0.02%     754:831          0.098           0.677 
          +17            -0.15%     752:831         -0.646           0.624 
          +18            -0.01%     740:827          2.150*          0.398 
          +19            -0.01%     733:855         -0.064          -0.450 
          +20            -0.02%     728:875         -0.579          -1.049 
 
The symbols $, *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, using 1-tail Patell Z and 




Mean Daily Abnormal Volumes Around TSX Repurchase Announcements 
 
This table presents mean daily, non-cumulative, abnormal volumes during the period prior to, during and 
after TSX NCIB repurchase announcements (day 0).   Mean daily abnormal volumes are calculated using 
the market model with log transformed daily firm and total exchange volume, estimated over a minimum 
of 60 days and a maximum of 200 days split equally between the period ending 31 days before and 
commencing 31 days after the event day.   Patell Z test results and generalized sign test results are 
calculated according to the definitions contained in Appendix 6.   All results were generated using the 
statistical package Eventus. 
 
                                                                                  
                  Mean                                                          
               Abnormal                                                        
                  Relative          Positive:         Patell        Generalized     
         Day    Volume          Negative            Z             Sign Z 
         -20             0.11%      523:1624           7.510***       -1.348$  
         -19            -0.13%      513:1634           0.197          -1.842* 
         -18            -0.09%      500:1647          3.621***       -2.485** 
         -17            -0.06%      518:1629          4.057***       -1.595$  
         -16             0.09%      518:1629          0.300          -1.595$  
         -15            -0.04%      488:1659          1.006          -3.078** 
         -14             0.10%      572:1575          3.727***        1.075   
         -13            -0.06%      547:1600          3.974***       -0.161   
         -12             0.03%      584:1563          4.080***        1.668*  
         -11             0.01%      547:1600         14.239***       -0.161   
         -10            -0.14%      571:1576          5.215***        1.025   
          -9             0.08%      587:1560          3.971***        1.816*  
          -8             0.07%      558:1589          4.107***        0.382   
          -7            -0.04%      542:1605          2.389**        -0.409   
          -6             0.05%      579:1568          5.550***        1.421$  
          -5             0.03%      560:1587          4.637***        0.481   
          -4             0.00%      578:1569         9.363***        1.371$  
          -3             0.11%      554:1593          5.257***        0.185   
          -2             0.01%      563:1584          3.303***        0.630   
          -1             0.10%      571:1576          4.538***        1.025   
          0              0.48%      747:1400         14.752***        9.725*** 
          +1             0.74%      735:1412         14.344***        9.132*** 
          +2             0.33%      664:1483         10.785***        5.622*** 
          +3             0.27%      677:1470         13.278***        6.265*** 
          +4             0.06%      595:1552          7.099***        2.211*   
          +5             0.15%      601:1546          9.147***        2.508**  
          +6             0.04%      633:1514          9.325***        4.090*** 
          +7            -0.01%      593:1554          5.855***        2.113*   
          +8             0.07%      609:1538          8.150***        2.904**  
          +9             0.07%      608:1539          7.094***        2.854**  
         +10            -0.09%      569:1578          5.691***        0.926    
         +11            -0.15%      593:1554          7.097***        2.113*   
         +12            -0.06%      580:1567         10.254***        1.470$   
         +13            -0.07%      583:1564         10.361***        1.618$   
         +14             0.10%      614:1533         12.066***        3.151*** 
         +15             0.10%      608:1539         11.946***        2.854** 
         +16            -0.07%      563:1584          6.740***        0.630   
         +17            -0.10%      554:1593          4.855***        0.185   
         +18             0.02%      578:1569         10.933***        1.371$  
         +19            -0.05%      592:1555          5.497***        2.063*  
         +20            -0.08%      553:1594          5.027***        0.135   
 
The symbols $,*,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, using 1-tail Patell Z and 
generalized sign Z tests as described in Appendix 6. 





Correlation Matrix of Announcement Reaction Models’ Independent Variables 
 
This table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients of variables used in the market reaction analysis 
models, the results of which are presented in Tables 18 to 31.    
 
NCIB3= number of repurchase programs in the three fiscal years preceding the fiscal year of the current 
announcement.  CUV=1 if announcement states current undervaluation as a reason for the repurchase program, 0 
otherwise.  FUV=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated in case of future 
undervaluation, 0 otherwise.  LIQ=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being put in place to 
improve liquidity, 0 otherwise.  GOOD=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is a good use of cash or a 
good investment, 0 otherwise.  EXCASH=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated due to 
excess cash, 0 otherwise.  STOCKP=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated to prevent 
dilution due to stock options, 0 otherwise.  REMSH=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being 
initiated to benefit the remaining shareholders or to increase their proportionate interest, 0 otherwise.   OPTPER= 
Number of stock options outstanding divided by total shares outstanding at the end of the most recently completed 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.  INMONEY= Total intrinsic value of options held by insiders per the most 
recent proxy circular prior to the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal 
year preceding the announcement.  INSIDER= Total shares held by senior officers and directors per the most 
recent proxy circular preceding the announcement date divided by total outstanding shares at the end of 
the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  REP= Percentage of announced shares 
actually repurchased during the most recent repurchase program that was completed no more than three years prior 
to the current announcement.  PPRET= Cumulative abnormal returns determined using the market model during the 
one year period of the most recent prior repurchase program that was completed no more than three years prior to the 
current announcement.  CARJB= Abnormal returns determined using the market model during the twenty eight days 
prior to the announcement window.  EXBRD= Percentage of board members who are not officers of the firm 
per the most recent proxy circular preceding the announcement date.  CASH= Total cash as a percentage 
of total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  OCF= 
Operating cash flow during the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement divided by 
total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.     INTAN= 
Total intangible assets as a percentage of total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the 
announcement.   XRD= Research and development expenses as a percentage of total sales during the most recently 
reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   VOL= Total share volume during the most recently reported 
fiscal year prior to the announcement divided by total shares outstanding at the end of the most recently 
reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.   MBOOK= Market value of equity divided by book value of 
equity at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   CAPX=capital expenditures 
during the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the 
most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  SIZE= Natural log of total assets at the end of the 
most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   CGCINC= Percentage change in annual earnings 
during the two most recently reported fiscal years preceding the announcement.   CHGREV= Percentage change in 
annual sales during the two most recently reported fiscal years preceding the announcement.   CHGCAPX= 






Table 17 (continued) 
Correlation Matrix of Announcement Reaction Models’ Independent Variables 
 
 CARJB NCIB3 REP PPRET CUV FUV GOOD 
CARJB 1.00       
NCIB3 0.07 1.00      
REP 0.01 -0.02 1.00     
PPRET 0.06 -0.04 -0.08 1.00    
CUV -0.15 -0.27 0.04 0.03 1.00   
FUV 0.05 -0.01 -0.18 -0.02 -0.15 1.00  
GOOD -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 0.18 0.14 1.00 
EXCASH 0.12 -0.00 0.03 -0.05 -0.09 -0.04 -0.00 
STOCKP 0.01 0.15 -0.08 -0.01 -0.18 0.06 -0.09 
LIQ -0.03 -0.03 -0.09 -0.03 0.08 -0.11 -0.04 
REMSH -0.10 -0.10 -0.06 -0.01 0.11 0.10 -0.15 
TARGET -0.04 -0.08 0.14 -0.02 0.05 -0.00 0.19 
REPxCUV -0.08 -0.14 0.56 -0.05 0.52 -0.04 0.10 
REPxFUV -0.05 -0.05 0.27 -0.08 0.06 0.53 0.08 
REPxLIQ 0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.07 -0.08 
REPxPPRET 0.10 -0.01 -0.21 0.63 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 
SIZE 0.08 0.17 0.02 0.00 -0.35 -0.00 -0.24 
MBOOK -0.00 0.11 -0.01 0.09 -0.12 0.00 0.04 
CASH 0.00 -0.04 0.03 0.00 0.25 -0.16 0.16 
OCF -0.19 -0.06 0.01 0.02 -0.10 0.15 -0.08 
VOL 0.06 -0.04 0.08 0.00 -0.07 -0.13 -0.17 
CHGINC -0.06 -0.02 0.01 -0.12 -0.09 0.03 -0.09 
CHGCAPX 0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 0.07 0.01 -0.00 
CHGREV 0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.13 -0.06 0.03 -0.06 
INTAN 0.13 0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.13 -0.12 0.02 
XRD 0.09 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.07 -0.13 0.03 
CAPX -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.21 -0.04 
EXBRD 0.00 0.08 0.07 0.00 -0.07 -0.05 -0.14 
OPT 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.26 -0.08 0.13 
INMONEY -0.12 0.11 -0.04 -0.14 0.24 -0.04 0.15 





Table 17 (continued) 
Correlation Matrix of Announcement Reaction Models’ Independent Variables 
 
 
 EXCASH STOCKP LIQ REMSH TARGE
T 




EXCASH 1.0         
STOCKP -0.02 1.00        
LIQ -0.03 -0.06 1.00       
REMSH 0.01 -0.25 0.12 1.00      
TARGET -0.02 -0.23 0.04 0.03 1.00     
REPxCUV -0.02 -0.08 -0.04 0.05 0.02 1.00    
REPxFUV -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 0.05 0.12 0.19 1.00   
REPxLIQ -0.04 -0.04 0.62 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 1.00  
REPxPPRET -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.01 -0.33 -0.11 0.00 1.00 
SIZE 0.04 0.26 -0.06 -0.10 -0.12 -0.07 -0.12 -0.04 0.03 
MBOOK -0.2 0.07 -0.06 -0.10 -0.01 -0.09 0.00 -0.02 0.05 
CASH 0.01 0.09 -0.09 -0.08 0.01 0.10 -0.07 -0.05 0.03 
OCF 0.02 -0.05 0.08 0.16 0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 
VOL 0.30 -0.07 0.02 0.04 0.14 0.06 -0.03 -0.06 -0.01 
CHGINC -0.04 -0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.06 -0.03 -0.02 0.09 -0.03 
CHGCAPX -0.05 -0.00 0.10 -0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.10 0.25 -0.04 
CHGREV 0.02 -0.02 0.31 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.62 -0.10 
INTAN -0.10 -0.18 0.03 -0.14 -0.13 0.00 -0.08 0.21 -0.03 
XRD 0.20 -0.11 -0.04 0.09 -0.15 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 0.05 
CAPX 0.02 -0.01 0.08 0.21 0.06 -0.04 0.11 -0.01 -0.02 
EXBRD 0.03 0.18 -0.05 0.07 0.00 0.03 -0.01 -0.13 0.02 
OPT 0.04 -0.17 -0.02 -0.08 0.03 0.06 0.08 -0.01 0.01 
INMONEY -0.01 -0.07 0.05 -0.06 0.11 0.05 -0.06 0.04 -0.06 




Table 17 (continued) 
Correlation Matrix of Announcement Reaction Models’ Independent Variables 
 
 
 SIZE MBOOK CASH OCF VOL CHGINC CHGCAPX CHGREV INTAN 
SIZE 1.00         
MBOOK 0.01 1.00        
CASH -0.29 0.10 1.00       
OCF -0.02 0.10 -0.17 1.00      
VOL 0.34 0.02 0.04 0.08 1.00     
CHGINC -0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.12 0.10 1.00    
CHGCAPX -0.10 0.01 0.01 -0.08 0.00 0.15 1.00   
CHGREV 0.01 0.00 -0.09 0.15 0.09 0.26 0.37 1.00  
INTAN 0.05 0.05 -0.09 -0.14 -0.10 -0.00 0.14 0.18 1.00 
XRD -0.29 0.01 0.57 -0.21 0.04 0.00 -0.08 -0.07 -0.00 
CAPX -0.08 0.03 -0.29 0.43 0.08 0.12 0.27 0.19 -0.29 
EXBRD 0.39 0.02 -0.07 0.07 0.16 -0.07 -0.10 -0.17 -0.07 
OPT -0.31 0.02 0.33 -0.14 0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.03 
INMONEY -0.25 0.20 0.38 0.19 0.09 0.03 0.13 0.09 -0.07 
INSIDER -0.33 0.00 0.12 -0.12 -0.30 0.04 0.06 -0.01 0.05 
 
 
 XRD CAPX EXBRD OPT INMONEY INSIDER 
XRD 1.00      
CAPX -0.21 1.00     
EXBRD -0.09 -0.03 1.00    
OPT 0.30 -0.09 -0.10 1.00   
INMONEY 0.01 0.03 -0.00 0.10 1.00  




Regression Analysis of Market Returns Reaction: All Announcers 
 
This table presents, without the use of selection controls, OLS regression results for all sample firms with the required data.   
Model 1 presents the results using the contents of the announcement and returns data.     Model 2 presents the results using the 
contents of the announcement, market data and accounting data.     Model 3 presents the results using the contents of the 
announcement, market data, accounting data and proxy circular data.    Model 4 presents the same results as Model 3 but excludes 
announcements that involved multiple securities or had competing earnings or dividend announcements during the event window.    
T-statistics are calculated using robust clustered standard errors as recommended by Petersen (2008). 
 
The dependent variable, CAR, is cumulative abnormal returns determined using the market model (equally weighted index) over 
the window (-1,+1) relative to the announcement date.     Market model parameters are estimated using a minimum of 60 and a 
maximum of 200 days of returns split equally between the period ending 31 days before and commencing 31 days after the event 
day.   Independent variables are defined as follows.  NCIB3= number of repurchase programs in the three fiscal years preceding 
the fiscal year of the current announcement.  CUV=1 if announcement states current undervaluation as a reason for the repurchase 
program, 0 otherwise.  FUV=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated in case of future undervaluation, 
0 otherwise.  LIQ=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being put in place to improve liquidity, 0 otherwise.  
GOOD=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is a good use of cash or a good investment, 0 otherwise.  EXCASH=1 
if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated due to excess cash, 0 otherwise.  STOCKP=1 if announcement 
states that repurchase program is being initiated to prevent dilution due to stock options, 0 otherwise.  REMSH=1 if 
announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated to benefit the remaining shareholders or to increase their 
proportionate interest, 0 otherwise.   OPTPER= Number of stock options outstanding divided by total shares outstanding at the 
end of the most recently completed fiscal year preceding the announcement.  INMONEY= Total intrinsic value of options held by 
insiders per the most recent proxy circular prior to the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently 
reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  INSIDER= Total shares held by senior officers and directors per the most 
recent proxy circular preceding the announcement date divided by total outstanding shares at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.  REP= Percentage of announced shares actually repurchased during the most recent 
repurchase program that was completed no more than three years prior to the current announcement.  PPRET= Cumulative 
abnormal returns determined using the market model during the one year period of the most recent prior repurchase program that 
was completed no more than three years prior to the current announcement.  CARJB= Abnormal returns determined using the 
market model during the twenty eight days prior to the announcement window.  EXBRD= Percentage of board members who are 
not officers of the firm per the most recent proxy circular preceding the announcement date.  CASH= Total cash as a percentage 
of total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  OCF= Operating cash flow during 
the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.   XRD= Research and development expenses as a percentage of total sales during the 
most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   VOL= Total share volume during the most recently reported fiscal 
year prior to the announcement divided by total shares outstanding at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding 
the announcement.   MBOOK= Market value of equity divided by book value of equity at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year prior to the announcement.   CAPX=capital expenditures during the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the 
announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  SIZE= 
Natural log of total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   CGCINC= Percentage 
change in annual earnings during the two most recently reported fiscal years preceding the announcement.   CHGREV= 
Percentage change in annual sales during the two most recently reported fiscal years preceding the announcement.   CHGCAPX= 




Table 18 (continued) 
Regression Analysis of Market Returns Reaction: All Announcers 
 
















Number of Obs. 1747  1023  516  458  
Number of Firms 622  365  201  187  
R-squared 0.0238  0.0415  0.0771  0.0730  
         
Intercept 0.0209 3.27*** 0.0358 2.60*** 0.03867 1.26 0.0248 0.73 
         
History:         
a. NCIB3 -0.0128 -3.11*** -0.0054 -3.02*** -0.0041 -1.58 -0.0046 -1.67* 
Announcement 
Content: 
        
b. CUV 0.0113 2.80*** 0.0024 0.45 0.0018 0.20 0.0029 0.31 
c. FUV -0.0051 -1.43 -0.0077 1.81* -0.0138 -2.16** -0.0129 -1.96* 
d. GOOD -0.0042 -1.15 -0.0042 -0.93 -0.0070 -1.04 -0.0058 -0.81 
e. EXCASH -0.0049 -0.68 0.0053 0.72 0.0114 1.17 0.0045 0.46 
f. STOCKP -0.0049 -1.26 -0.0021 -0.43 -0.0070 -0.72 -0.0061 -0.61 
g. LIQ -0.0062 -0.72 0.0031 0.25 -0.0098 -0.61 -0.0072 -0.47 
h. REMSH -0.0044 -1.22 -0.0038 -0.83 -0.0059 -0.88 -0.0031 -0.45 
i. TARGET 0.0005 0.69 0.0007 0.65 0.0005 0.34 0.0008 0.53 
Market Data         
j. CARJB 0.0179 1.23 0.0228 1.07 0.0428 1.74* 0.0308 1.32 
k. VOL   -0.0094 -0.81 -0.0101 -0.51 -0.0031 -0.15 
Accounting:         
l. SIZE   -0.0015 -1.14 -0.0028 -1.40 -0.0010 -0.51 
m. MBOOK   -0.0006 -0.90 -0.0001 -0.20 -0.0001 -0.12 
n. CASH   0.0301 1.94* 0.0272 1.56 0.0252 1.53 
o. OCF   -0.0031 -0.19 0.0095 0.53 0.0139 0.81 
p. INT   -0.0135 -0.90 -0.0267 -1.38 -0.0310 -1.42 
q. XRD   -0.0250 -0.43 -0.0377 -0.51 0.0063 0.09 
r. CAPX   -0.0022 -0.12 -0.0224 -1.18 -0.0156 -0.95 
s. CHGINC   0.0000 1.05 0.0001 10.20*** 0.0001 9.62*** 
t. CHGCAPX   -0.0007 -1.87* -0.0008 -0.98  0.0006 0.41 
u. CHGREV   0.0001 6.89*** 0.0000 3.91***  0.0001 1.27 
Proxy Circular         
v. EXBRD     0.0174 0.47   0.0077 0.18 
w. OPT     -0.0465 -1.16 -0.0382 -0.89 
x. INMONEY     -0.0871 -1.73* -0.0736 -1.66* 
y. INSIDER     0.0000 1.48   0.0001 2.74*** 
 
*** denotes significance at the 0.01 level, ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level and * denotes 





Regression Analysis of Market Returns Reaction: Repeat Announcers Only 
 
This table presents, without the use of selection controls, OLS regression results for all firms with repeat announcements during 
the sample period and the required data.  Model 1 presents the results using the contents of the announcement and returns data.     
Model 2 presents the results using the contents of the announcement, market data and accounting data.     Model 3 presents the 
results using the contents of the announcement, market data, accounting data and proxy circular data.    Model 4 presents the same 
results as Model 3 but excludes announcements that involved multiple securities or had competing earnings or dividend 
announcements during the event window.    T-statistics are calculated using robust clustered standard errors as recommended by 
Petersen (2008). 
The dependent variable, CAR, is cumulative abnormal returns determined using the market model (equally weighted index) over 
the window (-1,+1) relative to the announcement date.     Market model parameters are estimated using a minimum of 60 and a 
maximum of 200 days of returns split equally between the period ending 31 days before and commencing 31 days after the event 
day.   Independent variables are defined as follows.  NCIB3= number of repurchase programs in the three fiscal years that 
preceding the fiscal year of the current announcement.  CUV=1 if announcement states current undervaluation as a reason for the 
repurchase program, 0 otherwise.  FUV=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated in case of future 
undervaluation, 0 otherwise.  LIQ=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being put in place to improve liquidity, 0 
otherwise.  GOOD=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is a good use of cash or a good investment, 0 otherwise.  
EXCASH=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated due to excess cash, 0 otherwise.  STOCKP=1 if 
announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated to prevent dilution due to stock options, 0 otherwise.  REMSH=1 
if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated to benefit the remaining shareholders or to increase their 
proportionate interest, 0 otherwise.   OPTPER= Number of stock options outstanding divided by total shares outstanding at the 
end of the most recently completed fiscal year preceding the announcement.  INMONEY= Total intrinsic value of options held by 
insiders per the most recent proxy circular prior to the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently 
reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  INSIDER= Total shares held by senior officers and directors per the most 
recent proxy circular preceding the announcement date divided by total outstanding shares at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.  REP= Percentage of announced shares actually repurchased during the most recent 
repurchase program that was completed no more than three years prior to the current announcement.  PPRET= Cumulative 
abnormal returns determined using the market model during the one year period of the most recent prior repurchase program that 
was completed no more than three years prior to the current announcement.  CARJB= Abnormal returns determined using the 
market model during the twenty eight days prior to the announcement window.  EXBRD= Percentage of board members who are 
not officers of the firm per the most recent proxy circular preceding the announcement date.  CASH= Total cash as a percentage 
of total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  OCF= Operating cash flow during 
the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.    INTAN= Total intangible assets as a percentage of total assets at the end of the most 
recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   XRD= Research and development expenses as a percentage of total 
sales during the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   VOL= Total share volume during the most 
recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement divided by total shares outstanding at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.   MBOOK= Market value of equity divided by book value of equity at the end of the 
most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   CAPX=capital expenditures during the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the 
announcement.  SIZE= Natural log of total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   
CGCINC= Percentage change in annual earnings during the two most recently reported fiscal years preceding the announcement.   
CHGREV= Percentage change in annual sales during the two most recently reported fiscal years preceding the announcement.   





Table 19 (continued) 
Regression Analysis of Market Returns Reaction: Repeat Announcers Only 
 
















Number of Obs. 1064  694  356  316  
Number of Firms 360  246  132  125  
R-squared 0.0409  0.0634  0.0994  0.0981  
         
Intercept 0.0405 1.10 0.0194 1.35 0.0047 0.19 0.0101 0.39 
History:         
a. CARJB 0.0456 2.62*** 0.0326 1.29 0.0389 1.54 0.0424 1.72* 
b. REP 0.0105 2.03** 0.0088 1.63 0.0148 1.81* 0.0079 1.01 
c. PPRET 0.0043 0.09 0.0020 0.35 0.0038 0.49 -0.0038 -0.62 
d. NCIB3 -0.0351 -0.97 -0.0020 -0.83 -0.0002 -0.04 -0.0027 -0.74 
Announcement 
Content: 
        
e. CUV 0.0125 2.18** 0.0030 0.38 0.0153 1.30 0.0113 0.93 
f. FUV 0.0011 0.23 -0.0055 -0.99 -0.0096 -1.41 -0.0056 -0.73 
g. GOOD -0.0020 -0.45 0.0112 1.56 0.0067 1.05 0.0057 0.94 
h. EXCASH 0.0087 1.14 0.0112 1.56 -0.0012 -0.11 -0.0092 -0.84 
i. STOCKP -0.0033 -0.67 -0.0008 -0.13 -0.0051 -0.48 -0.0040 -0.40 
j. LIQ 0.0029 0.23 0.0128 0.76 -0.0146 -0.45 -0.0164 -0.46 
k. REMSH -0.0095 -2.21 -0.0031 -0.62 -0.0055 -0.76 -0.0033 -0.49 
l. TARGET 0.0003 0.42 -0.0004 -0.38 -0.0014 -1.12 -0.0009 -0.75 
History/Content:         
m. REPxCUV -0.0117 -1.31 -0.0112 -0.83 -0.0258 -1.66* -0.0071 -0.46 
n. REPxFUV -0.0028 -0.33 0.0010 0.10 -0.0013 -0.09 -0.0105 -0.67 
o. REPxLIQ -0.0492 -1.88* -0.0491 1.54 0.0199 0.44 0.0371 0.77 
p. REPxPPRET 0.0036 0.39 0.0111 0.97 -0.0056 -0.46 0.0056 0.48 
Accounting:         
q. SIZE   -0.0014 -1.22 -0.0014 -0.66 0.0032 0.19 
r. MBOOK   -0.0018 -3.64*** -0.0024 -1.46 -0.0012 -0.96 
s. CASH   0.0429 1.92* 0.0188 0.78 0.0101 0.48 
t. OCF   0.0032 0.18 0.0321 1.27 0.0354 1.27 
u. VOL   0.0026 0.41 0.0115 0.98 0.0151 1.36 
v. CHGINC   0.0000 1.74* 0.0005 10.65*** 0.0001 10.47 
w. CHGCAPX   -0.0007 -0.51 -0.0007 -0.45 -0.0008 -0.57 
x. CHGREV   -0.0016 -0.44 0.0029 0.59 0.0000 0.01 
y. INTAN   0.0023 0.14 -0.0065 -0.34 -0.0077 -0.38 
z. XRD   0.0109 0.18 0.0112 0.16 0.0713 1.38 
aa. CAPX   0.0081 0.31 -0.0416 -1.10 -0.0148 -0.44 
Proxy Circular         
bb. EXBRD     0.0135 0.46 -0.0125 -0.42 
cc. OPT     0.0173 0.33 0.0187 0.37 
dd. INMONEY     -0.2324 -0.99 -0.0971 -0.52 
ee. INSIDER     0.0001 2.31** 0.0001 4.55*** 
 
*** denotes significance at the 0.01 level, ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level and * denotes 




Regression Analysis of Market Returns Reaction with  
Probit Model 1 Surprise Control: All Announcers 
 
This table presents OLS regression results for all sample firms with the required data.   The market’s level of surprise that the 
announcement is occurring is controlled for by including the predicted value (P1 below) from probit model 1.    The results of 
probit model 1 are summarized in Table 11.      Model 2 presents the results using the contents of the announcement, market data 
and accounting data.     Model 3 presents the results using the contents of the announcement, market data, accounting data and 
proxy circular data.    Model 4 presents the same results as Model 3 but excludes announcements that involved multiple securities 
or had competing earnings or dividend announcements during the event window.    T-statistics are calculated using robust 
clustered standard errors as recommended by Petersen (2008). 
 
The dependent variable, CAR, is cumulative abnormal returns determined using the market model (equally weighted index) over 
the window (-1,+1) relative to the announcement date.     Market model parameters are estimated using a minimum of 60 and a 
maximum of 200 days of returns split equally between the period ending 31 days before and commencing 31 days after the event 
day.   Independent variables are defined as follows.  CUV=1 if announcement states current undervaluation as a reason for the 
repurchase program, 0 otherwise.  FUV=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated in case of future 
undervaluation, 0 otherwise.  LIQ=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being put in place to improve liquidity, 0 
otherwise.  GOOD=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is a good use of cash or a good investment, 0 otherwise.  
EXCASH=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated due to excess cash, 0 otherwise.  STOCKP=1 if 
announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated to prevent dilution due to stock options, 0 otherwise.  REMSH=1 
if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated to benefit the remaining shareholders or to increase their 
proportionate interest, 0 otherwise.   OPTPER= Number of stock options outstanding divided by total shares outstanding at the 
end of the most recently completed fiscal year preceding the announcement.  INMONEY= Total intrinsic value of options held by 
insiders per the most recent proxy circular prior to the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently 
reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  INSIDER= Total shares held by senior officers and directors per the most 
recent proxy circular preceding the announcement date divided by total outstanding shares at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.  REP= Percentage of announced shares actually repurchased during the most recent 
repurchase program that was completed no more than three years prior to the current announcement.  PPRET= Cumulative 
abnormal returns determined using the market model during the one year period of the most recent prior repurchase program that 
was completed no more than three years prior to the current announcement.  CARJB= Abnormal returns determined using the 
market model during the twenty eight days prior to the announcement window.  EXBRD= Percentage of board members who are 
not officers of the firm per the most recent proxy circular preceding the announcement date.  CASH= Total cash as a percentage 
of total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  OCF= Operating cash flow during 
the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.   INTAN= Total intangible assets as a percentage of total assets at the end of the most 
recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   XRD= Research and development expenses as a percentage of total 
sales during the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   VOL= Total share volume during the most 
recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement divided by total shares outstanding at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.   MBOOK= Market value of equity divided by book value of equity at the end of the 
most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   CAPX=capital expenditures during the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the 
announcement.  SIZE= Natural log of total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.  
CGCINC= Percentage change in annual earnings during the two most recently reported fiscal years preceding the announcement.   
CHGREV= Percentage change in annual sales during the two most recently reported fiscal years preceding the announcement.   




Table 20 (continued) 
Regression Analysis of Market Returns Reaction with 
 Probit Model 1 Surprise Control: All Announcers 
 












Number of Obs. 897  447  417  
Number of Firms 327  180  170  
R-squared 0.0455  0.0908  0.0906  
       
Intercept 0.0405 2.67*** 0.0453 1.47 0.0378 1.10 
       
Surprise Control:       
        a.   P1 -0.0245 -2.75*** -0.0162 -1.32 -0.0223 -1.60 
Announcement Content:       
b. CUV 0.0011 0.19 -0.0007 -0.08 -0.0028 -0.29 
c. FUV -0.0071 -1.49 -0.0159 -2.31** -0.0142 -2.05** 
d. GOOD -0.0060 -1.17 -0.0095 -1.41 -0.0099 -1.36 
e. EXCASH 0.0048 0.61 0.0114 0.85 0.0046 0.41 
f. STOCKP -0.0055 -0.89 -0.0119 -1.27 -0.0137 -1.19 
g. LIQ 0.0038 0.24 -0.0079 -0.33 -0.0094 -0.41 
h. REMSH -0.0061 -1.16 -0.0089 -1.25 -0.0083 -1.08 
i. TARGET 0.0009 0.73 0.0006 0.38 0.0011 0.65 
Market Data       
j. CARJB 0.0290 1.27 0.0489 1.81* 0.0420 1.61 
k. VOL -0.0000 -1.02 -0.0164 -0.79 -0.0118 -0.52 
Accounting:       
l. SIZE -0.0010 -0.60 -0.0026 -1.07 -0.0002 -0.07 
m. MBOOK -0.0000 -0.12 -0.0000 -0.09 0.0001 0.22 
n. CASH 0.0332 2.06** 0.0255 1.40 0.0306 1.68* 
o. OCF -0.0034 -0.17 0.0061 0.34 0.0106 0.63 
p. INTAN -0.0255 -1.32 -0.0395 -1.71* -0.0462 -1.66* 
q. XRD -0.0512 -0.82 -0.0125 -2.29** -0.0113 -2.26** 
r. CAPX -0.0063 -0.33 -0.0301 -1.62 -0.0001 -1.38 
s. CHGINC -0.0000 -0.90 0.0011 1.59 0.0014 2.04** 
t. CHGCAPX -0.0007 -2.01** -0.0009 -1.19 -0.0001 -0.10 
u. CHGREV 0.0000 6.52*** 0.0000 4.20*** 0.0000 2.14** 
Proxy Circular       
v. EXBRD   0.0224 0.61 0.0076 0.18 
w. OPT   -0.0610 -1.44 -0.0314 -0.76 
x. INMONEY   -0.0971 -2.01 -0.0902 -2.05** 
y. INSIDER   0.0075 0.38 0.0113 0.54 
 
*** denotes significance at the 0.01 level, ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level and * denotes 





Regression Analysis of Market Returns Reaction with  
Probit Model 1 Surprise Control: Repeat Announcers Only 
 
This table presents OLS regression results for all firms with repeat announcements during the sample period and the required 
data.   The market’s level of surprise that the announcement is occurring is controlled for by including the predicted value (P1 
below) from probit model 1.    The results of probit model 1 are summarized in Table 11.      Model 2 presents the results using 
the contents of the announcement, market data and accounting data.     Model 3 presents the results using the contents of the 
announcement, market data, accounting data and proxy circular data.    Model 4 presents the same results as Model 3 but excludes 
announcements that involved multiple securities or had competing earnings or dividend announcements during the event window.    
T-statistics are calculated using robust clustered standard errors as recommended by Petersen (2008). 
 
The dependent variable, CAR, is cumulative abnormal returns determined using the market model (equally weighted index) over 
the window (-1,+1) relative to the announcement date.     Market model parameters are estimated using a minimum of 60 and a 
maximum of 200 days of returns split equally between the period ending 31 days before and commencing 31 days after the event 
day.   Independent variables are defined as follows.  CUV=1 if announcement states current undervaluation as a reason for the 
repurchase program, 0 otherwise.  FUV=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated in case of future 
undervaluation, 0 otherwise.  LIQ=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being put in place to improve liquidity, 0 
otherwise.  GOOD=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is a good use of cash or a good investment, 0 otherwise.  
EXCASH=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated due to excess cash, 0 otherwise.  STOCKP=1 if 
announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated to prevent dilution due to stock options, 0 otherwise.  REMSH=1 
if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated to benefit the remaining shareholders or to increase their 
proportionate interest, 0 otherwise.   OPTPER= Number of stock options outstanding divided by total shares outstanding at the 
end of the most recently completed fiscal year preceding the announcement.  INMONEY= Total intrinsic value of options held by 
insiders per the most recent proxy circular prior to the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently 
reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  INSIDER= Total shares held by senior officers and directors per the most 
recent proxy circular preceding the announcement date divided by total outstanding shares at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.  REP= Percentage of announced shares actually repurchased during the most recent 
repurchase program that was completed no more than three years prior to the current announcement.  PPRET= Cumulative 
abnormal returns determined using the market model during the one year period of the most recent prior repurchase program that 
was completed no more than three years prior to the current announcement.  CARJB= Abnormal returns determined using the 
market model during the twenty eight days prior to the announcement window.  EXBRD= Percentage of board members who are 
not officers of the firm per the most recent proxy circular preceding the announcement date.  CASH= Total cash as a percentage 
of total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  OCF= Operating cash flow during 
the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.   XRD= Research and development expenses as a percentage of total sales during the 
most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   VOL= Total share volume during the most recently reported fiscal 
year prior to the announcement divided by total shares outstanding at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding 
the announcement.   MBOOK= Market value of equity divided by book value of equity at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year prior to the announcement.   INTAN= Total intangible assets as a percentage of total assets at the end of the most 
recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   CAPX=capital expenditures during the most recently reported fiscal 
year preceding the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the 
announcement.  SIZE= Natural log of total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.  
CGCINC= Percentage change in annual earnings during the two most recently reported fiscal years preceding the announcement.   
CHGREV= Percentage change in annual sales during the two most recently reported fiscal years preceding the announcement.   





Table 21 (continued) 
Regression Analysis of Market Returns Reaction with  
Probit Model 1 Surprise Control: Repeat Announcers Only 
 












Number of Obs. 587  300  264  
Number of Firms 221  115  108  
R-squared 0.1104  0.1087  0.0930  
       
Intercept 0.0235 1.45 0.0074 0.28 0.0123 0.45 
       
Surprise Control:       
       a.   P1 -0.0138 -1.09 -0.0011 -0.06 -0.0076 -0.35 
History:       
b. CARJB 0.0338 1.25 0.0484 1.68* 0.0521 1.87* 
c. REP 0.0135 2.36** 0.0164 1.75* 0.0089 1.10 
d. PPRET 0.0043 0.75 0.0079 0.84 -0.0006 -0.08 
Announcement Content:       
e. CUV 0.0042 0.50 0.0173 1.27 0.0131 0.92 
f. FUV -0.028 -0.45 -0.0101 -1.32 -0.0058 -0.69 
g. GOOD 0.0004 0.07 0.0049 0.75 0.0032 0.5 
h. EXCASH 0.0072 0.79 0.0008 0.06 -0.0108 -0.79 
i. STOCKP -0.0058 -0.78 -0.0061 -0.53 -0.0051 -0.44 
j. LIQ 0.0165 0.73 -0.0251 -0.57 -0.0338 -0.71 
k. REMSH -0.0048 -0.80 -0.0056 -0.63 -0.0031 -0.36 
l. TARGET -0.0008 -0.79 -0.0019 -1.37 -0.0012 -1.01 
History/Content:       
m. REPxCUV -0.0212 -1.52 -0.0408 -2.42** -0.0223 -1.45 
n. REPxFUV -0.0008 -0.07 0.0037 0.24 -0.0045 -0.29 
o. REPxLIQ -0.0720 -2.27** 0.0593 0.36 0.1733 1.04 
p. REPxPPRET 0.0068 0.58 -0.0164 -1.23 -0.0050 -0.43 
Accounting:       
q. SIZE -0.0003 -0.21 -0.0004 -0.15 0.0014 0.64 
r. MBOOK -0.0021 -0.95 -0.0042 -1.49 -0.0024 -0.96 
s. CASH 0.0370 1.48 0.0230 0.83 0.0135 0.54 
t. OCF -0.0073 -0.28 0.0323 1.05 0.0397 1.27 
u. VOL 0.0002 -1.60 0.0105 0.83 0.0153 1.27 
v. CHGINC -0.0015 -1.60 0.0010 1.08 0.0007 0.80 
w. CHGCAPX -0.0009 -0.49 -0.0012 -0.73 -0.0011 -0.71 
x. CHGREV 0.0018 0.41 0.0012 0.21 -0.0025 -0.43 
y. INTAN -0.0075 -0.37 -0.0038 -0.14 -0.0119 -0.39 
z. XRD 0.0598 0.62 -0.0358 -0.62 0.0030 0.07 
aa. CAPX 0.0166 -0.49 -0.0437 -1.12 -0.0180 -0.52 
Proxy Circular       
bb. EXBRD   0.0100 0.34 -0.0215 -0.73 
cc. OPT   0.0274 0.57 0.0324 0.68 
dd. INMONEY   -0.1437 -0.65 -0.0266 -0.15 
ee. INSIDER   0.0071 0.28 0.0128 0.56 
 
*** denotes significance at the 0.01 level, ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level and * denotes 





Market Reaction Returns Analysis Using Full Information  
Maximum Likelihood Heckman Model: All Announcers 
 
This table presents Heckman full information maximum likelihood results for all sample firms with the required data.   Selection 
is controlled for by utilizing a Heckman full information maximum likelihood model.    Probit results from the full information 
maximum likelihood model are presented in Table 11.    Model 2 utilizes Probit Model 1 from Table 11 in the first stage and 
controls for the contents of the announcement and accounting data.    Model 3 utilizes Probit Model 1 from Table 11 in the first 
stage and presents the results using the contents of the announcement, market data, accounting data and proxy circular data.    
Model 4 presents the same results as Model 3 but excludes announcements that involved multiple securities or had competing 
earnings or dividend announcements during the event window.  Z-statistics are calculated using robust clustered standard errors 
as recommended by Petersen (2008). 
 
The dependent variable, CAR, is cumulative abnormal returns determined using the market model (equally weighted index) over 
the window (-1,+1) relative to the announcement date.     Market model parameters are estimated using a minimum of 60 and a 
maximum of 200 days of returns split equally between the period ending 31 days before and commencing 31 days after the event 
day.   ATHRHO is the hyperbolic arctangent of the probability from the probit model and is used to control for sample selection. 
Rho is the correlation between the residuals of the repurchase decision model and the market reaction model.    Independent 
variables are defined as follows.  CUV=1 if announcement states current undervaluation as a reason for the repurchase program, 0 
otherwise.  FUV=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated in case of future undervaluation, 0 
otherwise.  LIQ=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being put in place to improve liquidity, 0 otherwise.  
GOOD=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is a good use of cash or a good investment, 0 otherwise.  EXCASH=1 
if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated due to excess cash, 0 otherwise.  STOCKP=1 if announcement 
states that repurchase program is being initiated to prevent dilution due to stock options, 0 otherwise.  REMSH=1 if 
announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated to benefit the remaining shareholders or to increase their 
proportionate interest, 0 otherwise.   OPTPER= Number of stock options outstanding divided by total shares outstanding at the 
end of the most recently completed fiscal year preceding the announcement.  INMONEY= Total intrinsic value of options held by 
insiders per the most recent proxy circular prior to the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently 
reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  INSIDER= Total shares held by senior officers and directors per the most 
recent proxy circular preceding the announcement date divided by total outstanding shares at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.  REP= Percentage of announced shares actually repurchased during the most recent 
repurchase program that was completed no more than three years prior to the current announcement.  PPRET= Cumulative 
abnormal returns determined using the market model during the one year period of the most recent prior repurchase program that 
was completed no more than three years prior to the current announcement.  CARJB= Abnormal returns determined using the 
market model during the twenty eight days prior to the announcement window.  EXBRD= Percentage of board members who are 
not officers of the firm per the most recent proxy circular preceding the announcement date.  CASH= Total cash as a percentage 
of total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  OCF= Operating cash flow during 
the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.   XRD= Research and development expenses as a percentage of total sales during the 
most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   VOL= Total share volume during the most recently reported fiscal 
year prior to the announcement divided by total shares outstanding at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding 
the announcement.   MBOOK= Market value of equity divided by book value of equity at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year prior to the announcement.  INTAN= Total intangible assets as a percentage of total assets at the end of the most 
recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   CAPX=capital expenditures during the most recently reported fiscal 
year preceding the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the 
announcement.  SIZE= Natural log of total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.  
CGCINC= Percentage change in annual earnings during the two most recently reported fiscal years preceding the announcement.   
CHGREV= Percentage change in annual sales during the two most recently reported fiscal years preceding the announcement.   





Table 22 (continued) 
Market Reaction Returns Analysis Using Full Information  
Maximum Likelihood Heckman Model: All Announcers  
 












Number of Obs. 886  446  393  
Number of Firms 327  178  164  
       
Intercept 0.0170 1.09 0.0306 0.98 0.0116 0.34 
       
Sample Selection Control:       
        a.  ATHRHO 0.1427 2.63*** 0.0980 1.28 0.1139 1.30 
        a1. Rho 0.1417  0.0977  0.1134  
Announcement Content:       
b. CUV 0.0015 0.26 -0.0017 -0.18 -0.0009 -0.09 
c. FUV -0.0070 -1.49 -0.0161 -2.35** -0.0152 -2.18** 
d. GOOD -0.0062 -1.23 -0.0091 -1.28 -0.0065 -0.88 
e. EXCASH 0.0045 0.59 0.0123 1.17 0.0067 0.64 
f. STOCKP -0.0060 -0.98 -0.0129 -1.20 -0.0111 -0.98 
g. LIQ -0.0034 0.22 -0.0091 -0.38 -0.0079 -0.36 
h. REMSH -0.0064 -1.23 -0.0088 -1.17 -0.0056 -0.73 
i. TARGET 0.0009 0.72 0.0040 0.24 0.0008 0.47 
Market Data       
j. CARJB 0.0283 1.25 0.0487 1.87* 0.0360 1.45 
k. VOL -0.0116 -0.94 -0.0154 -0.74 -0.0070 -0.32 
Accounting:       
l. SIZE -0.0008 -0.51 -0.0028 -1.13 -0.0010 -0.39 
m. MBOOK -0.0001 -0.19 0.0000 0.02 0.0001 0.17 
n. CASH 0.0332 2.07** 0.0309 1.63 0.0281 1.60 
o. OCF -0.0024 -0.13 0.0074 0.39 0.0085 0.53 
p. INTAN -0.0259 -1.37 -0.0378 -1.59 -0.0469 -1.73* 
q. XRD -0.0445 -0.71 -0.0916 -1.18 -0.0561 -0.76 
r. CAPX -0.0052 -0.29 -0.0295 -1.60 -0.0251 -1.64 
s. CHGINC -0.0000 -0.86 0.0011 1.66* 0.0016 2.34** 
t. CHGCAPX -0.0007 -2.03** -0.0010 -1.31 0.0002 0.13 
u. CHGREV 0.0001 6.63*** 0.0000 4.36*** 0.0000 2.10** 
Proxy Circular       
v. EXBRD   0.0232 0.61 0.0155 0.36 
w. OPT   -0.0556 -1.29 -0.0257 -0.64 
x. INMONEY   -0.0948 -1.91* -0.0845 -1.98** 
y. INSIDER   0.0059 0.29 0.0031 0.16 
 
*** denotes significance at the 0.01 level, ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level and * denotes 







Market Reaction Returns Analysis Using Full Information  
Maximum Likelihood Heckman Model: Repeat Announcers Only 
 
This table presents Heckman full information maximum likelihood results for all firms with repeat announcements during the 
sample period and the required data.   Selection is controlled for by utilizing the Heckman full information maximum likelihood 
method.    The results of the probit model are reported in Table 11.     Model 2 utilizes Probit Model 1 from Table 11 in the first 
stage and controls for the contents of the announcement and accounting data.    Model 3 utilizes Probit Model 1 from Table 11 in 
the first stage and presents the results using the contents of the announcement, market data, accounting data and proxy circular 
data.    Model 4 presents the same results as Model 3 but excludes announcements that involved multiple securities or had 
competing earnings or dividend announcements during the event window.  Z-statistics are calculated using robust clustered 
standard errors as recommended by Petersen (2008). 
 
The dependent variable, CAR, is cumulative abnormal returns determined using the market model (equally weighted index) over 
the window (-1,+1) relative to the announcement date.     Market model parameters are estimated using a minimum of 60 and a 
maximum of 200 days of returns split equally between the period ending 31 days before and commencing 31 days after the event 
day.   ATHRHO is the hyperbolic arctangent of the probability from the probit model and is used to control for sample selection.   
Rho is the correlation between the residuals of the repurchase decision model and the market reaction model.  Independent 
variables are defined as follows.  CUV=1 if announcement states current undervaluation as a reason for the repurchase program, 0 
otherwise.  FUV=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated in case of future undervaluation, 0 
otherwise.  LIQ=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being put in place to improve liquidity, 0 otherwise.  
GOOD=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is a good use of cash or a good investment, 0 otherwise.  EXCASH=1 
if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated due to excess cash, 0 otherwise.  STOCKP=1 if announcement 
states that repurchase program is being initiated to prevent dilution due to stock options, 0 otherwise.  REMSH=1 if 
announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated to benefit the remaining shareholders or to increase their 
proportionate interest, 0 otherwise.   OPTPER= Number of stock options outstanding divided by total shares outstanding at the 
end of the most recently completed fiscal year preceding the announcement.  INMONEY= Total intrinsic value of options held by 
insiders per the most recent proxy circular prior to the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently 
reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  INSIDER= Total shares held by senior officers and directors per the most 
recent proxy circular preceding the announcement date divided by total outstanding shares at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.  REP= Percentage of announced shares actually repurchased during the most recent 
repurchase program that was completed no more than three years prior to the current announcement.  PPRET= Cumulative 
abnormal returns determined using the market model during the one year period of the most recent prior repurchase program that 
was completed no more than three years prior to the current announcement.  CARJB= Abnormal returns determined using the 
market model during the twenty eight days prior to the announcement window.  EXBRD= Percentage of board members who are 
not officers of the firm per the most recent proxy circular preceding the announcement date.  CASH= Total cash as a percentage 
of total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  OCF= Operating cash flow during 
the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.   INTAN= Total intangible assets as a percentage of total assets at the end of the most 
recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   XRD= Research and development expenses as a percentage of total 
sales during the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   VOL= Total share volume during the most 
recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement divided by total shares outstanding at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.   MBOOK= Market value of equity divided by book value of equity at the end of the 
most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   CAPX=capital expenditures during the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the 
announcement.  SIZE= Natural log of total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.  
CGCINC= Percentage change in annual earnings during the two most recently reported fiscal years preceding the announcement.   
CHGREV= Percentage change in annual sales during the two most recently reported fiscal years preceding the announcement.   




Table 23 (continued) 
Market Reaction Returns Analysis Using Full Information  
Maximum Likelihood Heckman Model: Repeat Announcers Only  
 












Number of Obs. 586  299  264  
Number of Firms 221  115  108  
       
Intercept 0.0127 0.74 0.0060 0.23 0.0026 0.10 
       
Sample Selection Control:       
       a.   ATHRHO 0.0658 0.86 0.0076 0.06 0.0566 0.36 
       a1. Rho 0.0657  0.0076  0.0565  
History:       
b. CARJB 0.0335 1.26 0.0478 1.76* 0.0521 1.99** 
c. REP 0.0134 2.41** 0.0165 1.85* 0.0090 1.19 
d. PPRET 0.0045 0.81 0.0079 0.88 -0.0007 -0.11 
Announcement Content:       
e. CUV 0.0043 0.52 0.0174 1.32 0.0136 1.00 
f. FUV -0.0028 -0.45 -0.0099 -1.37 -0.0057 -0.73 
g. GOOD 0.0003 0.05 0.0051 0.81 0.0032 0.54 
h. EXCASH 0.0071 0.78 -0.0009 -0.08 -0.0115 -0.96 
i. STOCKP -0.0061 -0.83 -0.0064 -0.57 -0.0051 -0.47 
j. LIQ 0.0164 0.75 -0.0254 -0.61 -0.0343 -0.77 
k. REMSH -0.0051 -0.87 -0.0061 -0.74 -0.0032 -0.41 
l. TARGET -0.0008 -0.83 -0.0018 -1.41 -0.0011 -1.00 
History/Content:       
m. REPxCUV -0.0211 -1.55 -0.0407 -2.53** -0.0224 -1.55 
n. REPxFUV -0.0007 -0.06 0.0038 0.26 -0.0044 -0.30 
o. REPxLIQ -0.0722 -2.35 0.0639 0.40 0.1788 1.13 
p. REPxPPRET 0.0064 0.56 -0.0162 -1.30 -0.0050 -0.46 
Accounting:       
q. SIZE -0.0004 -0.29 -0.0003 -0.11 0.0016 0.79 
r. MBOOK -0.0022 -1.01 -0.0042 -1.56 -0.0025 -1.03 
s. CASH 0.0367 1.50 0.0194 0.74 0.0106 0.46 
t. OCF -0.0081 -0.32 0.0335 1.17 0.0408 1.40 
u. VOL 0.0032 0.44 0.0103 0.87 0.0155 1.38 
v. CHGINC -0.0015 -1.65* 0.0010 1.12 0.0007 0.81 
w. CHGCAPX -0.0009 -0.53 -0.0011 -0.73 -0.0041 -0.72 
x. CHGREV 0.0018 0.45 0.0010 0.19 -0.0025 -0.47 
y. INTAN -0.0083 -0.42 -0.0047 -0.18 -0.0132 -0.46 
z. XRD 0.0665 0.70 -0.0276 -0.37 0.0320 0.55 
aa. CAPX 0.0164 0.57 -0.0011 -0.73 -0.0176 -0.54 
Proxy Circular       
bb. EXBRD   0.0095 0.34 -0.0214 -0.77 
cc. OPT   0.0281 0.58 0.0282 0.62 
dd. INMONEY   -0.1364 -0.63 -0.0144 -0.08 
ee. INSIDER   0.0062 0.25 0.0127 0.59 
 
*** denotes significance at the 0.01 level, ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level and * denotes 




Summary of Results from Market Reaction Return Explanatory Models 
 
 
This table reports significant coefficients from Tables 18 to 23.   Panel A summarizes the returns results for all 
announcers.    Panel B summarizes the returns results for repeat announcers.  Blank cells represent statistically 
insignificant coefficients.    Variables not included in a model are denoted n/a. 
 
The dependent variable, CAR, is cumulative abnormal returns determined using the market model 
(equally weighted index) over the window (-1,+1) relative to the announcement date.     Market model 
parameters are estimated using a minimum of 60 and a maximum of 200 days of returns split equally 
between the period ending 31 days before and commencing 31 days after the event day.    
ATHRHO is the hyperbolic arctangent of the probability from the probit model and is used to control for sample 
selection in the Heckman models (Tables 25 and 26).   Independent variables are defined as follows.  P1 is the 
predicted value from probit model 1.   CUV=1 if announcement states current undervaluation as a reason for the 
repurchase program, 0 otherwise.  FUV=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated in case 
of future undervaluation, 0 otherwise.  LIQ=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being put in place 
to improve liquidity, 0 otherwise.  INMONEY= Total intrinsic value of options held by insiders per the most recent 
proxy circular prior to the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year 
preceding the announcement.  INSIDER= Total shares held by senior officers and directors per the most 
recent proxy circular preceding the announcement date divided by total outstanding shares at the end of 
the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  REP= Percentage of announced shares 
actually repurchased during the most recent repurchase program that was completed no more than three years prior 
to the current announcement.  CARJB= Abnormal returns determined using the market model during the twenty 
eight days prior to the announcement window.  CASH= Total cash as a percentage of total assets at the end of 
the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  INTAN= Total intangible assets as a 
percentage of total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   XRD= 
Research and development expenses as a percentage of total sales during the most recently reported fiscal year prior 
to the announcement.   VOL= Total share volume during the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the 
announcement divided by total shares outstanding at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year 
preceding the announcement.   MBOOK= Market value of equity divided by book value of equity at the end of 
the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   CAPX=capital expenditures during the most 
recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently 
reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  SIZE= Natural log of total assets at the end of the most recently 
reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.  CGCINC= Percentage change in annual earnings during the two 
most recently reported fiscal years preceding the announcement.   CHGREV= Percentage change in annual sales 
during the two most recently reported fiscal years preceding the announcement.   CHGCAPX= Percentage change in 




Table 24 (continued) 
Summary of Results from Market Reaction Return Explanatory Models 
 
 
Panel A Market Return Models: All Announcers 
 














N 1747 1023 516 458 897 447 417 
R2 0.0238  0.0415 0.0771 0.0730 0.0455 0.0908 0.0906 
        
NCIB3 -0.013*** -0.005***  -0.0046*    
P1 n/a n/a n/a n/a -0.0245***   
ATHRHO n/a n/a n/a n/a    
CARJB   .0428*   0.0489*  
CUV 0.0113***       
FUV  -0.0077* -0.0138** -0.0129*  -0.0159** -0.0142** 
CASH n/a   0.0301*     0.0306 
CHGINC n/a   0.0000*** 0.0001*** 0.0322** 0.0000*** 0.0000 
CHGREV n/a   0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***  0.0014 
CHGCAPX n/a  -0.00067*  -0.0007**   
XRD n/a     -0.0125** -0.0013** 
INTAN      -0.0395*  
CAPX n/a       
INMONEY n/a n/a -0.0871* -0.0736*    
INSIDER n/a n/a  0.0001***    
 






N 886 446 393 
    
NCIB3 n/a n/a n/a 
P1 n/a n/a n/a 
ATHRHO 0.1427***   
CARJB  0.0487*  
CUV    
FUV  -0.0161** -0.0152** 
CASH 0.0332**   
CHGINC  0.0011** 0.0016** 
CHGREV 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.0000** 
CHGCAPX -0.0007**   
XRD    
CAPX    
INTAN   -0.0469* 
INMONEY n/a -0.0948* -0.0845** 
INSIDER n/a   
 




Table 24 (continued) 
Summary of Results from Market Reaction Return Explanatory Models  
 
Panel B Market Return Models: Repeat Announcers 
 














N 1064 694 356 316 587 300 264 
R2 0.0409 0.0634 0.0994 0.0981 0.1104 0.1087 0.0930 
        
P1 n/a n/a      
ATHRHO n/a n/a n/a n/a    
CARJB 0.0456***   0.0424*  0.0484* 0.0521* 
REP 0.0105**  0.0148*  0.0135** 0.0164*  
CUV 0.0125**       
REPxCUV   -0.0258*   -0.0408**  
REPxLIQ     0.0720**   
MBOOK n/a -0.002***      
CASH n/a 0.0429*      
CHGINC n/a 0.00003* 0.0005***     
INMONEY n/a n/a      
INSIDER n/a n/a 0.00007** 0.0001***    
 






N 586 299 264 
    
P1 n/a n/a n/a 
ATHRHO    
CARJB  0.0478* 0.0521** 
REP 0.0134** 0.0165*  
CUV    
REPxCUV  -0.0407**  
REPxLIQ    
MBOOK    
CASH    
CHGINC -0.0015*   
INMONEY    
INSIDER    
 






Regression Analysis of Market Volume Reaction: All Announcers 
 
This table presents, without the use of selection controls, OLS regression results for all sample firms with the necessary data.   
Model 1 presents the results using the contents of the announcement and returns data.     Model 2 presents the results using the 
contents of the announcement, market data and accounting data.     Model 3 presents the results using the contents of the 
announcement, market data, accounting data and proxy circular data.    Model 4 presents the same results as Model 3 but excludes 
announcements that involved multiple securities or had competing earnings or dividend announcements during the event window.    
T-statistics are calculated using robust clustered standard errors as recommended by Petersen (2008). 
 
The dependent variable, CAV, is cumulative abnormal volume determined using the market model over the window (-1,+1) 
relative to the announcement date.     Market model parameters are estimated using a minimum of 60 and a maximum of 200 days 
of returns split equally between the period ending 31 days before and commencing 31 days after the event day.   Independent 
variables are defined as follows.  NCIB3= number of repurchase programs in the three fiscal years preceding the fiscal year of the 
current announcement.  CUV=1 if announcement states current undervaluation as a reason for the repurchase program, 0 
otherwise.  FUV=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated in case of future undervaluation, 0 
otherwise.  LIQ=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being put in place to improve liquidity, 0 otherwise.  
GOOD=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is a good use of cash or a good investment, 0 otherwise.  EXCASH=1 
if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated due to excess cash, 0 otherwise.  STOCKP=1 if announcement 
states that repurchase program is being initiated to prevent dilution due to stock options, 0 otherwise.  REMSH=1 if 
announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated to benefit the remaining shareholders or to increase their 
proportionate interest, 0 otherwise.   OPTPER= Number of stock options outstanding divided by total shares outstanding at the 
end of the most recently completed fiscal year preceding the announcement.  INMONEY= Total intrinsic value of options held by 
insiders per the most recent proxy circular prior to the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently 
reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  INSIDER= Total shares held by senior officers and directors per the most 
recent proxy circular preceding the announcement date divided by total outstanding shares at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.  REP= Percentage of announced shares actually repurchased during the most recent 
repurchase program that was completed no more than three years prior to the current announcement.  PPRET= Cumulative 
abnormal returns determined using the market model during the one year period of the most recent prior repurchase program that 
was completed no more than three years prior to the current announcement.  CARJB= Abnormal returns determined using the 
market model during the twenty eight days prior to the announcement window.  EXBRD= Percentage of board members who are 
not officers of the firm per the most recent proxy circular preceding the announcement date.  CASH= Total cash as a percentage 
of total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  OCF= Operating cash flow during 
the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.  INTAN= Total intangible assets as a percentage of total assets at the end of the most 
recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   XRD= Research and development expenses as a percentage of total 
sales during the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   VOL= Total share volume during the most 
recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement divided by total shares outstanding at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.   MBOOK= Market value of equity divided by book value of equity at the end of the 
most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   CAPX=capital expenditures during the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the 
announcement.  SIZE= Natural log of total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.  
CGCINC= Percentage change in annual earnings during the two most recently reported fiscal years preceding the announcement.   
CHGREV= Percentage change in annual sales during the two most recently reported fiscal years preceding the announcement.   




Table 25 (continued) 
Regression Analysis of Market Volume Reaction: All Announcers 
 
















Number of Obs. 1757  1031  514  454  
Number of Firms 613  359  196  183  
R-squared 0.0140  0.0497  0.0660  0.0911  
         
Intercept 0.0287 2.84*** 0.0088 0.45 0.0337 0.54 0.0243 0.36 
         
History:         
a. NCIB3 -0.0134 -1.95* -0.0057 -1.89* -0.0041 -0.69 -0.0071 -2.17** 
Announcement 
Content: 
        
b. CUV -0.0236 -3.83*** -0.0137 -1.76* -0.0047 -0.30 0.0132 0.88 
c. FUV -0.0011 -0.01 0.0035 0.42 0.0180 1.04 0.0007 0.08 
d. GOOD 0.0027 0.44 0.0029 0.44 0.0097 0.80 0.0034 0.40 
e. EXCASH 0.0055 0.39 -0.0103 -0.56 -0.0240 -0.66 -0.0439 -1.59 
f. STOCKP -0.0212 -2.70*** -0.0120 -1.39 -0.0001 -0.06 0.0052 0.38 
g. LIQ -0.0058 -0.82 -0.0049 -0.45 -0.0115 -0.67 -0.0017 -0.11 
h. REMSH -0.0042 -0.67 0.0053 0.72 0.0127 0.81 0.0099 0.14 
i. TARGET 0.0011 1.07 -0.0011 -0.62 -0.0011 -0.41 -0.0011 -0.39 
Market Data         
j. CARJB -0.0230 -1.18 -0.0702 -2.34** -0.0534 -1.31 -0.0296 -0.91 
k. VOL     0.0670 1.55 0.0545 1.20 
Accounting:         
l. SIZE   -0.0003 -0.14 -0.0006 -0.11 0.0039 1.65* 
m. MBOOK   0.0002 0.24 0.0015 1.70* 0.0009 1.76* 
n. CASH   0.0196 0.68 -0.0271 -0.85 -0.0347 -1.31 
o. OCF   -0.0043 -0.22 -0.0177 -0.52 0.0056 0.29 
p. INTAN   0.0402 1.01 0.0643 0.92 0.0042 0.11 
q. XRD   -0.0122 -0.17 -0.0713 -0.48 0.1349 1.35 
r. CAPX   -0.0301 -1.49 -0.0458 -1.25 -0.0242 -1.02 
s. CHGINC   -0.0000 -0.67 0.0001 0.40 0.0000 2.76*** 
t. CHGCAPX   -0.0020 -1.98** -0.0029 -1.44 -0.0011 -0.59 
u. CHGREV   0.0001 2.69*** 0.0000 1.77* 0.0000 0.90 
Proxy Circular         
v. EXBRD     -0.0566 -0.76 -0.0627 -0.72 
w. OPT     0.0433 0.42 -0.0563 -1.17 
x. INMONEY     0.0584 0.51 0.0537 0.54 
y. INSIDER     0.0000 0.39 0.0001 1.88* 
         
 
*** denotes significance at the 0.01 level, ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level and * denotes 




Regression Analysis of Market Volume Reaction: Repeat Announcers Only 
 
This table presents, without the use of selection controls, OLS regression results for all firms with repeat announcements during 
the sample period and the necessary data.  Model 1 presents the results using the contents of the announcement and returns data.     
Model 2 presents the results using the contents of the announcement, market data and accounting data.     Model 3 presents the 
results using the contents of the announcement, market data, accounting data and proxy circular data.    Model 4 presents the same 
results as Model 3 but excludes announcements that involved multiple securities or had competing earnings or dividend 
announcements during the event window.    T-statistics are calculated using robust clustered standard errors as recommended by 
Petersen (2008). 
The dependent variable, CAV, is cumulative abnormal volume determined using the market model over the window (-1,+1) 
relative to the announcement date.     Market model parameters are estimated using a minimum of 60 and a maximum of 200 days 
of returns split equally between the period ending 31 days before and commencing 31 days after the event day.   Independent 
variables are defined as follows.  CUV=1 if announcement states current undervaluation as a reason for the repurchase program, 0 
otherwise.  FUV=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated in case of future undervaluation, 0 
otherwise.  LIQ=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being put in place to improve liquidity, 0 otherwise.  
GOOD=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is a good use of cash or a good investment, 0 otherwise.  EXCASH=1 
if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated due to excess cash, 0 otherwise.  STOCKP=1 if announcement 
states that repurchase program is being initiated to prevent dilution due to stock options, 0 otherwise.  REMSH=1 if 
announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated to benefit the remaining shareholders or to increase their 
proportionate interest, 0 otherwise.   OPTPER= Number of stock options outstanding divided by total shares outstanding at the 
end of the most recently completed fiscal year preceding the announcement.  INMONEY= Total intrinsic value of options held by 
insiders per the most recent proxy circular prior to the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently 
reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  INSIDER= Total shares held by senior officers and directors per the most 
recent proxy circular preceding the announcement date divided by total outstanding shares at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.  REP= Percentage of announced shares actually repurchased during the most recent 
repurchase program that was completed no more than three years prior to the current announcement.  PPRET= Cumulative 
abnormal returns determined using the market model during the one year period of the most recent prior repurchase program that 
was completed no more than three years prior to the current announcement.  CARJB= Abnormal returns determined using the 
market model during the twenty eight days prior to the announcement window.  EXBRD= Percentage of board members who are 
not officers of the firm per the most recent proxy circular preceding the announcement date.  CASH= Total cash as a percentage 
of total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  OCF= Operating cash flow during 
the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.  INTAN= Total intangible assets as a percentage of total assets at the end of the most 
recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   XRD= Research and development expenses as a percentage of total 
sales during the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   VOL= Total share volume during the most 
recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement divided by total shares outstanding at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.   MBOOK= Market value of equity divided by book value of equity at the end of the 
most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   CAPX=capital expenditures during the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the 
announcement.  SIZE= Natural log of total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.  
CGCINC= Percentage change in annual earnings during the two most recently reported fiscal years preceding the announcement.   
CHGREV= Percentage change in annual sales during the two most recently reported fiscal years preceding the announcement.   




Table 26 (continued) 
Regression Analysis of Market Volume Reaction: Repeat Announcers Only 
 
















Number of Obs. 1071  697  354  313  
Number of Firms 355  243  129  122  
R-squared 0.0172  0.0333  0.0594  0.1066  
Intercept 0.0299 1.12 -0.0253 -1.55 -0.0326 -0.80 -0.0654 -2.25** 
Market:         
a. CARJB -0.0184 -0.75 -0.0606 -2.23** -0.0999 -1.80* -0.0397 -1.38 
History         
b. NCIB3 -0.0234 -0.93 -0.0008 -0.22 0.0037 0.38 -0.0049 -1.37 
c. REP -0.0053 -0.76 0.0036 0.31 0.0183 0.81 -0.0032 -0.29 
d. PPRET 0.0015 0.19 -0.0006 -0.05 0.0039 0.19 -0.0052 -0.93 
Announcement 
Content: 
        
e. CUV -0.0279 -3.59 *** -0.0150 -1.88* -0.0100 -0.79 -0.0020 -0.19 
f. FUV -0.0005 -0.04 -0.0012 -0.13 0.0236 0.81 -0.0074 -0.84 
g. GOOD 0.0094 1.45 0.0132 1.90* 0.0192 1.17 0.0069 0.96 
h. EXCASH -0.0071 -0.53 -0.0106 -0.64 0.0001 0.00 -0.0210 -1.30 
i. STOCKP -0.0136 -1.70* -0.0089 -0.92 0.0037 0.20 0.0038 0.27 
j. LIQ 0.0052 0.31 0.0162 0.86 0.0040 0.21 -0.0020 -0.13 
k. REMSH -0.0016 -0.24 0.0008 0.99 0.0223 0.96 0.0114 1.55 
l. TARGET 0.0021 1.71* 0.0012 0.96 0.0019 0.81 0.0019 1.17 
History/Content:         
m. REPXCUV 0.0112 1.27 -0.0030 -0.21 -0.0098 -0.31 0.0115 0.68 
n. REPxFUV -0.0054 -0.36 0.0010 0.06 -0.0136 -0.72 -0.0202 -1.29 
o. REPxLIQ -0.0215 -0.93 -0.0241 -0.72 -0.0047 -0.11 0.0492 1.52 
p. REPxPPRET 0.0033 0.34 0.0089 0.72 0.0090 0.44 0.0068 0.77 
Accounting:         
q. SIZE   0.0035 1.83* -0.0007 -0.10 0.0036 1.36 
r. MBOOK   -0.0011 -1.61 0.0010 0.33 0.0021 1.29 
s. CASH   0.0130 0.64 -0.0106 -033 -0.0081 -0.42 
t. OCF   0.0024 0.07 -0.0583 -0.82 0.0135 0.42 
u. VOL   -0.0054 -0.31 0.0097 0.36 -0.0035 -0.21 
v. CHGINC   0.0000 0.02 -0.0001 -0.32 0.0000 2.32** 
w. CHGCAPX   -0.0047 -1.16 -0.0032 -0.64 0.0021 0.87 
x. CHGREV   0.0000 0.00 -0.0034 -0.41 -0.0022 -0.51 
y. INTAN   0.0361 0.64 0.0928 0.86 -0.0348 -0.99 
z. XRD   0.0844 1.20 0.0457 0.20 0.1921 2.09** 
aa. CAPX   -0.0124 -0.33 -0.0535 -0.66 -0.0491 -1.14 
Proxy Circular         
bb. EXBRD     0.0082 0.20 0.0571 2.29** 
cc. OPT     -0.1564 -1.51 -0.0625 -0.92 
dd. INMONEY     0.0698 0.19 -0.2472 -1.71* 
ee. INSIDER     -0.0000 -0.20 0.0000 1.06 
 
*** denotes significance at the 0.01 level, ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level and * denotes 





Regression Analysis of Market Volume Reaction with  
Probit Model 1 Surprise Control: All Announcers 
 
This table presents OLS regression results for all sample firms with the necessary data.   The market’s level of surprise that the 
announcement is occurring is controlled for by including the predicted value (P1 below) from Probit Model 1.    The results of 
Probit Model 1 are presented in Table 11.      Model 2 presents the results using the contents of the announcement, market data 
and accounting data.     Model 3 presents the results using the contents of the announcement, market data, accounting data and 
proxy circular data.    Model 4 presents the same results as Model 3 but excludes announcements that involved multiple securities 
or had competing earnings or dividend announcements during the event window.    T-statistics are calculated using robust 
clustered standard errors as recommended by Petersen (2008). 
The dependent variable, CAV, is cumulative abnormal volume determined using the market model over the window (-1,+1) 
relative to the announcement date.     Market model parameters are estimated using a minimum of 60 and a maximum of 200 days 
of returns split equally between the period ending 31 days before and commencing 31 days after the event day.   Independent 
variables are defined as follows.  CUV=1 if announcement states current undervaluation as a reason for the repurchase program, 0 
otherwise.  FUV=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated in case of future undervaluation, 0 
otherwise.  LIQ=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being put in place to improve liquidity, 0 otherwise.  
GOOD=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is a good use of cash or a good investment, 0 otherwise.  EXCASH=1 
if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated due to excess cash, 0 otherwise.  STOCKP=1 if announcement 
states that repurchase program is being initiated to prevent dilution due to stock options, 0 otherwise.  REMSH=1 if 
announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated to benefit the remaining shareholders or to increase their 
proportionate interest, 0 otherwise.   OPTPER= Number of stock options outstanding divided by total shares outstanding at the 
end of the most recently completed fiscal year preceding the announcement.  INMONEY= Total intrinsic value of options held by 
insiders per the most recent proxy circular prior to the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently 
reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  INSIDER= Total shares held by senior officers and directors per the most 
recent proxy circular preceding the announcement date divided by total outstanding shares at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.  REP= Percentage of announced shares actually repurchased during the most recent 
repurchase program that was completed no more than three years prior to the current announcement.  PPRET= Cumulative 
abnormal returns determined using the market model during the one year period of the most recent prior repurchase program that 
was completed no more than three years prior to the current announcement.  CARJB= Abnormal returns determined using the 
market model during the twenty eight days prior to the announcement window.  EXBRD= Percentage of board members who are 
not officers of the firm per the most recent proxy circular preceding the announcement date.  CASH= Total cash as a percentage 
of total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  OCF= Operating cash flow during 
the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.   INTAN= Total intangible assets as a percentage of total assets at the end of the most 
recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   XRD= Research and development expenses as a percentage of total 
sales during the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   VOL= Total share volume during the most 
recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement divided by total shares outstanding at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.   MBOOK= Market value of equity divided by book value of equity at the end of the 
most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   CAPX=capital expenditures during the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the 
announcement.  SIZE= Natural log of total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.  
CGCINC= Percentage change in annual earnings during the two most recently reported fiscal years preceding the announcement.   
CHGREV= Percentage change in annual sales during the two most recently reported fiscal years preceding the announcement.   




Table 27 (continued) 
Regression Analysis of Market Volume Reaction with  
Probit Model 1 Surprise Control: All Announcers 
 












       
Number of Obs. 896  458  403  
Number of Firms 321  177  165  
R-squared 0.0621  0.0815  0.0842  
       
Intercept 0.0067 0.31 0.0287 0.42 0.0555 0.79 
       
Surprise Control:       
a. P1 -0.0336 -2.11** -0.0247 -0.80 -0.0156 -0.54 
Announcement Content:       
b. CUV -0.0162 -1.91** -0.0106 -0.68 -0.0029 -0.19 
c. FUV 0.0053 0.59 0.0181 1.01 0.0195 1.04 
d. GOOD 0.0016 0.23 0.0097 0.78 0.0065 0.54 
e. EXCASH -0.0124 -0.66 -0.0312 -0.85 -0.0481 -1.60 
f. STOCKP -0.0116 -1.19 0.0042 0.26 0.0101 0.58 
g. LIQ -0.0068 -0.47 -0.0216 -1.03 -0.0204 -1.02 
h. REMSH 0.0053 0.63 0.0174 0.92 0.0177 0.96 
i. TARGET -0.0011 -0.58 -0.0012 -0.38 -0.0021 -0.67 
Market Data       
j. CARJB -0.0773 -2.39** -0.0744 -1.60 -0.0764 -1.64 
k. VOL 0.0000 1.83* 0.0702 1.53 0.0607 1.27 
Accounting:       
l. SIZE 0.0008 0.29 0.0003 0.06 -0.0019 -0.31 
m. MBOOK 0.0010 1.22 0.0014 1.41 0.0004 0.53 
n. CASH 0.0251 0.81 -0.0177 -0.52 -0.0025 -0.08 
o. OCF 0.0118 0.56 -0.0048 -0.14 -0.0154 -0.52 
p. INTAN 0.0535 1.01 0.0953 0.99 0.1245 1.15 
q. XRD -0.0071 -0.09 0.0004 0.07 -0.0014 -0.25 
r. CAPX -0.0326 -1.48 -0.0028 -1.34 -0.0237 -0.89 
s. CHGINC -0.0000 -4.59*** -0.0002 -0.19 -0.0011 -1.29 
t. CHGCAPX -0.0020 -1.95** -0.0028 -1.34 -0.0047 -1.16 
u. CHGREV 0.0000 2.33** 0.0000 1.34 0.0000 1.07 
Proxy Circular       
v. EXBRD   -0.0593 -0.74 -0.0679 -0.78 
w. OPT   0.0620 0.65 -0.0567 -0.81 
x. INMONEY   0.0556 0.47 0.0344 0.37 
y. INSIDER   -0.0165 -0.62 -0.0255 -1.01 
 





 Table 28 
Regression Analysis of Market Volume Reaction with 
Probit Model 1 Surprise Control: Repeat Announcers Only 
 
This table presents OLS regression results for all firms with repeat announcements during the sample period and the necessary 
data.   The market’s level of surprise that the announcement is occurring is controlled for by including the predicted value (P1 
below) from probit model 1.    The results of probit model 1 are presented in Table 11.      Model 2 presents the results using the 
contents of the announcement, market data and accounting data.     Model 3 presents the results using the contents of the 
announcement, market data, accounting data and proxy circular data.    Model 4 presents the same results as Model 3 but excludes 
announcements that involved multiple securities or had competing earnings or dividend announcements during the event window.       
T-statistics are calculated using robust clustered standard errors as recommended by Petersen (2008). 
 
The dependent variable, CAV, is cumulative abnormal volume determined using the market model over the window (-1,+1) 
relative to the announcement date.     Market model parameters are estimated using a minimum of 60 and a maximum of 200 days 
of returns split equally between the period ending 31 days before and commencing 31 days after the event day.   Independent 
variables are defined as follows.  CUV=1 if announcement states current undervaluation as a reason for the repurchase program, 0 
otherwise.  FUV=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated in case of future undervaluation, 0 
otherwise.  LIQ=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being put in place to improve liquidity, 0 otherwise.  
GOOD=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is a good use of cash or a good investment, 0 otherwise.  EXCASH=1 
if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated due to excess cash, 0 otherwise.  STOCKP=1 if announcement 
states that repurchase program is being initiated to prevent dilution due to stock options, 0 otherwise.  REMSH=1 if 
announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated to benefit the remaining shareholders or to increase their 
proportionate interest, 0 otherwise.   OPTPER= Number of stock options outstanding divided by total shares outstanding at the 
end of the most recently completed fiscal year preceding the announcement.  INMONEY= Total intrinsic value of options held by 
insiders per the most recent proxy circular prior to the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently 
reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  INSIDER= Total shares held by senior officers and directors per the most 
recent proxy circular preceding the announcement date divided by total outstanding shares at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.  REP= Percentage of announced shares actually repurchased during the most recent 
repurchase program that was completed no more than three years prior to the current announcement.  PPRET= Cumulative 
abnormal returns determined using the market model during the one year period of the most recent prior repurchase program that 
was completed no more than three years prior to the current announcement.  CARJB= Abnormal returns determined using the 
market model during the twenty eight days prior to the announcement window.  EXBRD= Percentage of board members who are 
not officers of the firm per the most recent proxy circular preceding the announcement date.  CASH= Total cash as a percentage 
of total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  OCF= Operating cash flow during 
the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.   INTAN= Total intangible assets as a percentage of total assets at the end of the most 
recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   XRD= Research and development expenses as a percentage of total 
sales during the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   VOL= Total share volume during the most 
recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement divided by total shares outstanding at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.   MBOOK= Market value of equity divided by book value of equity at the end of the 
most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   CAPX=capital expenditures during the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the 
announcement.  SIZE= Natural log of total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.  
CGCINC= Percentage change in annual earnings during the two most recently reported fiscal years preceding the announcement.   
CHGREV= Percentage change in annual sales during the two most recently reported fiscal years preceding the announcement.   




Table 28 (continued) 
Regression Analysis of Market Volume Reaction with  
Probit Model 1 Surprise Control: Repeat Announcers Only 
 












Number of Obs. 598  309  273  
Number of Firms 216  114  108  
R-squared 0.0390  0.0845  0.1712  
       
Intercept -0.0220 -1.14 -0.0509 -1.10 -0.0576 -1.82* 
Surprise Control:       
a. P1 0.0008 0.03 0.0273 0.53 -0.0311 -1.56 
Market:       
b. CARJB -0.0681 -2.18** -0.1314 -2.03** -0.0605 -2.01** 
History       
c. REP -0.0019 -0.17 0.0186 0.72 -0.0052 -0.53 
d. PPRET 0.0003 0.03 0.0011 0.04 -0.0102 -1.65 
Announcement Content:       
e. CUV -0.0159 -1.80* -0.0118 -0.75 -0.0071 -0.61 
f. FUV 0.0013 0.13 0.0266 0.94 -0.0061 -0.71 
g. GOOD 0.0094 1.35 0.0163 1.03 0.0054 0.71 
h. EXCASH -0.0174 -1.27 -0.0139 -0.46 -0.0398 -2.62** 
i. STOCKP -0.0082 -0.71 0.0058 0.25 0.0045 0.29 
j. LIQ 0.0254 1.20 -0.0127 -0.46 -0.0247 -1.53 
k. REMSH 0.0064 0.60 0.0248 0.80 0.0104 1.26 
l. TARGET 0.0012 0.83 0.0022 0.68 0.0028 1.72* 
History/Content:       
m. REPxCUV 0.0001 0.01 -0..0109 -0.26 0.0191 1.10 
n. REPxFUV 0.0059 0.33 -0.0144 -0.69 -0.0203 -1.34 
o. REPxLIQ -0.0370 -0.92 0.2194 0.50 0.6186 3.54*** 
p. REPxPPRET 0.0059 0.44 0.0123 0.46 0.0136 1.42 
Accounting:       
q. SIZE 0.0037 1.14 -0.0006 -0.07 0.0057 2.06** 
r. MBOOK -0.0018 -0.68 -0.0006 -0.12 0.0025 0.74 
s. CASH 0.0108 0.47 -0.0271 -0.75 -0.0178 -0.80 
t. OCF 0.0118 0.31 -0.0390 -0.42 0.0355 1.09 
u. VOL -0.0000 -0.41 0.0123 0.43 -0.0043 -0.26 
v. CHGINC -0.0006 -1.46 -0.0013 -1.01 -0.0011 -1.69* 
w. CHGCAPX -0.0051 -1.07 -0.0035 -0.52 0.0034 1.13 
x. CHGREV 0.0015 0.19 -0.0058 -0.47 -0.0077 -1.35 
y. INTAN 0.0485 0.58 0.1367 0.79 -0.0678 -1.36 
z. XRD 0.1356 1.92* 0.1324 0.95 0.1855 4.39*** 
aa. CAPX -0.03334 -0.79 -0.0745 -1.11 -0.0796 -1.80* 
Proxy Circular       
bb. EXBRD   0.0135 0.30 0.0379 1.47 
cc. OPT   -0.1525 -1.12 -0.0008 -0.01 
dd. INMONEY   0.1031 0.28 -0.2756 -1.78* 
ee. INSIDER   0.0099 0.28 0.0006 0.03 
 
*** denotes significance at the 0.01 level, ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level and * denotes 





Market Volume Reaction Analysis using Full Information  
Maximum Likelihood Heckman Model: All Announcers  
 
This table presents Heckman full information maximum likelihood results for all sample firms with the required data.   Selection 
is controlled for by utilizing the Heckman full information maximum likelihood method.    The results of the relevant probit 
models are reported in Table 11.     Model 2 utilizes Probit Model 1 from Table 11 in the first stage and controls for the contents 
of the announcement and accounting data.    Model 3 utilizes Probit Model 2 from Table 11 in the first stage and presents the 
results using the contents of the announcement, market data, accounting data and proxy circular data.    Model 4 presents the same 
results as Model 3 but excludes announcements that involved multiple securities or had competing earnings or dividend 
announcements during the event window.  Z-statistics are calculated using robust clustered standard errors as recommended by 
Petersen (2008). 
 
The dependent variable, CAV, is cumulative abnormal volume determined using the market model and log transformed volume 
over the window (-1,+1) relative to the announcement date.     Market model parameters are estimated using a minimum of 60 
and a maximum of 200 days of returns split equally between the period ending 31 days before and commencing 31 days after the 
event day.   ATHRHO is the hyperbolic arctangent of the probability from the probit model and is used to control for sample 
selection.   Rho is the correlation between the residuals of the repurchase decision model and the market reaction model.  
Independent variables are defined as follows.  CUV=1 if announcement states current undervaluation as a reason for the 
repurchase program, 0 otherwise.  FUV=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated in case of future 
undervaluation, 0 otherwise.  LIQ=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being put in place to improve liquidity, 0 
otherwise.  GOOD=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is a good use of cash or a good investment, 0 otherwise.  
EXCASH=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated due to excess cash, 0 otherwise.  STOCKP=1 if 
announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated to prevent dilution due to stock options, 0 otherwise.  REMSH=1 
if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated to benefit the remaining shareholders or to increase their 
proportionate interest, 0 otherwise.   OPTPER= Number of stock options outstanding divided by total shares outstanding at the 
end of the most recently completed fiscal year preceding the announcement.  INMONEY= Total intrinsic value of options held by 
insiders per the most recent proxy circular prior to the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently 
reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  INSIDER= Total shares held by senior officers and directors per the most 
recent proxy circular preceding the announcement date divided by total outstanding shares at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.  REP= Percentage of announced shares actually repurchased during the most recent 
repurchase program that was completed no more than three years prior to the current announcement.  PPRET= Cumulative 
abnormal returns determined using the market model during the one year period of the most recent prior repurchase program that 
was completed no more than three years prior to the current announcement.  CARJB= Abnormal returns determined using the 
market model during the twenty eight days prior to the announcement window.  EXBRD= Percentage of board members who are 
not officers of the firm per the most recent proxy circular preceding the announcement date.  CASH= Total cash as a percentage 
of total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  OCF= Operating cash flow during 
the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.   INTAN= Total intangible assets as a percentage of total assets at the end of the most 
recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   XRD= Research and development expenses as a percentage of total 
sales during the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   VOL= Total share volume during the most 
recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement divided by total shares outstanding at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.   MBOOK= Market value of equity divided by book value of equity at the end of the 
most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   CAPX=capital expenditures during the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the 
announcement.  SIZE= Natural log of total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.  
CGCINC= Percentage change in annual earnings during the two most recently reported fiscal years preceding the announcement.   
CHGREV= Percentage change in annual sales during the two most recently reported fiscal years preceding the announcement.   





Table 29 (continued) 
Market Volume Reaction Analysis using Full Information  
Maximum Likelihood Heckman Model: All Announcers   
 












       
Number of Obs. 895  446  391  
Number of Firms 321  173  160  
       
Intercept -0.0400 -1.43 -0.0074 -0.09 -0.0145 -0.18 
       
Sample Selection Control:       
a. ATHRHO 0.1894 1.88* 0.1241 0.67 0.2328 1.61 
b. Rho 0.1872  0.1235  0.2287  
Announcement Content:       
c. CUV -0.0172 -1.94* -0.0119 -0.75 0.0079 0.52 
d. FUV 0.0050 0.55 0.0181 1.01 0.0004 0.04 
e. GOOD 0.0025 0.35 0.0098 0.85 0.0039 0.42 
f. EXCASH -0.0120 -0.65 -0.0292 -0.82 -0.0537 -2.04** 
g. STOCKP -0.0110 -1.14 0.0050 0.31 0.0124 0.87 
h. LIQ -0.0064 -0.43 -0.0226 -1.04 -0.0082 -0.40 
i. REMSH 0.0058 0.68 0.0181 1.00 0.0048 0.66 
j. TARGET -0.0011 -0.57 -0.0012 -0.38 -0.0010 -0.32 
Market Data       
k. CARJB -0.0750 -2.32** -0.0722 -1.59 -0.0493 -1.38 
l. VOL 0.0554 1.80* 0.0697 1.55 0.0583 1.24 
Accounting:       
m. SIZE 0.0020 0.65 0.0011 0.15 0.0054 1.66* 
n. MBOOK 0.0009 1.16 0.0015 1.49 0.0008 1.45 
o. CASH 0.0234 0.78 -0.0111 -0.33 -0.0215 -0.77 
p. OCF 0.0156 0.73 -0.0043 -0.12 0.0144 0.68 
q. INTAN 0.0506 0.97 0.0970 1.03 0.0114 0.23 
r. XRD -0.0004 -0.01 -0.0484 -0.32 0.1846 1.74* 
s. CAPX -0.0338 -1.45 -0.0294 -0.81 -0.0069 -0.30 
t. CHGINC -0.0001 -4.85*** -0.0003 -0.22 -0.0010 -1.37 
u. CHGCAPX -0.0020 -2.06** -0.0027 -1.25 -0.0000 -0.01 
v. CHGREV 0.0000 2.43** 0.0000 1.27 -0.0000 -0.17 
Proxy Circular       
w. EXBRD   -0.0608 -0.79 -0.0814 -0.91 
x. OPT   0.0675 0.72 -0.0182 -0.33 
y. INMONEY   0.0529 0.46 0.0536 0.51 
z. INSIDER   -0.0156 -0.61 -0.0291 -1.24 
 
 
*** denotes significance at the 0.01 level, ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level and * denotes 





Market Volume Reaction Analysis using Full Information  
Maximum Likelihood Heckman Model: Repeat Announcers Only 
 
This table presents Heckman full information maximum likelihood results for all firms with repeat announcements during the 
sample period and the required data.   Selection is controlled for by utilizing the Heckman full information maximum likelihood 
method.    The results of the relevant probit models are reported in Table 11.     Model 2 utilizes Probit Model 1 from Table 11 in 
the first stage and controls for the contents of the announcement and accounting data.    Model 3 utilizes Probit Model 2 from 
Table 11 in the first stage and presents the results using the contents of the announcement, market data, accounting data and 
proxy circular data.    Model 4 presents the same results as Model 3 but excludes announcements that involved multiple securities 
or had competing earnings or dividend announcements during the event window.  Z-statistics are calculated using robust clustered 
standard errors as recommended by Petersen (2008). 
 
The dependent variable, CAV, is cumulative abnormal volume determined using the market model and log transformed returns 
over the window (-1,+1) relative to the announcement date.     Market model parameters are estimated using a minimum of 60 
and a maximum of 200 days of returns split equally between the period ending 31 days before and commencing 31 days after the 
event day.   ATHRHO is the hyperbolic arctangent of the probability from the probit model and is used to control for sample 
selection.   Rho is the correlation between the residuals of the repurchase decision model and the market reaction model.  
Independent variables are defined as follows.  CUV=1 if announcement states current undervaluation as a reason for the 
repurchase program, 0 otherwise.  FUV=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated in case of future 
undervaluation, 0 otherwise.  LIQ=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being put in place to improve liquidity, 0 
otherwise.  GOOD=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is a good use of cash or a good investment, 0 otherwise.  
EXCASH=1 if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated due to excess cash, 0 otherwise.  STOCKP=1 if 
announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated to prevent dilution due to stock options, 0 otherwise.  REMSH=1 
if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated to benefit the remaining shareholders or to increase their 
proportionate interest, 0 otherwise.   OPTPER= Number of stock options outstanding divided by total shares outstanding at the 
end of the most recently completed fiscal year preceding the announcement.  INMONEY= Total intrinsic value of options held by 
insiders per the most recent proxy circular prior to the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently 
reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  INSIDER= Total shares held by senior officers and directors per the most 
recent proxy circular preceding the announcement date divided by total outstanding shares at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.  REP= Percentage of announced shares actually repurchased during the most recent 
repurchase program that was completed no more than three years prior to the current announcement.  PPRET= Cumulative 
abnormal returns determined using the market model during the one year period of the most recent prior repurchase program that 
was completed no more than three years prior to the current announcement.  CARJB= Abnormal returns determined using the 
market model during the twenty eight days prior to the announcement window.  EXBRD= Percentage of board members who are 
not officers of the firm per the most recent proxy circular preceding the announcement date.  CASH= Total cash as a percentage 
of total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  OCF= Operating cash flow during 
the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.  INTAN= Total intangible assets as a percentage of total assets at the end of the most 
recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   XRD= Research and development expenses as a percentage of total 
sales during the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   VOL= Total share volume during the most 
recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement divided by total shares outstanding at the end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.   MBOOK= Market value of equity divided by book value of equity at the end of the 
most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   CAPX=capital expenditures during the most recently reported 
fiscal year preceding the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the 
announcement.  SIZE= Natural log of total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.  
CGCINC= Percentage change in annual earnings during the two most recently reported fiscal years preceding the announcement.   
CHGREV= Percentage change in annual sales during the two most recently reported fiscal years preceding the announcement.   





Table 30 (continued) 
Market Volume Reaction Analysis using Full Information  
Maximum Likelihood Heckman Model: Repeat Announcers Only  
 












Number of Observations 590  299  263  
Number of Firms 218  112  105  
       
Intercept -0.0217 -0.76 -0.0237 -0.38 -0.0948 -3.53*** 
       
Sample Selection Control:       
a. ATHRHO -0.0037 -0.04 -0.0792 -0.74 0.2229 1.39 
b. Rho -0.0036  -0.0790    
Market:       
c. CARJB -0.0685 -2.26** -0.1297 -2.09** -0.0572 -2.04** 
History       
d. REP -0.0018 -0.17 0.0185 0.76 -0.0057 -0.60 
e. PPRET 0.0003 0.02 0.0009 0.04 -0.0107 -1.77* 
Announcement Content:       
f. CUV -0.0155 -1.77* -0.0113 -0.79 -0.0070 -0.62 
g. FUV 0.0015 0.15 0.0262 0.97 -0.0070 -0.84 
h. GOOD 0.0093 1.36 0.0158 1.04 0.0053 0.75 
i. EXCASH -0.0171 -1.28 -0.0079 -0.28 -0.0344 -2.30** 
j. STOCKP -0.0080 -0.71 0.0067 0.31 0.0051 0.35 
k. LIQ 0.0253 1.22 -0.0128 -0.47 -0.0243 -1.51 
l. REMSH 0.0064 0.61 0.0267 0.93 0.0121 1.55 
m. TARGET 0.0012 0.87 0.0021 0.70 0.0027 1.71 
History/Content:       
n. REPxCUV -0.0000 -0.01 -0.0017 -0.30 0.0184 1.14 
o. REPxFUV 0.0057 0.33 -0.0143 -0.73 -0.0192 -1.32 
p. REPxLIQ -0.0370 -0.94 0.2089 0.49 0.6185 3.63*** 
q. REPxPPRET 0.0060 0.45 0.0119 0.49 0.0132 1.43 
Accounting:       
r. SIZE 0.0037 1.16 -0.0009 -0.10 0.0060 2.14** 
s. MBOOK -0.0018 -0.69 -0.0007 -0.14 0.0020 0.64 
t. CASH 0.0097 0.43 -0.0155 -0.47 -0.0072 -0.37 
u. OCF 0.0122 0.33 -0.0424 -0.49 0.0330 1.08 
v. VOL -0.0075 -0.41 0.0118 0.45 -0.0016 -0.11 
w. CHGINC -0.0005 -1.50 -0.0013 -1.04 -0.0012 -1.87* 
x. CHGCAPX -0.0051 -1.08 -0.0037 -0.58 0.0033 1.15 
y. CHGREV 0.0016 0.21 -0.0054 -0.46 -0.0705 -1.49 
z. INTAN 0.0491 0.58 0.1419 0.85 -0.0705 -1.49 
aa. XRD 0.1352 1.89* 0.1132 0.47 0.2635 2.72*** 
bb. CAPX -0.0335 0.79 -0.0705 -1.09 -0.0747 -1.76* 
Proxy Circular       
cc. EXBRD   0.0158 0.37 0.0401 1.60 
dd. OPT   -0.1564 -1.35 -0.0199 -0.31 
ee. INMONEY   0.0899 0.26 -0.2902 -1.91* 
ff. INSIDER   0.0141 0.41 0.0033 0.15 
 
*** denotes significance at the 0.01 level, ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level and * denotes 





Summary of Results from Market Volume Reaction Explanatory Models 
 
The following table presents the significant coefficients from Tables 28 to 35.   Panel A summarizes the volume results for all 
announcers.    Panel B summarizes the volume results for repeat announcers.  Blank cells represent statistically insignificant 
coefficients.    Variables not included in a model are denoted n/a. 
 
The dependent variable, CAV, is cumulative abnormal volume determined using the market model and log transformed firm and 
exchange volume over the window (-1,+1) relative to the announcement date.     Market model parameters are estimated using a 
minimum of 60 and a maximum of 200 days of returns split equally between the period ending 31 days before and commencing 
31 days after the event day.    
Independent variables are defined as follows.  P1 is the predicted value from probit model 1.   ATHRHO is the hyperbolic 
arctangent of the probability from the probit model and is used to control for sample selection in the Heckman models (Tables 
29and 30).   CUV=1 if announcement states current undervaluation as a reason for the repurchase program, 0 otherwise.  FUV=1 
if announcement states that repurchase program is being initiated in case of future undervaluation, 0 otherwise.  LIQ=1 if 
announcement states that repurchase program is being put in place to improve liquidity, 0 otherwise.  GOOD=1 if announcement 
states that repurchase program is a good use of cash or a good investment, 0 otherwise.  EXCASH=1 if announcement states that 
repurchase program is being initiated due to excess cash, 0 otherwise.  STOCKP=1 if announcement states that repurchase 
program is being initiated to prevent dilution due to stock options, 0 otherwise.  REMSH=1 if announcement states that 
repurchase program is being initiated to benefit the remaining shareholders or to increase their proportionate interest, 0 otherwise.   
OPTPER= Number of stock options outstanding divided by total shares outstanding at the end of the most recently completed 
fiscal year preceding the announcement.  INMONEY= Total intrinsic value of options held by insiders per the most recent proxy 
circular prior to the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the 
announcement.  INSIDER= Total shares held by senior officers and directors per the most recent proxy circular preceding the 
announcement date divided by total outstanding shares at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the 
announcement.  REP= Percentage of announced shares actually repurchased during the most recent repurchase program that was 
completed no more than three years prior to the current announcement.  PPRET= Cumulative abnormal returns determined using 
the market model during the one year period of the most recent prior repurchase program that was completed no more than three 
years prior to the current announcement.  CARJB= Abnormal returns determined using the market model during the twenty eight 
days prior to the announcement window.  EXBRD= Percentage of board members who are not officers of the firm per the most 
recent proxy circular preceding the announcement date.  CASH= Total cash as a percentage of total assets at the end of the most 
recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  OCF= Operating cash flow during the most recently reported fiscal 
year preceding the announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the 
announcement.  INTAN= Total intangible assets as a percentage of total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year 
prior to the announcement.   XRD= Research and development expenses as a percentage of total sales during the most recently 
reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.   VOL= Total share volume during the most recently reported fiscal year prior to 
the announcement divided by total shares outstanding at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the 
announcement.   MBOOK= Market value of equity divided by book value of equity at the end of the most recently reported fiscal 
year prior to the announcement.   CAPX=capital expenditures during the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the 
announcement divided by total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year preceding the announcement.  SIZE= 
Natural log of total assets at the end of the most recently reported fiscal year prior to the announcement.  CGCINC= Percentage 
change in annual earnings during the two most recently reported fiscal years preceding the announcement.   CHGREV= 
Percentage change in annual sales during the two most recently reported fiscal years preceding the announcement.   CHGCAPX= 




Table 31 (continued) 
Summary of Results of Announcement Volume Explanatory Models 
 
Panel A: Market Volume Models, All Announcers 
 














N 1757 1031 514 454 896 458 403 
R2 0.0140 0.0497 0.0660 0.0911 0.0621 0.0815 0.0842 
        
NCIB3 -0.0134* -0.0137*  -0.0071**    
P1 n/a n/a n/a n/a -0.0336**   
ATHRHO n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
CARJB        
CUV -0.0236*** -0.0137*   -0.0336**   
FUV        
STOCKP -0.0212***       
EXCASH        
CARJB  -0.0702**   -0.0773**   
MBOOK   0.0015* 0.0009*    
VOL     0.0000*   
SIZE        
CASH        
CHGINC    0.0000*** -0.0005***   
CHGREV  -0.0001*** 0.0000*  0.0000**   
CHGCAPX  -0.0020**   -0.0020**   
XRD        
CAPX        
INMONEY        
INSIDER    0.0001*    
 






N 895 446 391 
    
NCIB3    
ATHRHO 0.1894*   
CARJB -0.0750**   
CUV -0.0172*   
FUV    
EXCASH   -0.0537** 
REMSH    
SIZE   0.0054* 
CASH    
CHGINC -0.0001**   
CHGREV 0.0000**   
CHGCAPX -0.0020**   
XRD   0.1846* 
CAPX    
INMONEY    
INSIDER    
 




Table 31 (continued) 
Summary of Results of Announcement Volume Explanatory Models 
 
Panel B: Market Volume Models, Repeat Announcers 
 














N 1071 69 354 313 598 309 273 
R2 0.0172 0.0333 0.0594 0.1066 0.0390 0.0845 0.1712 
        
P1 n/a n/a n/a n/a    
ATHRHO n/a n/a n/a n/a    
CARJB  -0.0606** -0.0999*  -0.0681** -0.1314** -0.0605** 
REP        
CUV -0.0279*** -0.0150*   -0.0159*   
STOCKP -0.0136*       
EXCASH       -0.0398** 
REMSH        
GOOD*  0.0132*      
REPxCUV        
REPxLIQ       0.6186* 
TARGET* 0.0021*      0.0028* 
SIZE*  0.0035*     0.0057** 
MBOOK        
XRD*    0.1921** 0.1356*  0.1855*** 
CASH        
CAPX       -0.0796* 
CHGINC    0.0000**   -0.0011* 
EXBRD*    0.0571**    
INMONEY    -0.2740*    
INSIDER        
 






N 590 299 263 
    
P1 n/a n/a n/a 
ATHRHO    
CARJB -0.0685** -0.1297* -0.0572** 
REP    
CUV -0.0155*   
EXCASH   -0.0344** 
LIQ*    
REPxCUV    
REPxLIQ   0.6185*** 
PPRET   -0.0107* 
TARGET    
MBOOK    
SIZE   0.0060** 
XRD 0.1352*  0.2635*** 
CASH    
CAPX   -0.0747* 
CHGINC   -0.0012* 
INMONEY   -0.2902* 
INSIDER    
 







Daily Abnormal Return by Day Relative to Announcement Date: 
Announcing Firms 
 
This table presents abnormal returns during the period prior to and after TSX NCIB repurchase 
announcements (day 0).   Abnormal returns are determined using the primary measure of CAR described 







Daily Abnormal Volume by Day Relative to Announcement Date: 
Announcing Firms 
 
This table presents abnormal volume during the period prior to and after TSX NCIB repurchase 
announcements (day 0).   Abnormal volume is determined using the primary measure of CAV described 
in Table 10.    
 




Model of the Market Reaction to Repurchase Announcements 
 
The market reaction to a repurchase announcement, measured using cumulative abnormal returns and 
volume changes over the announcement period, is a function of the amount of new information in the 
announcement, the contents of the announcement and the credibility of the announcement. 
 
Amount of Aew Information 
1. Surprise level of announcement.  Dependant on the market’s expected probability of an 
announcement based on the following ex-ante information: 
a. First-time or repeat announcer. 
b. Dividend level. 
c. Liquidity. 
d. Cash flow. 
e. Corporate governance. 
f. Information asymmetry. 
 
Contents of Announcement 
 
1.    Size of repurchase program being announced. 
2.    Reasons for the repurchase. 
 
Credibility of Information 
1. Management incentives (stock options, shares). 
2. Management credibility (past repurchase program follow-through rate, returns over last 
repurchase period). 
3. Corporate governance (board composition). 
4. Plausibility of announcement information being real good news (cash is available to fund the 













Authority Policy 6-501 of the TSX Manual governs 
Normal Course Issuer Bids 
 
No specific statutory rules relating to 
repurchases 
Firms fall under SEC Reg. 10b-18, a safe 
harbour provision for share purchases 
Authorization Firms must obtain authorization from the 
TSX to commence a normal course issuer bid 
No requirement for authorization 
 
Size Limitation Annual repurchases are limited to the greater 
of 5% of total shares outstanding or 10% of 
the public float 
No more than 2% of total outstanding shares 
in a month 
No specific limitations 
Reg. 10b-18 provides safe harbour if a firm 
does not exceed certain limits with respect to 
price, volume and time of day 
Announcement 
disclosure 
Press release announcing program mandatory 
Specific announcement requirements as per 
Appendix 2 – includes requirement (item 6) 
to disclose reason(s) for repurchasing 
No requirement to announce start of 
repurchase program although most firms 
choose to do so16 




Requirement to disclose shares repurchased 
in last twelve months as part of 
announcement press release 
Requirement to report shares repurchased 
each month once program started – published 
in the TSX Daily Record 
No requirements to disclose shares 
repurchased except in the normal course of 
preparing interim and annual financial 
statements 




Limited to a maximum of twelve months at 
which time authorization must be re-obtained 
No specific program duration.  Can range 
from short (several months) to long (several 
years or no fixed duration) 
                                                     
14 Source: Toronto Stock Exchange requirements for normal course issuer bids are contained in Policy 6-501 of the 
TSE Manual. 
15 Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen. 2000.  Stock Repurchases in Canada: Performance and Strategic Trading, 
The Journal of Finance (Vol.55, No.6), p.2377.  
16 Oded, J.  2005.  Why Do Firms Announce Open-Market Repurchase Programs.  The Review of Financial Studies 
(Vol.18, No.1), p.271. 
17 E. Lie.   2005.  Operating Performance Following Open Market Share Repurchase Announcements.  Journal of 




TSE Company Manual Disclosure Requirements for Open Market Share Repurchases 
 
 
Source: TSE Company Manual, Appendix F 
 
CONTENTS OF NOTICE — A notice shall provide the information set out below in the following 
form: 
 
Item 1   Name of Issuer 
Item 2 Shares Sought — State the class and maximum number (or percentage) of shares that may 
be acquired. Also state the percentage of shares outstanding or the public float, as the case 
may be, that the bid is for. Where the issuer has established a specific number of shares to 
be acquired, state the number of shares sought. A notice may relate to the acquisition of 
more than one class of shares of an issuer provided the bid for each class of shares 
qualifies as a normal course issuer bid. For example, an issuer with common shares and 
convertible preferred shares outstanding may wish to purchase up to 5% of each class 
over a 12 month period. 
Item 3  Duration — State the dates on which the normal course issuer bid will commence and 
terminate.  The normal course issuer bid may not extend for a period of more than one 
year from the date on which purchases may commence. 
Item 4  Method of Acquisition — Indicate clearly that purchases will be effected through the 
facilities of the Exchange and identify any other exchanges on which purchases will be 
made. State that purchase and payment for the shares will be made by the issuer in 
accordance with the requirements of the Exchange and that the price that the issuer will 
pay for any shares acquired by it will be the market pr ice of the shares at the time of 
acquisition.  In addition, indicate whether purchases (other than by way of exempt offer) 
will be made other than by means of open market transactions during the period the 
normal course issuer bid is outstanding. 
Item 5  Consideration Offered — Indicate any restrictions on the price the offeror is prepared to 
pay and any other restrictions relating to the issuer bid, such as specific funds available, 
method of purchasing, etc. 
Item 6  Reasons for the Normal Course Issuer Bid — State the purpose or the business reasons 
for normal course issuer bid. 
Item 7  Valuation — Include a summary of any appraisal or valuation of the issuer known to the 
directors or officers of the issuer after reasonable enquiry regarding the issuer, its 




Appendix 3 (continued) 
TSE Company Manual Disclosure Requirements for Open Market Share Repurchases 
 
 notice, together with a statement of a reasonable time and place at which such appraisal 
or valuation, or a copy thereof, may be inspected. For the purpose of this Item 7, the 
phrase ‘‘appraisal or valuation’’ means both an independent appraisal or valuation and a 
material non-independent appraisal or valuation. 
Item 8  Previous Purchases — Where the issuer has purchased shares which are the subject of the 
normal course issuer bid within the past 12 months, state the method of acquisition, the 
number of shares purchased and the average price paid. 
Item 9  Persons Acting Jointly or In Concert with the Issuer — Disclose the identity of any party 
acting jointly or in concert with the issuer. 
Item 10  Acceptance by Insiders, Affiliates and Associates — State the name of every director or 
senior officer of the company who intends to sell shares of the issuer during the course of 
the normal course issuer bid and where their intention is known after reasonable enquiry, 
the name of every: 
(a) associate of a director or senior officer of the company; 
(b) person acting jointly or in concert with the company; or 
(c) person holding 10% or more of any class of equity securities of the company, who 
intends to sell shares. 
Item 11  Benefits from the Normal Course Issuer Bid — State direct or indirect benefits to any of 
the persons or companies named in item 10 of selling or not selling shares of the issuer 
during the course of the normal course issuer bid. An answer to this item is not required 
where the benefits to such company of selling or not selling shares are the same as the 
benefits to any other shareholder who sells or does not sell. 
Item 12  Material Changes in the Affairs of the Issuer Company — Disclose any previously 
undisclosed material changes or plans or proposals for material changes in the affairs of 
the issuer. 
Item 13  Certificate — The notice shall be certified complete and accurate and in compliance with 
Part 6 of the Rules and Policies of the Exchange by a director or senior officer of the 
issuer duly authorized by the issuer ’s board of directors. The certificate shall include a 
statement to the effect that the notice contains no untrue statement of a material fact and 
does not omit to state a material fact that is required to be stated or that is necessary to 





Sample Repurchase Announcement 
 
Copyright 2002 Business Wire, Inc.   
Business Wire 
 
December 19, 2002, Thursday 
 
DISTRIBUTIOA: Business Editors 
 
LEAGTH: 377 words 
 
HEADLIAE: Polyair Inter Pack Inc.: Press Release 
 




Polyair Inter Pack Inc. (AMEX:PPK) (TSX:PPK) announced today that the Toronto Stock Exchange 
has accepted a notice filed by the Company of its intention to make normal course issuer bids. 
 
The notice provides that the Company may, during the 12-month period commencing December 20, 
2002 and ending December 19, 2003, purchase on the Toronto Stock Exchange up to 305,165 common 
shares in total, or 5% of the outstanding common shares. The price that the Company will pay for any 
such shares will be the market price at the time of acquisition. The actual number of common shares that 
may be purchased and the timing of any such purchases will be determined by the Company. The 
Company intends to cancel the common shares purchased pursuant to the normal course issuer bid. As 
of December 10, 2002, there are 6,103,300 common shares of the Company outstanding.  
 
During the twelve months ending December 19, 2002, the Corporation acquired 120,000 common shares 
of the Corporation at an average price of $8.25 per share, excluding commissions, pursuant to a normal 
course issuer bid through the facilities of the Toronto Stock Exchange. 
 
The Company believes that the common shares have been trading in a price range that may not 
adequately reflect their value in relation to the Company’s future business prospects. As a result, 




Appendix 4 (continued) 
Sample Repurchase Announcement 
 
common shares may represent an attractive investment to the Company and a desirable use of a portion 
of its available funds. 
 
Polyair Inter Pack Inc. (www.polyair.com and www.cantar.com), through its Polyair Division, 
manufactures protective packaging; through its Cantar Pool division the Company manufactures 
swimming pool accessory products are sold through a network of some 2,500 distributors across North 
America. Polyair operates ten manufacturing facilities, seven of which are based in the United States 
where the Company generated approximately 85% of its annual sales. The shares are traded on The 
American Stock Exchange and The Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbol “PPK”.   
 
CONTACT: Polyair Inter Pack Inc. 
John Foglietta, 416/740-2687 









Announcement Prediction Variables 
 





NCIB3 Number of repurchase programs in 
the three fiscal years preceding the 
fiscal year of the current 
announcement. 
Jagannathan and Stephens (2003).       + (P1) 
NCIB1 1 if the firm commenced a 
repurchase program in the fiscal 
year preceding the fiscal year of the 
current announcement, 0 otherwise. 
Jagannathan and Stephens (2003).       + (P1) 
DVPT Dividends as a percentage of total 
income during the most recently 
reported fiscal year preceding the 
announcement.     
Grullon and Michaely (2002). 
Repurchases are increasingly being used 
as a substitute for dividends. 
 
DYIELD Dividends per share during the 
most recently reported fiscal year 
preceding the announcement 
divided by year end market value 
per share as of the most recently 
reported fiscal year preceding the 
announcement. 
To determine if TSX firms are 
substituting repurchases for dividends. 
 
VOL Total share volume during the most 
recently reported fiscal year prior to 
the announcement divided by total 
shares outstanding at the end of the 
most recently reported fiscal year 
preceding the announcement. 
Low liquidity firms have an incentive to 
provide liquidity through repurchases in 
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Announcement Prediction Variables 
 





CASH Total cash as a percentage of total 
assets at the end of the most 
recently reported fiscal year 
preceding the announcement. 
Dittmar (2000).  High cash firms 
have an incentive to make 
payouts to reduce agency costs.  
+ (P2A) 
OCF Operating cash flow during the most 
recently reported fiscal year 
preceding the announcement 
divided by total assets at the end of 
the most recently reported fiscal 
year preceding the announcement. 
Jagannathan, Stephens and 
Weisbach (2000), Dittmar (2000).  
High cash flow firms have an 
incentive to make payouts to 
reduce agency costs. 
+ (P2B) 
CASHCHG Percentage change in opening and 
closing cash during the most 
recently reported fiscal year 
preceding the announcement. 
Guay and Harford (2000).  Firms 
with increases in cash are more 
likely to use repurchases than 
dividends to payout excess cash. 
+ (P2C) 
FCF Operating cash flow less capital 
expenditures during the most 
recently reported fiscal year 
preceding the announcement 
divided by total assets at the end of 
the most recently reported fiscal 
year preceding the announcement. 
Jensen (1986) suggests that firms 
with high free cash flow should 
payout cash to reduce agency 
costs. 
+ (P2) 
INTAN Total intangible assets as a 
percentage of total assets at the end 
of the most recently reported fiscal 
year prior to the announcement. 
Barth and Kasznik (1999) 
conclude that intangible assets are 
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XRD Research and development 
expenses as a percentage of total 
sales during the most recently 
reported fiscal year prior to the 
announcement. 
Huddart and Ke (2007) find that 
research and development expense is 
a good measure of information 
asymmetry based on models of 
informed trading. 
       +     (P3) 
SIZE Natural log of total assets at the 
end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year prior to the 
announcement. 
Dittmar (2000).   Larger firms are 
more likely to announce repurchase 
program as indicated by the 
descriptive statistics contained in 
Table 6. 
        +     (P3) 
CARJB Abnormal returns in the twenty 
eight days prior to the 
announcement window. 
Li and McNally (2007), Dittmar 
(2000).  Firms who have had recent 
stock price drops are more likely to 
be considered undervalued by 
management and hence find 
repurchasing beneficial. 
- (P4) 
MBOOK Market value of equity divided 
by book value of equity at the 
end of the most recently reported 
fiscal year prior to the 
announcement. 
Dittmar (2000) and Li and McNally 
(2007).  Indicative of potential for 
over- or under-valuation. 
- (P4) 
LEV Total debt divided by total assets 
at the end of the most recently 
reported fiscal year prior to the 
announcement. 
Highly leveraged firms have less 
available financial resources to 
commit to repurchases since they 
require their financial resources to 
repay debt. 
         - 
LOWIND 1 if the firm is in industries with 
the following SIC codes: 
1000,1040,1400,2834,2836,3663 
and 7373.   Per Table 8, these 
industries had announcement 
rates of ten percent or less.  
Liano, Huang and Manakyan (2003) 
find industry to be associated with 
announcement returns, which they 
attribute to some industries being 
more or less likely to engage in 
repurchases. 
         - 
HIGHIND 1 if the firm is in industries with 
the following SIC codes: 
6020,6211,6282 and 6512.   Per 
Table 8, these industries had 
announcement rates of thirty 
percent or more. 
Liano, Huang and Manakyan (2003) 
find industry to be associated with 
announcement returns, which they 
attribute to some industries being 
more or less likely to engage in 
repurchases. 





Definition of Returns and Market Reaction Test Statistics 
 
 
Source: Eventus Manual 
 
Market Model Returns18 
Assume that security returns follow a single factor market model, 
Rjt = αj + βjRmt + εjt, 
Where Rjt is the rate of return of the j
th firm on day t;  Rmt is the rate of return of a market index on day t; 
εjt is a random variable that by construction must have an expected value of zero, and is assumed to be 
uncorrelated with Rmt, uncorrelated with Rjt for k≠j, not autocorrelated, and homoskedastic.  βj is a 
parameter that measures the sensitivity of Rjt to the market index.   Define the abnormal return (or 
prediction error) for the common stock of the jth firm on day t as: 
Ajt = Rjt – (
^αj- 
^βjRmt) 
where the coefficients ^αj and 
^βj are ordinary least squares estimates of αj  and βj. 
The average abnormal return (or average prediction error) AARt is the sample mean: 
 N 
 ∑  Ajt  
AARt = j=1   
 N 
Where t is defined in trading days relative to the event date (e.g. t=-60 means 60 trading days before the 
event). 
 
Over an interval of two or more trading days beginning with day T1, and ending with T2, the cumulative 
average abnormal return is 
   N T2 
CAART1,T2 = 1  ∑ ∑  Ajt 
  N  j=1 t=T1 
 
                                                     
18 Cowan, A.  2007.   Eventus Software for Event Studies, Users Guide, p.p.73-74. 
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Definition of Returns and Market Reaction Test Statistics 
 
Buy and Hold Returns19 
 
Over an interval of two or more trading days beginning with day T1, and ending with T2, the buy and 
hold abnormal return is 
      T2                T2 
BHART1,T2 = [ ∏ (1+Rjt)-1] – [(1+ 
^αj)
(T2-T1+1) -1  ]- ^βj [∏(1+Rmt)-1] 
     t=T1                 t=T1 
 
The average compound abnormal return is 
 
ACART1,T2 = 1 ∑ BHARj,T1,T2 




Under the null hypothesis, each Ajt has mean zero and variance σ
2 Ajt.   The maximum likelihood estimate 
of the variance is 
     E2 
s2 Ajt =   s
2 Aj [1 + 1/Mj + ((Rmt-RmEst)
2)/(∑(Rmk-RmEst)
2) 




 ∑        
s2 Aj =  k=E1     A
2
jk  , 
         Mj-2 
 
Rmt is the observed return on the market index for day t, RmEst is the mean market return over the 
estimation period and Mj is the number of non-missing trading day returns in the interval E1 to E2 used to 
estimate the parameters for firm j.    
 
Define the standardized abnormal return (or standardized prediction error) as 
 
SARjt = Ajt/ sAjt 
 
                                                     
19 Cowan, A.  2007.   Eventus Software for Event Studies, Users Guide, p.74. 
20 Cowan, A.  2007.   Eventus Software for Event Studies, Users Guide, p.p.80-82. 
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Under the null hypothesis, each SARjt follows a Student’s t-distribution with Mj -2 degress of freedom.    
Summing the SARjt across the sample, we obtain 
   N 
TSARt = ∑ SARjt 
 j=1 
The expected value of TSARt is zero.   The variance of TSARt is 
 N 
Qt =  ∑   Mj-2 
 j=1     Mj-4 
 
The test statistic for the null hypothesis that CART1,T2=0 is 
 
ZT1,T2 = 1       ∑  Z
j
T1,T2, 
  N1/2 
    T2 
Where ZjT1,T2 =     1/(Q
j
T1,T2)
1/2 ∑ SARjt 
    t=T1 
 
and QjT1,T2 = (T2-T1+1) Mj-2 
   Mj-4 
 
Under cross-sectional independence of the ZjT1,T2 and other conditions (see Patell ,1976),  ZT1,T2 follows 
the standard normal distribution under the null hypothesis. 
 
 
Generalized Sign Test21 
The null hypothesis of the generalized sign test is that the fraction of positive returns in the event window 
is the same as in the estimation period.   The actual test uses the normal approximation to the binomial 
distribution. 
                                                     





Returns and Volume Testing: Primary Explanatory Variables 
 
Variable Definition Rationale/Prior Studies Expected 
coefficient 
CUV 1 if announcement states current 
undervaluation as a reason for the 
repurchase program, 0 otherwise. 
Otchere and Ross (2002) and Li McNally 
(2007) find greater announcement returns for 
firms who offer undervaluation as an 
explanation for their repurchase 
announcements.  
  +    (P6A) 
FUV 1 if announcement states that 
repurchase program is being initiated in 
case of future undervaluation, 0 
otherwise.  
Firm is offering shareholders some downside 
price protection which is valuable.        
  +   (P6B) 
LIQ 1 if announcement states that 
repurchase program is being put in 
place to improve liquidity, 0 otherwise. 
Improving liquidity will reduce the price 
penalty that firms with poor liquidity pay. 
  +   (P6C) 
GOOD 1 if announcement states that 
repurchase program is a good use of 
cash or a good investment, 0 otherwise. 
To determine if the market differentiates 
between explanations other than undervaluation 
when reacting to repurchase announcements. 
  No 
prediction. 
EXCASH 1 if announcement states that 
repurchase program is being initiated 
due to excess cash, 0 otherwise. 
To determine if the market differentiates 
between explanations other than undervaluation 
when reacting to repurchase announcements. 
  No 
prediction. 
STOCKP 1 if announcement states that 
repurchase program is being initiated to 
prevent dilution due to stock options, 0 
otherwise. 
To determine if the market differentiates 
between explanations other than undervaluation 
when reacting to repurchase announcements. 
  No 
prediction. 
REMSH 1 if announcement states that 
repurchase program is being initiated to 
benefit the remaining shareholders or to 
increase their proportionate interest, 0 
otherwise.    
To determine if the market differentiates 
between explanations other than undervaluation 
when reacting to repurchase announcements. 
   No 
prediction. 
OPTPER Number of stock options outstanding 
divided by total shares outstanding at 
the end of the most recently completed 
fiscal year preceding the 
announcement. 
Kahle (2001) finds that the market reaction is 
negatively related to options outstanding.   
Market will not see repurchase announcement 
as credible if management stands to gain from 
an increase in stock prices.   
       -  (H2) 
INMONE
Y 
Total intrinsic value of options held by 
insiders per the most recent proxy 
circular prior to the announcement 
divided by total assets at the end of the 
most recently reported fiscal year 
preceding the announcement. 
Incentive to fool the market is higher when 
options are currently in the money since option 
holder can reap an immediate profit. 




Appendix 7 (continued) 
Returns and Volume Testing: Primary Explanatory Variables 
 
Variable Definition Rationale/Prior Studies Expected 
coefficient 
INSIDER Total shares held by senior officers 
and directors per the most recent 
proxy circular preceding the 
announcement date divided by total 
outstanding shares at the end of the 
most recently reported fiscal year 
preceding the announcement. 
The greater management shareholdings are, the 
more incentive management has to make a 
repurchase announcement to benefit their own 
wealth. 
       -   
(H2) 
REP Percentage of announced shares 
actually repurchased during the most 
recent repurchase program that was 
completed no more than three years 
prior to the current announcement. 
Firms will develop a reputation for either 
following through or not following through on 
their repurchase announcements.  Credibility 
will be increasing in the follow-through rate. 
      +  (H3) 
PPRET Cumulative abnormal returns 
determined using the market model 
during the one year period of the most 
recent prior repurchase program that 
was completed no more than three 
years prior to the current 
announcement. 
If a firm was able to credibly announce good 
news through the past repurchase program, 
returns should be positive.  Negative returns 
indicate that the announcement was not 
followed by increased economic performance. 
       +  (P7) 
CARJB Abnormal returns determined using the 
market model during the twenty eight 
days prior to the announcement 
window.  
Stephens and Weisbach (1998) and Li and 
McNally (2007) find that the market is more 
likely to believe that the firm is undervalued 
where recent returns are negative. 
   -   (P8) 
EXBRD Percentage of board members who 
are not officers of the firm per the 
most recent proxy circular 
preceding the announcement date. 
External board members increase credibility of 
disclosures since management is being 
monitored.  Announcement of repurchase 
program communicates that monitoring is 
working to ensure cash not wasted. 
   +   (P9) 
CASH Total cash as a percentage of total 
assets at the end of the most 
recently reported fiscal year 
preceding the announcement. 
The good news contained in a repurchase 
announcement is more plausible if the firm has 
cash available to purchase its own shares.   
Distributing cash reduces agency costs. 
    +  (P10) 
OCF Operating cash flow during the 
most recently reported fiscal year 
preceding the announcement 
divided by total assets at the end of 
the most recently reported fiscal 
year preceding the announcement. 
High cash flow firms incur agency costs if 
management spends funds on perks or negative 
NPV projects.    Announcement is seen as an 
intention to reduce agency costs. 




Announcement Reaction Control Variables 
 
Variable Definition Rationale/Prior Studies Expected coefficient in 
returns and volume 
regressions 
MBOOK Market to Book Ratio at the end of 
the most recently reported fiscal 
year prior to the announcement. 
Ikenberry, Lakonishok and 
Vermaelen (1995, 2000) 
       - 
TARGET Size of Repurchase Announcement 
as a % of Total Shares Outstanding 
at end of Most Recent Fiscal Year 
Comment and Jarrell (1991)        + 
SIZE Natural log of total assets at the end 
of the most recently reported fiscal 
year prior to the announcement. 
To control for size.     n/a 
CHGINC Percentage change in annual 
earnings during the two most 
recently reported fiscal years 
preceding the announcement. 
Ho, Liu and Ramanan (1997)        + 
CHGREV Percentage change in annual sales 
during the two most recently 
reported fiscal years preceding the 
announcement. 
Ho, Liu and Ramanan (1997)        + 
CHGCAPX Percentage change in annual capital 
expenditures during the two most 
recently reported fiscal years 
preceding the announcement. 
Ho, Liu and Ramanan (1997)        - 
VOL Total share volume during the most 
recently reported fiscal year prior to 
announcement divided by total 
shares outstanding at the end of the 
most recently reported fiscal year 
preceding the announcement. 
To control for differences in 
liquidity. 
    n/a 
 
 
